Content for  TS 33.501  Word version:  19.0.0

5G AKA enhances EPS AKA [10] by providing the home network with proof of successful authentication of the UE from the visited network. The proof is sent by the visited network in an Authentication Confirmation message. The selection of using 5G AKA is described in subclause 6.1.2 of the present document.

The authentication procedure for 5G AKA works as follows, cf. also Figure 6.1.3.2-1: If the authentication was successful, the key KSEAF received in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message shall become the anchor key in the sense of the key hierarchy as specified in subclause 6.2 of the present document. Then the SEAF shall derive the KAMF from the KSEAF, the ABBA parameter and the SUPI according to Annex A.7. The SEAF shall provide the ngKSI and the KAMF to the AMF. If the AUSF indicates that the authentication was successful from the home network point of view, then the AMF shall initiate NAS security mode command procedure (see clause 6.7.2) with the UE, to take the newly generated partial native 5G NAS security context into use. Upon receiving the valid NAS Security Mode Command message from the AMF, the UE shall consider the performed primary authentication as successful. If a SUCI was used for this authentication, then the SEAF shall only provide ngKSI and KAMF to the AMF after it has received the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message containing KSEAF and SUPI; no communication services will be provided to the UE until the SUPI is known to the serving network. The further steps taken by the AUSF after the authentication procedure are described in subclause 6.1.4 of the present document.

This clause describes how RES* verification failure in the SEAF or in the AUSF shall be handled. In step 9 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1, the SEAF shall compute HRES* from RES* according to Annex A.5, and the SEAF shall compare HRES* and HXRES*. If they don't coincide, then the SEAF shall consider the authentication as unsuccessful. The SEAF shall proceed with step 10 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1 and after receiving the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message from the AUSF in step 12 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1, proceed as described below:

• If the AUSF has indicated in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF that the verification of the RES* was not successful in the AUSF, or
• if the verification of the RES* was not successful in the SEAF,

then the SEAF shall either reject the authentication by sending an Authentication Reject to the UE if the SUCI was used by the UE in the initial NAS message or the SEAF/AMF shall initiate an Identification procedure with the UE if the 5G-GUTI was used by the UE in the initial NAS message to retrieve the SUCI and an additional authentication attempt may be initiated. Also, if the SEAF does not receive any Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message from the AUSF as expected, then the SEAF shall either reject the authentication to the UE or initiate an Identification procedure with the UE.

This clause describes synchronisation failure or MAC failure in USIM. In step 7 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1 when 5G AKA is used; or in step 5 in Figure 6.1.3.1-1 when EAP-AKA' is used, at the receipt of the RAND and AUTN, if the verification of the AUTN fails, then the USIM indicates to the ME the reason for failure and in the case of a synchronisation failure passes the AUTS parameter (see TS 33.102) to the ME. If 5G AKA is used: The ME shall respond with NAS message Authentication Failure with a CAUSE value indicating the reason for failure. In case of a synchronisation failure of AUTN (as described in TS 33.102), the UE also includes AUTS that was provided by the USIM. Upon receipt of an authentication failure message, the AMF/SEAF may initiate new authentication towards the UE. (see TS 24.501). If EAP-AKA' is used: The ME shall proceed as described in RFC 4187 and RFC 5448 for EAP-AKA'.

Upon receiving an authentication failure message with synchronisation failure (AUTS) from the UE, the SEAF sends an Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" to the AUSF and the AUSF sends an Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message to the UDM/ARPF, together with the following parameters:

• RAND sent to the UE in the preceding Authentication Request, and
• AUTS received by the SEAF in the response from the UE to that request, as described in subclause 6.1.3.2.0 and subclause 6.1.3.3.1.

An SEAF will not react to unsolicited "synchronisation failure indication" messages from the UE. The SEAF does not send new authentication requests to the UE before having received the response to its Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" from the AUSF (or before it is timed out). When the UDM/ARPF receives an Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" it acts as described in clause 6.3.5 of TS 33.102 where ARPF is mapped to HE/AuC. The UDM/ARPF sends an Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response message with a new authentication vector for either EAP-AKA' or 5G-AKA depending on the authentication method applicable for the user to the AUSF. The AUSF runs a new authentication procedure with the UE according to clause 6.1.3.1 or clause 6.1.3.2 depending on the authentication method applicable for the user.