RFC 9415
On the Generation of Transient Numeric Identifiers
Pages: ~37
IRTF//irtf/draft-irtf-pearg-numeric-ids-generation-12
Informational
On the Generation of Transient Numeric Identifiers
Abstract
This document performs an analysis of the security and privacy implications of different types of "transient numeric identifiers" used in IETF protocols and tries to categorize them based on their interoperability requirements and their associated failure severity when such requirements are not met. Subsequently, it provides advice on possible algorithms that could be employed to satisfy the interoperability requirements of each identifier category while minimizing the negative security and privacy implications, thus providing guidance to protocol designers and protocol implementers. Finally, it describes a number of algorithms that have been employed in real implementations to generate transient numeric identifiers and analyzes their security and privacy properties. This document is a product of the Privacy Enhancements and Assessments Research Group (PEARG) in the IRTF.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research and development activities. These results might not be suitable for deployment. This RFC represents the consensus of the Privacy Enhancements and Assessments Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). Documents approved for publication by the IRSG are not candidates for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9415 .
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Terminology
- 3. Threat Model
- 4. Issues with the Specification of Transient Numeric Identifiers
- 5. Protocol Failure Severity
- 6. Categorizing Transient Numeric Identifiers
- 7. Common Algorithms for Transient Numeric Identifier Generation
-
8. Common Vulnerabilities Associated with Transient Numeric Identifiers
- 8.1. Network Activity Correlation
- 8.2. Information Leakage
- 8.3. Fingerprinting
- 8.4. Exploitation of the Semantics of Transient Numeric Identifiers
- 8.5. Exploitation of Collisions of Transient Numeric Identifiers
- 8.6. Exploitation of Predictable Transient Numeric Identifiers for Injection Attacks
- 8.7. Cryptanalysis
- 9. Vulnerability Assessment of Transient Numeric Identifiers
- 10. IANA Considerations
- 11. Security Considerations
- 12. References
- Appendix A. Algorithms and Techniques with Known Issues
- Acknowledgements
- Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
Networking protocols employ a variety of transient numeric identifiers for different protocol objects, such as IPv4 and IPv6 Identification values [RFC 0791] [RFC 8200], IPv6 Interface Identifiers (IIDs) [RFC 4291], transport-protocol ephemeral port numbers [RFC 6056], TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) [RFC 9293], NTP Reference IDs (REFIDs) [RFC 5905], and DNS IDs [RFC 1035]. These identifiers typically have specific requirements (e.g., uniqueness during a specified period of time) that must be satisfied such that they do not result in negative interoperability implications and an associated failure severity when such requirements are not met.
For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of IETF protocols have been subject to a variety of attacks, with effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection to information leakages that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring [RFC 7258]. The root cause of these issues has been, in many cases, the poor selection of transient numeric identifiers in such protocols, usually as a result of insufficient or misleading specifications. While it is generally trivial to identify an algorithm that can satisfy the interoperability requirements of a given transient numeric identifier, empirical evidence exists that doing so without negatively affecting the security and/or privacy properties of the aforementioned protocols is prone to error [RFC 9414].
For example, implementations have been subject to security and/or privacy issues resulting from:
- predictable IPv4 or IPv6 Identification values (e.g., see [Sanfilippo1998a], [RFC 6274], and [RFC 7739]),
- predictable IPv6 IIDs (e.g., see [RFC 7217], [RFC 7707], and [RFC 7721]),
- predictable transport-protocol ephemeral port numbers (e.g., see [RFC 6056] and [Silbersack2005]),
- predictable TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) (e.g., see [Morris1985], [Bellovin1989], and [RFC 6528]),
- predictable initial timestamps in TCP timestamps options (e.g., see [TCPT-uptime] and [RFC 7323]), and
- predictable DNS IDs (see, e.g., [Schuba1993] and [Klein2007]).
2. Terminology
- Transient Numeric Identifier:
- A data object in a protocol specification that can be used to definitely distinguish a protocol object (a datagram, network interface, transport-protocol endpoint, session, etc.) from all other objects of the same type, in a given context. Transient numeric identifiers are usually defined as a series of bits and represented using integer values. These identifiers are typically dynamically selected, as opposed to statically assigned numeric identifiers (see, e.g., [IANA-PROT]). We note that different transient numeric identifiers may have additional requirements or properties depending on their specific use in a protocol. We use the term "transient numeric identifier" (or simply "numeric identifier" or "identifier" as short forms) as a generic term to refer to any data object in a protocol specification that satisfies the identification property stated above.
- Failure Severity:
- The interoperability consequences of a failure to comply with the interoperability requirements of a given identifier. Severity considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by the system damage and/or time lost to repair the failure. In this document, we define two types of failure severity: "soft failure" and "hard failure".
- Soft Failure:
- A recoverable condition in which a protocol does not operate in the prescribed manner but normal operation can be resumed automatically in a short period of time. For example, a simple packet-loss event that is subsequently recovered with a packet retransmission can be considered a soft failure.
- Hard Failure:
- A non-recoverable condition in which a protocol does not operate in the prescribed manner or it operates with excessive degradation of service. For example, an established TCP connection that is aborted due to an error condition constitutes, from the point of view of the transport protocol, a hard failure, since it enters a state from which normal operation cannot be resumed.
3. Threat Model
Throughout this document, we do not consider on-path attacks. That is, we assume the attacker does not have physical or logical access to the system(s) being attacked and that the attacker can only observe traffic explicitly directed to the attacker. Similarly, an attacker cannot observe traffic transferred between the sender and the receiver(s) of a target protocol but may be able to interact with any of these entities, including by, e.g., sending any traffic to them to sample transient numeric identifiers employed by the target hosts when communicating with the attacker.
For example, when analyzing vulnerabilities associated with TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs), we consider the attacker is unable to capture network traffic corresponding to a TCP connection between two other hosts. However, we consider the attacker is able to communicate with any of these hosts (e.g., establish a TCP connection with any of them) to, e.g., sample the TCP ISNs employed by these hosts when communicating with the attacker.
Similarly, when considering host-tracking attacks based on IPv6 Interface Identifiers, we consider an attacker may learn the IPv6 address employed by a victim host if, e.g., the address becomes exposed as a result of the victim host communicating with an attacker-operated server. Subsequently, an attacker may perform host-tracking by probing a set of target addresses composed by a set of target prefixes and the IPv6 Interface Identifier originally learned by the attacker. Alternatively, an attacker may perform host-tracking if, e.g., the victim host communicates with an attacker-operated server as it moves from one location to another, thereby exposing its configured addresses. We note that none of these scenarios require the attacker observe traffic not explicitly directed to the attacker.
4. Issues with the Specification of Transient Numeric Identifiers
While assessing IETF protocol specifications regarding the use of transient numeric identifiers, we have found that most of the issues discussed in this document arise as a result of one of the following conditions:
- protocol specifications that under specify their transient numeric identifiers
- protocol specifications that over specify their transient numeric identifiers
- protocol implementations that simply fail to comply with the specified requirements
5. Protocol Failure Severity
Section 2 defines the concept of "failure severity", along with two types of failure severities that we employ throughout this document: soft and hard.
Our analysis of the severity of a failure is performed from the point of view of the protocol in question. However, the corresponding severity on the upper protocol (or application) might not be the same as that of the protocol in question. For example, a TCP connection that is aborted might or might not result in a hard failure of the upper application, i.e., if the upper application can establish a new TCP connection without any impact on the application, a hard failure at the TCP protocol may have no severity at the application layer. On the other hand, if a hard failure of a TCP connection results in excessive degradation of service at the application layer, it will also result in a hard failure at the application.
6. Categorizing Transient Numeric Identifiers
This section includes a non-exhaustive survey of transient numeric identifiers, which are representative of all the possible combinations of interoperability requirements and failure severities found in popular protocols of different layers. Additionally, it proposes a number of categories that can accommodate these identifiers based on their interoperability requirements and their associated failure severity (soft or hard).
Table 1: Survey of Transient Numeric Identifiers
NOTE:
Table 2: Identifier Categories
We note that Category #4 could be considered a generalized case of Category #3, in which a monotonically increasing element is added to a stable (within context) element, such that the resulting identifiers are monotonically increasing within a specified context. That is, the same algorithm could be employed for both #3 and #4, given appropriate parameters.
| Identifier | Interoperability Requirements | Failure Severity |
|---|---|---|
| IPv6 ID | Uniqueness (for IPv6 address pair) | Soft/Hard (1) |
| IPv6 IID | Uniqueness (and stable within IPv6 prefix) (2) | Soft (3) |
| TCP ISN | Monotonically increasing (4) | Hard (4) |
| TCP initial timestamp | Monotonically increasing (5) | Hard (5) |
| TCP ephemeral port | Uniqueness (for connection ID) | Hard |
| IPv6 Flow Label | Uniqueness | None (6) |
| DNS ID | Uniqueness | None (7) |
- (1)
- While a single collision of IPv6 Identification (ID) values would simply lead to a single packet drop (and hence, a "soft" failure), repeated collisions at high data rates might result in self-propagating collisions of IPv6 IDs, thus possibly leading to a hard failure [RFC 4963].
- (2)
- While the interoperability requirements are simply that the Interface Identifier results in a unique IPv6 address, for operational reasons, it is typically desirable that the resulting IPv6 address (and hence, the corresponding Interface Identifier) be stable within each network [RFC 7217] [RFC 8064].
- (3)
- While IPv6 Interface Identifiers must result in unique IPv6 addresses, IPv6 Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [RFC 4862] allows for the detection of duplicate addresses, and hence, such Interface Identifier collisions can be recovered.
- (4)
- In theory, there are no interoperability requirements for TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs), since the TIME-WAIT state and TCP's "quiet time" concept take care of old segments from previous incarnations of a connection. However, a widespread optimization allows for a new incarnation of a previous connection to be created if the ISN of the incoming SYN is larger than the last sequence number seen in that direction for the previous incarnation of the connection. Thus, monotonically increasing TCP ISNs allow for such optimization to work as expected [RFC 6528] and can help avoid connection-establishment failures.
- (5)
- Strictly speaking, there are no interoperability requirements for the initial TCP timestamp employed by a TCP instance (i.e., the TS Value (TSval) in a segment with the SYN bit set). However, some TCP implementations allow a new incarnation of a previous connection to be created if the TSval of the incoming SYN is larger than the last TSval seen in that direction for the previous incarnation of the connection (please see [RFC 6191]). Thus, monotonically increasing TCP initial timestamps (across connections to the same endpoint) allow for such optimization to work as expected [RFC 6191] and can help avoid connection-establishment failures.
- (6)
- The IPv6 Flow Label [RFC 6437], along with the IPv6 Source Address and the IPv6 Destination Address, is typically employed for load sharing [RFC 7098]. Reuse of a Flow Label value for the same set {Source Address, Destination Address} would typically cause both flows to be multiplexed onto the same link. However, as long as this does not occur deterministically, it will not result in any negative implications.
- (7)
- DNS IDs are employed, together with the IP Source Address, the IP Destination Address, the transport-protocol Source Port, and the transport-protocol Destination Port, to match DNS requests and responses. However, since an implementation knows which DNS requests were sent for that set of {IP Source Address, IP Destination Address, transport-protocol Source Port, transport-protocol Destination Port, DNS ID}, a collision of DNS IDs would result, if anything, in a small performance penalty (the response would nevertheless be discarded when it is found that it does not answer the query sent in the corresponding DNS query).
| Cat # | Category | Sample Numeric IDs |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Uniqueness (soft failure) | IPv6 Flow L., DNS ID |
| 2 | Uniqueness (hard failure) | IPv6 ID, TCP ephemeral port |
| 3 | Uniqueness, stable within context (soft failure) | IPv6 IID |
| 4 | Uniqueness, monotonically increasing within context (hard failure) | TCP ISN, TCP initial timestamp |
7. Common Algorithms for Transient Numeric Identifier Generation
The following subsections describe some sample algorithms that can be employed for generating transient numeric identifiers for each of the categories above while mitigating the vulnerabilities analyzed in Section 8 of this document.
All of the variables employed in the algorithms of the following subsections are of "unsigned integer" type, except for the "retry" variable, which is of (signed) "integer" type.
7.1. Category #1: Uniqueness (Soft Failure)
The requirement of uniqueness with a soft failure severity can be complied with a Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG).
While most systems provide access to a PRNG, many of such PRNG implementations are not cryptographically secure and therefore might be statistically biased or subject to adversarial influence. For example, ISO C [C11] rand(3) implementations are not cryptographically secure.
On the other hand, a number of systems provide an interface to a Cryptographically Secure PRNG (CSPRNG) [RFC 4086] [RFC 8937], which guarantees high entropy, unpredictability, and good statistical distribution of the random values generated. For example, GNU/Linux's CSPRNG implementation is available via the getentropy(3) interface [GETENTROPY], while OpenBSD's CSPRNG implementation is available via the arc4random(3) and arc4random_uniform(3) interfaces [ARC4RANDOM]. Where available, these CSPRNGs should be preferred over, e.g., POSIX [POSIX] random(3) or ISO C [C11] rand(3) implementations.
In scenarios where a CSPRNG is not readily available to select transient numeric identifiers of Category #1, a security and privacy assessment of employing a regular PRNG should be performed, supporting the implementation decision.
We note that, since the premise is that collisions of transient numeric identifiers of this category only lead to soft failures, in many cases, the algorithm might not need to check the suitability of a selected identifier (i.e., the suitable_id() function, described below, could always return "true").
In scenarios where, e.g., simultaneous use of a given numeric identifier is undesirable and an implementation detects such condition, the implementation may opt to select the next available identifier in the same sequence or select another random number. Section 7.1.1 is an implementation of the former strategy, while Section 7.1.2 is an implementation of the latter. Typically, the algorithm in Section 7.1.2 results in a more uniform distribution of the generated transient numeric identifiers. However, for transient numeric identifiers where an implementation typically keeps local state about unsuitable/used identifiers, the algorithm in Section 7.1.2 may require many more iterations than the algorithm in Section 7.1.1 to generate a suitable transient numeric identifier. This will usually be affected by the current usage ratio of transient numeric identifiers (i.e., the number of numeric identifiers considered suitable / total number of numeric identifiers) and other parameters. Therefore, in such cases, many implementations tend to prefer the algorithm in Section 7.1.1 over the algorithm in Section 7.1.2.
7.1.1. Simple Randomization Algorithm
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
next_id = min_id + (random() % id_range);
retry = id_range;
do {
if (suitable_id(next_id)) {
return next_id;
}
if (next_id == max_id) {
next_id = min_id;
} else {
next_id++;
}
retry--;
} while (retry > 0);
return ERROR;
7.1.2. Another Simple Randomization Algorithm
The following pseudocode illustrates another algorithm for selecting a random transient numeric identifier where, in the event a selected identifier is found to be unsuitable (e.g., already in use), another identifier is randomly selected:
NOTE:
random() is a PRNG that returns a pseudorandom unsigned integer number of appropriate size. Beware that "adapting" the length of the output of random() with a modulo operator (e.g., C language's "%") may change the distribution of the PRNG. To preserve a uniform distribution, the rejection sampling technique [Romailler2020] can be used.
suitable_id() is a function that checks, if possible and desirable, whether a candidate numeric identifier is suitable (e.g., if it is not already in use). Depending on how/where the numeric identifier is used, it may or may not be possible (or even desirable) to check whether the numeric identifier is in use (or whether it has been recently employed).
When an identifier is found to be unsuitable, this algorithm selects another random numeric identifier. Thus, this algorithm might be unable to select a transient numeric identifier (i.e., return "ERROR"), even if there are suitable identifiers available, in cases where a large number of identifiers are found to be unsuitable (e.g., "in use").
Assuming the randomness requirements for the PRNG are met (see [RFC 4086]), this algorithm does not suffer from any of the issues discussed in Section 8.
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
retry = id_range;
do {
next_id = min_id + (random() % id_range);
if (suitable_id(next_id)) {
return next_id;
}
retry--;
} while (retry > 0);
return ERROR;
7.2. Category #2: Uniqueness (Hard Failure)
One of the most trivial approaches for generating a unique transient numeric identifier (with a hard failure severity) is to reduce the identifier reuse frequency by generating the numeric identifiers with a monotonically increasing function (e.g., linear). As a result, any of the algorithms described in Section 7.4 ("Category #4: Uniqueness, Monotonically Increasing within Context (Hard Failure)") can be readily employed for complying with the requirements of this transient numeric identifier category.
In cases where suitability (e.g., uniqueness) of the selected identifiers can be definitely assessed by the local system, any of the algorithms described in Section 7.1 ("Category #1: Uniqueness (Soft Failure)") can be readily employed for complying with the requirements of this numeric identifier category.
7.3. Category #3: Uniqueness, Stable within Context (Soft Failure)
The goal of the following algorithm is to produce identifiers that are stable for a given context (identified by "CONTEXT") but that change when the aforementioned context changes.
In order to avoid storing the transient numeric identifiers computed for each CONTEXT in memory, the following algorithm employs a calculated technique (as opposed to keeping state in memory) to generate a stable transient numeric identifier for each given context.
NOTE:
CONTEXT is the concatenation of all the elements that define a given context.
F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF). It must not be computable from the outside (without knowledge of the secret key). F() must also be difficult to reverse, such that it resists attempts to obtain the secret key, even when given samples of the output of F() and knowledge or control of the other input parameters. F() should produce an output of at least as many bits as required for the transient numeric identifier. SipHash-2-4 (128-bit key, 64-bit output) [SipHash] and BLAKE3 (256-bit key, arbitrary-length output) [BLAKE3] are two possible options for F(). Alternatively, F() could be implemented with a keyed hash message authentication code (HMAC) [RFC 2104]. HMAC-SHA-256 [FIPS-SHS] would be one possible option for such implementation alternative. Note: Use of HMAC-MD5 [RFC 1321] or HMAC-SHA1 [FIPS-SHS] are not recommended for F() [RFC 6151] [RFC 6194]. The result of F() is no more secure than the secret key, and therefore, "secret_key" must be unknown to the attacker and must be of a reasonable length. "secret_key" must remain stable for a given CONTEXT, since otherwise, the numeric identifiers generated by this algorithm would not have the desired stability properties (i.e., stable for a given CONTEXT). In most cases, "secret_key" should be selected with a PRNG (see [RFC 4086] for recommendations on choosing secrets) at an appropriate time and stored in stable or volatile storage (as necessary) for future use.
suitable_id() checks whether a candidate numeric identifier has suitable uniqueness properties.
In this algorithm, the function F() provides a stateless and stable per-CONTEXT offset, where CONTEXT is the concatenation of all the elements that define the given context.
For example, if this algorithm is expected to produce IPv6 IIDs that are unique per network interface and Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) prefix, CONTEXT should be the concatenation of, e.g., the network interface index and the SLAAC autoconfiguration prefix (please see [RFC 7217] for an implementation of this algorithm for generation of stable IPv6 addresses).
The result of F() is stored in the variable "offset", which may take any value within the storage type range, since we are restricting the resulting identifier to be in the range [min_id, max_id] in a similar way as in the algorithm described in Section 7.1.1.
As noted above, suitable_id() checks whether a candidate numeric identifier has suitable uniqueness properties. Collisions (i.e., an identifier that is not unique) are recovered by incrementing the "retry" variable and recomputing F(), up to a maximum of MAX_RETRIES times. However, recovering from collisions will usually result in identifiers that fail to remain constant for the specified context. This is normally acceptable when the probability of collisions is small, as in the case of, e.g., IPv6 IIDs resulting from SLAAC [RFC 7217] [RFC 8981].
For obvious reasons, the transient numeric identifiers generated with this algorithm allow for network activity correlation and fingerprinting within "CONTEXT". However, this is essentially a design goal of this category of transient numeric identifiers.
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
retry = 0;
do {
offset = F(CONTEXT, retry, secret_key);
next_id = min_id + (offset % id_range);
if (suitable_id(next_id)) {
return next_id;
}
retry++;
} while (retry <= MAX_RETRIES);
return ERROR;
7.4. Category #4: Uniqueness, Monotonically Increasing within Context (Hard Failure)
7.4.1. Per-Context Counter Algorithm
One possible way of selecting unique monotonically increasing identifiers (per context) is to employ a per-context counter. Such an algorithm could be described as follows:
NOTE:
CONTEXT is the concatenation of all the elements that define a given context.
increment() returns a small integer that is employed to increment the current counter value to obtain the next transient numeric identifier. This value must be larger than or equal to 1, and much smaller than the number of possible values for the numeric identifiers (i.e., "id_range"). Most implementations of this algorithm employ a constant increment of 1. Using a value other than 1 can help mitigate some information leakages (please see below) at the expense of a possible increase in the numeric identifier reuse frequency. The code above makes sure that the increment employed in the algorithm (id_inc) is always smaller than the number of possible values for the numeric identifiers (i.e., "max_id - min_d + 1"). However, as noted above, this value must also be much smaller than the number of possible values for the numeric identifiers.
lookup_counter() is a function that returns the current counter for a given context or an error condition if that counter does not exist.
random() is a PRNG that returns a pseudorandom unsigned integer number of appropriate size. Beware that "adapting" the length of the output of random() with a modulo operator (e.g., C language's "%") may change the distribution of the PRNG. To preserve a uniform distribution, the rejection sampling technique [Romailler2020] can be used.
store_counter() is a function that saves a counter value for a given context.
suitable_id() checks whether a candidate numeric identifier has suitable uniqueness properties.
Essentially, whenever a new identifier is to be selected, the algorithm checks whether a counter for the corresponding context exists. If it does, the value of such counter is incremented to obtain the new transient numeric identifier, and the counter is updated. If no counter exists for such context, a new counter is created and initialized to a random value and used as the selected transient numeric identifier. This algorithm produces a per-context counter, which results in one monotonically increasing function for each context. Since each counter is initialized to a random value, the resulting values are unpredictable by an off-path attacker.
The choice of id_inc has implications on both the security and privacy properties of the resulting identifiers and also on the corresponding interoperability properties. On one hand, minimizing the increments generally minimizes the identifier reuse frequency, albeit at increased predictability. On the other hand, if the increments are randomized, predictability of the resulting identifiers is reduced, and the information leakage produced by global constant increments is mitigated. However, using larger increments than necessary can result in higher numeric identifier reuse frequency.
This algorithm has the following drawbacks:
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
retry = id_range;
id_inc = increment() % id_range;
if( (next_id = lookup_counter(CONTEXT)) == ERROR){
next_id = min_id + random() % id_range;
}
do {
if ( (max_id - next_id) >= id_inc){
next_id = next_id + id_inc;
}
else {
next_id = min_id + id_inc - (max_id - next_id);
}
if (suitable_id(next_id)){
store_counter(CONTEXT, next_id);
return next_id;
}
retry = retry - id_inc;
} while (retry > 0);
return ERROR;
- It requires an implementation to store each per-context counter in memory. If, as a result of resource management, the counter for a given context must be removed, the last transient numeric identifier value used for that context will be lost. Thus, if an identifier subsequently needs to be generated for the same context, the corresponding counter will need to be recreated and reinitialized to a random value, thus possibly leading to reuse/collision of numeric identifiers.
- Keeping one counter for each possible "context" may in some cases be considered too onerous in terms of memory requirements.
7.4.2. Simple PRF-Based Algorithm
The goal of this algorithm is to produce monotonically increasing transient numeric identifiers (for each given context) with a randomized initial value. For example, if the identifiers being generated must be monotonically increasing for each {Source Address, Destination Address} set, then each possible combination of {Source Address, Destination Address} should have a separate monotonically increasing sequence that starts at a different random value.
Instead of maintaining a per-context counter (as in the algorithm from Section 7.4.1), the following algorithm employs a calculated technique to maintain a random offset for each possible context.
NOTE:
CONTEXT is the concatenation of all the elements that define a given context. For example, if this algorithm is expected to produce identifiers that are monotonically increasing for each set {Source Address, Destination Address}, CONTEXT should be the concatenation of Source Address and Destination Address.
increment() has the same properties and requirements as those specified for increment() in Section 7.4.1.
F() is a PRF, with the same properties as those specified for F() in Section 7.3.
suitable_id() checks whether a candidate numeric identifier has suitable uniqueness properties.
In the algorithm above, the function F() provides a stateless, stable, and unpredictable offset for each given context (as identified by "CONTEXT"). Both the "offset" and "counter" variables may take any value within the storage type range since we are restricting the resulting identifier to be in the range [min_id, max_id] in a similar way as in the algorithm described in Section 7.1.1. This allows us to simply increment the "counter" variable and rely on the unsigned integer to wrap around.
The result of F() is no more secure than the secret key, and therefore, "secret_key" must be unknown to the attacker and must be of a reasonable length. "secret_key" must remain stable for a given CONTEXT, since otherwise, the numeric identifiers generated by this algorithm would not have the desired properties (i.e., monotonically increasing for a given CONTEXT). In most cases, "secret_key" should be selected with a PRNG (see [RFC 4086] for recommendations on choosing secrets) at an appropriate time and stored in stable or volatile storage (as necessary) for future use.
It should be noted that, since this algorithm uses a global counter ("counter") for selecting identifiers (i.e., all counters share the same increment space), this algorithm results in an information leakage (as described in Section 8.2). For example, if this algorithm was used for selecting TCP ephemeral ports and an attacker could force a client to periodically establish a new TCP connection to an attacker-controlled system (or through an attacker-observable routing path), the attacker could subtract consecutive Source Port values to obtain the number of outgoing TCP connections established globally by the victim host within that time period (up to wrap-around issues and five-tuple collisions, of course). This information leakage could be partially mitigated by employing small random values for the increments (i.e., increment() function), instead of having increment() return the constant "1".
We nevertheless note that an improved mitigation of this information leakage could be more successfully achieved by employing the algorithm from Section 7.4.3, instead.
/* Initialization code */
counter = 0;
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
id_inc = increment() % id_range;
offset = F(CONTEXT, secret_key);
retry = id_range;
do {
next_id = min_id + (offset + counter) % id_range;
counter = counter + id_inc;
if (suitable_id(next_id)) {
return next_id;
}
retry = retry - id_inc;
} while (retry > 0);
return ERROR;
7.4.3. Double-PRF Algorithm
A trade-off between maintaining a single global "counter" variable and maintaining 2**N "counter" variables (where N is the width of the result of F()) could be achieved as follows. The system would keep an array of TABLE_LENGTH values, which would provide a separation of the increment space into multiple buckets. This improvement could be incorporated into the algorithm from Section 7.4.2 as follows:
NOTE:
increment() has the same properties and requirements as those specified for increment() in Section 7.4.1.
Both F() and G() are PRFs, with the same properties as those required for F() in Section 7.3. The results of F() and G() are no more secure than their respective secret keys ("secret_key1" and "secret_key2", respectively), and therefore, both secret keys must be unknown to the attacker and must be of a reasonable length. Both secret keys must remain stable for the given CONTEXT, since otherwise, the transient numeric identifiers generated by this algorithm would not have the desired properties (i.e., monotonically increasing for a given CONTEXT). In most cases, both secret keys should be selected with a PRNG (see [RFC 4086] for recommendations on choosing secrets) at an appropriate time and stored in stable or volatile storage (as necessary) for future use.
"table[]" could be initialized with random values, as indicated by the initialization code in the pseudocode above.
The "table[]" array assures that successive transient numeric identifiers for a given context will be monotonically increasing. Since the increment space is separated into TABLE_LENGTH different spaces, the identifier reuse frequency will be (probabilistically) lower than that of the algorithm in Section 7.4.2. That is, the generation of an identifier for one given context will not necessarily result in increments in the identifier sequence of other contexts. It is interesting to note that the size of "table[]" does not limit the number of different identifier sequences but rather separates the increment space into TABLE_LENGTH different spaces. The selected transient numeric identifier sequence will be obtained by adding the corresponding entry from "table[]" to the value in the "offset" variable, which selects the actual identifier sequence space (as in the algorithm from Section 7.4.2).
An attacker can perform traffic analysis for any "increment space" (i.e., context) into which the attacker has "visibility" -- namely, the attacker can force a system to generate identifiers for G(CONTEXT, secret_key2), where the result of G() identifies the target "increment space". However, the attacker's ability to perform traffic analysis is very reduced when compared to the simple PRF-based identifiers (described in Section 7.4.2) and the predictable linear identifiers (described in Appendix A.1). Additionally, an implementation can further limit the attacker's ability to perform traffic analysis by further separating the increment space (that is, using a larger value for TABLE_LENGTH) and/or by randomizing the increments (i.e., increment() returning a small random number as opposed to the constant "1").
Otherwise, this algorithm does not suffer from the issues discussed in Section 8.
/* Initialization code */
for(i = 0; i < TABLE_LENGTH; i++) {
table[i] = random();
}
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
id_inc = increment() % id_range;
offset = F(CONTEXT, secret_key1);
index = G(CONTEXT, secret_key2) % TABLE_LENGTH;
retry = id_range;
do {
next_id = min_id + (offset + table[index]) % id_range;
table[index] = table[index] + id_inc;
if (suitable_id(next_id)) {
return next_id;
}
retry = retry - id_inc;
} while (retry > 0);
return ERROR;
8. Common Vulnerabilities Associated with Transient Numeric Identifiers
8.1. Network Activity Correlation
An identifier that is predictable within a given context allows for network activity correlation within that context.
For example, a stable IPv6 Interface Identifier allows for network activity to be correlated within the context in which the Interface Identifier is stable [RFC 7721]. A stable per-network IPv6 Interface Identifier (as in [RFC 7217]) allows for network activity correlation within a network, whereas a constant IPv6 Interface Identifier (which remains constant across networks) allows not only network activity correlation within the same network but also across networks ("host-tracking").
Similarly, an implementation that generates TCP ISNs with a global counter could allow for fingerprinting and network activity correlation across networks, since an attacker could passively infer the identity of the victim based on the TCP ISNs employed for subsequent communication instances. Similarly, an implementation that generates predictable IPv6 Identification values could be subject to fingerprinting attacks (see, e.g., [Bellovin2002]).
8.2. Information Leakage
Transient numeric identifiers that result in specific patterns can produce an information leakage to other communicating entities. For example, it is common to generate transient numeric identifiers with an algorithm such as:
This generic expression generates identifiers by adding a monotonically increasing function (e.g., linear) to a randomized offset. offset() is constant within a given context, whereas mono() produces a monotonically increasing sequence for the given context. Identifiers generated with this expression will generally be predictable within CONTEXT.
The predictability of mono(), irrespective of the predictability of offset(), can leak information that may be of use to attackers. For example, a node that selects transport-protocol ephemeral port numbers, as in:
that is, with a per-destination offset but a global mono() function (e.g., a global counter), will leak information about the total number of outgoing connections that have been issued by the vulnerable implementation.
Similarly, a node that generates IPv6 Identification values as in:
will leak out information about the total number of fragmented packets that have been transmitted by the vulnerable implementation. The vulnerabilities described in [Sanfilippo1998a], [Sanfilippo1998b], and [Sanfilippo1999] are all associated with the use of a global mono() function (i.e., with a global and constant "CONTEXT") -- particularly when it is a linear function (constant increments of 1).
Predicting transient numeric identifiers can be of help for other types of attacks. For example, predictable TCP ISNs can open the door to trivial connection-reset and data injection attacks (see Section 8.6).
ID = offset(CONTEXT) + mono(CONTEXT);
ephemeral_port = offset(IP_Dst_Addr) + mono()
ID = offset(IP_Src_Addr, IP_Dst_Addr) + mono()
8.3. Fingerprinting
Fingerprinting is the capability of an attacker to identify or reidentify a visiting user, user agent, or device via configuration settings or other observable characteristics. Observable protocol objects and characteristics can be employed to identify/reidentify various entities. These entities can range from the underlying hardware or operating system (OS) (vendor, type, and version) to the user. [EFF] illustrates web-browser-based fingerprinting, but similar techniques can be applied at other layers and protocols, whether alternatively or in conjunction with it.
Transient numeric identifiers are one of the observable protocol components that could be leveraged for fingerprinting purposes. That is, an attacker could sample transient numeric identifiers to infer the algorithm (and its associated parameters, if any) for generating such identifiers, possibly revealing the underlying OS vendor, type, and version. This information could possibly be further leveraged in conjunction with other fingerprinting techniques and sources.
Evasion of protocol-stack fingerprinting can prove to be a very difficult task, i.e., most systems make use of a wide variety of protocols, each of which have a large number of parameters that can be set to arbitrary values or generated with a variety of algorithms with multiple parameters.
Algorithms that, from the perspective of an observer (e.g., the legitimate communicating peer), result in specific values or patterns will allow for at least some level of fingerprinting. For example, the algorithm from Section 7.3 will typically allow fingerprinting within the context where the resulting identifiers are stable. Similarly, the algorithms from Section 7.4 will result in monotonically increasing sequences within a given context, thus allowing for at least some level of fingerprinting (when the other communicating entity can correlate different sampled identifiers as belonging to the same monotonically increasing sequence).
Thus, where possible, algorithms from Section 7.1 should be preferred over algorithms that result in specific values or patterns.
8.4. Exploitation of the Semantics of Transient Numeric Identifiers
Identifiers that are not semantically opaque tend to be more predictable than semantically opaque identifiers. For example, a Media Access Control (MAC) address contains an Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), which may identify the vendor that manufactured the corresponding network interface card. This can be leveraged by an attacker trying to "guess" MAC addresses, who has some knowledge about the possible Network Interface Card (NIC) vendor.
[RFC 7707] discusses a number of techniques to reduce the search space when performing IPv6 address-scanning attacks by leveraging the semantics of IPv6 IIDs.
8.5. Exploitation of Collisions of Transient Numeric Identifiers
In many cases, the collision of transient network identifiers can have a hard failure severity (or result in a hard failure severity if an attacker can cause multiple collisions deterministically, one after another). For example, predictable IP Identification values open the door to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (see, e.g., [RFC 5722].).
8.6. Exploitation of Predictable Transient Numeric Identifiers for Injection Attacks
Some protocols rely on "sequence numbers" for the validation of incoming packets. For example, TCP employs sequence numbers for reassembling TCP segments, while IPv4 and IPv6 employ Identification values for reassembling IPv4 and IPv6 fragments (respectively). Lacking built-in cryptographic mechanisms for validating packets, these protocols are therefore vulnerable to on-path data (see, e.g., [Joncheray1995]) and/or control-information (see, e.g., [RFC 4953] and [RFC 5927]) injection attacks. The extent to which these protocols may resist off-path (i.e., "blind") injection attacks depends on whether the associated "sequence numbers" are predictable and the effort required to successfully predict a valid "sequence number" (see, e.g., [RFC 4953] and [RFC 5927]).
We note that the use of unpredictable "sequence numbers" is a completely ineffective mitigation for on-path injection attacks and also a mostly ineffective mitigation for off-path (i.e., "blind") injection attacks. However, many legacy protocols (such as TCP) do not incorporate cryptographic mitigations as part of the core protocol but rather as optional features (see, e.g., [RFC 5925]), if available at all. Additionally, ad hoc use of cryptographic mitigations might not be sufficient to relieve a protocol implementation of generating appropriate transient numeric identifiers. For example, use of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [RFC 8446] with TCP will protect the application protocol but will not help to mitigate, e.g., TCP-based connection-reset attacks (see, e.g., [RFC 4953]). Similarly, use of SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC 3971] will still imply reliance on the successful reassembly of IPv6 fragments in those cases where SEND packets do not fit into the link Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) (see [RFC 6980]).
8.7. Cryptanalysis
A number of algorithms discussed in this document (such as those described in Sections [7.4.2] and [7.4.3]) rely on PRFs. Implementations that employ weak PRFs or keys of inappropriate size can be subject to cryptanalysis, where an attacker can obtain the secret key employed for the PRF, predict numeric identifiers, etc.
Furthermore, an implementation that overloads the semantics of the secret key can result in more trivial cryptanalysis, possibly resulting in the leakage of the value employed for the secret key.
9. Vulnerability Assessment of Transient Numeric Identifiers
The following subsections analyze possible vulnerabilities associated with the algorithms described in Section 7.
9.1. Category #1: Uniqueness (Soft Failure)
Possible vulnerabilities associated with the algorithms from Section 7.1 include the following:
This example implementation means to obtain a transient numeric identifier in the range 0-49999. If random() produces, e.g., a pseudorandom number of 16 bits (with uniform distribution), the selected transient numeric identifier will have a nonuniform distribution with the numbers in the range 0-15535 having double frequency than the numbers in the range 15536-49999.
This effect is reduced if the PRNG produces an output that is much longer than the length implied by the modulo operation. We note that to preserve a uniform distribution, the rejection sampling technique [Romailler2020] can be used.
Use of algorithms other than PRNGs for generating identifiers of this category is discouraged.
- use of flawed PRNGs (please see, e.g., [Zalewski2001], [Zalewski2002], [Klein2007], and [CVEs])
- inadvertently affecting the distribution of an otherwise suitable PRNG (please see, e.g., [Romailler2020])
id = random() % 50000;
9.2. Category #2: Uniqueness (Hard Failure)
As noted in Section 7.2, this category can employ the same algorithms as Category #4, since a monotonically increasing sequence tends to minimize the transient numeric identifier reuse frequency. Therefore, the vulnerability analysis in Section 9.4 also applies to this category.
Additionally, as noted in Section 7.2, some transient numeric identifiers of this category might be able to use the algorithms from Section 7.1, in which case the same considerations as in Section 9.1 would apply.
9.3. Category #3: Uniqueness, Stable within Context (Soft Failure)
Possible vulnerabilities associated with the algorithms from Section 7.3 are the following:
- Use of weak PRFs or inappropriate secret keys (whether inappropriate selection or inappropriate size) could allow for cryptanalysis, which could eventually be exploited by an attacker to predict future transient numeric identifiers.
- Since the algorithm generates a unique and stable identifier within a specified context, it may allow for network activity correlation and fingerprinting within the specified context.
9.4. Category #4: Uniqueness, Monotonically Increasing within Context (Hard Failure)
The algorithm described in Section 7.4.1 for generating identifiers of Category #4 will result in an identifiable pattern (i.e., a monotonically increasing sequence) for the transient numeric identifiers generated for each CONTEXT, and thus will allow for fingerprinting and network activity correlation within each CONTEXT.
On the other hand, a simple way to generalize and analyze the algorithms described in Sections [7.4.2] and [7.4.3] for generating identifiers of Category #4 is as follows:
NOTE:
increment() returns a small integer that is employed to generate a monotonically increasing function. Most implementations employ a constant value for "increment()" (usually 1). The value returned by increment() must be much smaller than the value computed for "id_range".
update_mono(CONTEXT, id_inc) increments the counter corresponding to CONTEXT by "id_inc".
mono(CONTEXT) reads the counter corresponding to CONTEXT.
Essentially, an identifier (next_id) is generated by adding a monotonically increasing function (mono()) to an offset value, which is unknown to the attacker and stable for given context (CONTEXT).
The following aspects of the algorithm should be considered:
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
retry = id_range;
id_inc = increment() % id_range;
do {
update_mono(CONTEXT, id_inc);
next_id = min_id + (offset(CONTEXT) + \
mono(CONTEXT)) % id_range;
if (suitable_id(next_id)) {
return next_id;
}
retry = retry - id_inc;
} while (retry > 0);
return ERROR;
- For the most part, it is the offset() function that results in identifiers that are unpredictable by an off-patch attacker. While the resulting sequence is known to be monotonically increasing, the use of a randomized offset value makes the resulting values unknown to the attacker.
- The most straightforward "stateless" implementation of offset() is with a PRF that takes the values that identify the context and a secret key (not shown in the figure above) as arguments.
- One possible implementation of mono() would be to have mono() internally employ a single counter (as in the algorithm from Section 7.4.2) or map the increments for different contexts into a number of counters/buckets, such that the number of counters that need to be maintained in memory is reduced (as in the "Double-PRF Algorithm" from Section 7.4.3).
- In all cases, a monotonically increasing function is implemented by incrementing the previous value of a counter by increment() units. In the most trivial case, increment() could return the constant "1". But increment() could also be implemented to return small random integers such that the increments are unpredictable (see Appendix A.2 of this document). This represents a trade-off between the unpredictability of the resulting transient numeric identifiers and the transient numeric identifier reuse frequency.
- Since the algorithms for this category are similar to those of Section 9.3, with the addition of a monotonically increasing function, all the issues discussed in Section 9.3 ("Category #3: Uniqueness, Stable within Context (Soft Failure)") also apply to this case.
- mono() can be correlated to the number of identifiers generated for a given context (CONTEXT). Thus, if mono() spans more than the necessary context, the "increments" could be leaked to other parties, thus disclosing information about the number of identifiers that have been generated by the algorithm for all contexts. This information disclosure becomes more evident when an implementation employs a constant increment of 1. For example, an implementation where mono() is actually a single global counter will unnecessarily leak information about the number of identifiers that have been generated by the algorithm (globally, for all contexts). [Fyodor2003] describes one example of how such information leakages can be exploited. We note that limiting the span of the increment space will require a larger number of counters to be stored in memory (i.e., a larger value for the TABLE_LENGTH parameter of the algorithm in Section 7.4.3).
- Transient numeric identifiers generated with the algorithms described in Sections [7.4.2] and [7.4.3] will normally allow for fingerprinting within CONTEXT since, for such context, the resulting identifiers will have an identifiable pattern (i.e., a monotonically increasing sequence).
10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
11. Security Considerations
This entire document is about the security and privacy implications of transient numeric identifiers. [RFC 9416] recommends that protocol specifications specify the interoperability requirements of their transient numeric identifiers, perform a vulnerability assessment of their transient numeric identifiers, and recommend an algorithm for generating each of their transient numeric identifiers. This document analyzes possible algorithms (and their implications) that could be employed to comply with the interoperability requirements of the most common categories of transient numeric identifiers while minimizing the associated negative security and privacy implications.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
- [RFC0791]
-
J. Postel, "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc791 - [RFC0793]
-
J. Postel, "Transmission Control Protocol", RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc793 - [RFC1035]
-
P. Mockapetris, "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc1035 - [RFC1321]
-
R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc1321 - [RFC2460]
-
S. Deering, and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc2460 - [RFC4086]
-
D. Eastlake 3rd, J. Schiller, and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc4086 - [RFC4291]
-
R. Hinden, and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc4291 - [RFC4862]
-
S. Thomson, T. Narten, and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc4862 - [RFC5722]
-
S. Krishnan, "Handling of Overlapping IPv6 Fragments", RFC 5722, DOI 10.17487/RFC5722, December 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc5722 - [RFC5905]
-
D. Mills, J. Martin, J. Burbank, and W. Kasch, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc5905 - [RFC5925]
-
J. Touch, A. Mankin, and R. Bonica, "The TCP Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc5925 - [RFC6056]
-
M. Larsen, and F. Gont, "Recommendations for Transport-Protocol Port Randomization", BCP 156, RFC 6056, DOI 10.17487/RFC6056, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc6056 - [RFC6151]
-
S. Turner, and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms", RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc6151 - [RFC6191]
-
F. Gont, "Reducing the TIME-WAIT State Using TCP Timestamps", BCP 159, RFC 6191, DOI 10.17487/RFC6191, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc6191 - [RFC6437]
-
S. Amante, B. Carpenter, S. Jiang, and J. Rajahalme, "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437, DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc6437 - [RFC6528]
-
F. Gont, and S. Bellovin, "Defending against Sequence Number Attacks", RFC 6528, DOI 10.17487/RFC6528, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc6528 - [RFC7217]
-
F. Gont, "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc7217 - [RFC7323]
-
D. Borman, B. Braden, V. Jacobson, and R. Scheffenegger, "TCP Extensions for High Performance", RFC 7323, DOI 10.17487/RFC7323, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc7323 - [RFC8064]
-
F. Gont, A. Cooper, D. Thaler, and W. Liu, "Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers", RFC 8064, DOI 10.17487/RFC8064, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc8064 - [RFC8200]
-
S. Deering, and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc8200 - [RFC8981]
-
F. Gont, S. Krishnan, T. Narten, and R. Draves, "Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 8981, DOI 10.17487/RFC8981, February 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc8981 - [RFC9293]
-
W. Eddy, "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)", STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc9293
12.2. Informative References
- [ARC4RANDOM]
-
OpenBSD, "arc4random(3)", September 2019,
<https://man.openbsd.org/arc4random >. - [Aumasson2018]
- J-P. Aumasson, "Serious Cryptography: A Practical Introduction to Modern Encryption", ISBN-10 1-59327-826-8, November 2017.
- [Bellovin1989]
-
S. Bellovin, "Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite", April 1989,
<https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/ >.papers/ ipext.pdf - [Bellovin2002]
-
S. Bellovin, "A Technique for Counting NATted Hosts", ISBN 1-58113-603-X/02/0011, November 2002,
<https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/ >.papers/ fnat.pdf - [BLAKE3]
-
"BLAKE3: one function, fast everywhere", September 2022,
<https://blake3.io/>. - [C11]
- ISO/IEC, "Information technology - Programming languages - C", ISO/IEC 9899:2018, June 2018.
- [CPNI-TCP]
-
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), "Security Assessment of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)", CPNI Technical Note 3/2009, February 2009,
<https://www.si6networks.com/files/ >.publications/ tn-03-09-security-assessment-TCP.pdf - [CVEs]
-
NVD, "Vulnerability Advisories for PRNGs",
<https://www.gont.com.ar/miscellanea/ >.prng-cves/ - [EFF]
-
EFF, "Cover your tracks: See how trackers view your browser",
<https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/>. - [FIPS-SHS]
-
NIST, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ >.FIPS/ NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf - [Fyodor1998]
-
Fyodor, "Remote OS detection via TCP/IP Stack FingerPrinting", December 1998,
<http://www.phrack.org/archives/ >.issues/ 54/ 9.txt - [Fyodor2003]
-
Fyodor, "Idle Scanning and related IPID games", 2003,
<https://nmap.org/presentations/ >.CanSecWest03/ CD_Content/ idlescan_paper/ idlescan.html - [Fyodor2006]
-
G. Lyon, "Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection", January 2009,
<https://nmap.org/book/ >.osdetect.html - [GETENTROPY]
-
Linux, "getentropy(3)", March 2021,
<https://man7.org/linux/ >.man-pages/ man3/ getentropy.3.html - [IANA-PROT]
-
IANA, "Protocol Registries",
<https://www.iana.org/protocols >. - [IPID-DEV]
-
A. Klein, and B. Pinkas, "From IP ID to Device ID and KASLR Bypass (Extended Version)", DOI 10.48550/arXiv.1906.10478, October 2019,
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/ >.1906.10478.pdf - [Joncheray1995]
-
L. Joncheray, "Simple Active Attack Against TCP", June 1995,
<https://www.usenix.org/legacy/ >.publications/ library/ proceedings/ security95/ full_papers/ joncheray.pdf - [KASLR]
-
PaX Team, "Address Space Layout Randomization",
<https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/ >.aslr.txt - [Klein2007]
-
A. Klein, "OpenBSD DNS Cache Poisoning and Multiple O/S Predictable IP ID Vulnerability", November 2007,
<https://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/papers/ >.attack/ OpenBSD_DNS_Cache_Poisoning_and_Multiple_OS_Predictable_IP_ID_Vulnerability.pdf - [Knuth1983]
- D. Knuth, "The Art of Computer Programming", January 1981.
- [Morris1985]
-
R. Morris, "A Weakness in the 4.2BSD UNIX TCP/IP Software", February 1985,
<https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/~rtm/ >.papers/ 117.pdf - [nmap]
-
nmap, "Nmap: Free Security Scanner For Network Exploration and Audit", 2020,
<https://nmap.org/>. - [POSIX]
-
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information Technology -- Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX(TM)) Base Specifications, Issue 7", IEEE Std 1003.1-2017, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8277153, January 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/ >.IEEESTD.2018.8277153 - [Press1992]
- W. Press, S. Teukolsky, W. Vetterling, and B. Flannery, "Numerical Recipes in C: The Art of Scientific Computing", ISBN 0-521-43108-5, December 1992.
- [RFC2104]
-
H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc2104 - [RFC3971]
-
J. Arkko, J. Kempf, B. Zill, and P. Nikander, "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc3971 - [RFC4953]
-
J. Touch, "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks", RFC 4953, DOI 10.17487/RFC4953, July 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc4953 - [RFC4963]
-
J. Heffner, M. Mathis, and B. Chandler, "IPv4 Reassembly Errors at High Data Rates", RFC 4963, DOI 10.17487/RFC4963, July 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc4963 - [RFC5927]
-
F. Gont, "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927, DOI 10.17487/RFC5927, July 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc5927 - [RFC6194]
-
T. Polk, L. Chen, S. Turner, and P. Hoffman, "Security Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc6194 - [RFC6274]
-
F. Gont, "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol Version 4", RFC 6274, DOI 10.17487/RFC6274, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc6274 - [RFC6973]
-
A. Cooper, H. Tschofenig, B. Aboba, J. Peterson, J. Morris, M. Hansen, and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc6973 - [RFC6980]
-
F. Gont, "Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery", RFC 6980, DOI 10.17487/RFC6980, August 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc6980 - [RFC7098]
-
B. Carpenter, S. Jiang, and W. Tarreau, "Using the IPv6 Flow Label for Load Balancing in Server Farms", RFC 7098, DOI 10.17487/RFC7098, January 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc7098 - [RFC7258]
-
S. Farrell, and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc7258 - [RFC7707]
-
F. Gont, and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6 Networks", RFC 7707, DOI 10.17487/RFC7707, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc7707 - [RFC7721]
-
A. Cooper, F. Gont, and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms", RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc7721 - [RFC7739]
-
F. Gont, "Security Implications of Predictable Fragment Identification Values", RFC 7739, DOI 10.17487/RFC7739, February 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc7739 - [RFC8446]
-
E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc8446 - [RFC8937]
-
C. Cremers, L. Garratt, S. Smyshlyaev, N. Sullivan, and C. Wood, "Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols", RFC 8937, DOI 10.17487/RFC8937, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc8937 - [RFC9414]
-
F Gont, and I Arce, "Unfortunate History of Transient Numeric Identifiers", RFC 9414, DOI 10.17487/RFC9414, July 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc9414 - [RFC9416]
-
F Gont, and I Arce, "Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols", BCP 72, RFC 9416, DOI 10.17487/RFC9416, July 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/ >.rfc9416 - [Romailler2020]
-
Y. Romailler, "The Definitive Guide to "Modulo Bias and How to Avoid It"!", July 2020,
<https://research.kudelskisecurity.com/2020/ >.07/ 28/ the-definitive-guide-to-modulo-bias-and-how-to-avoid-it/ - [Sanfilippo1998a]
-
S. Sanfilippo, "about the ip header id", December 1998,
<http://seclists.org/bugtraq/ >.1998/ Dec/ 48 - [Sanfilippo1998b]
-
S. Sanfilippo, "new tcp scan method", December 1998,
<https://seclists.org/bugtraq/ >.1998/ Dec/ 79 - [Sanfilippo1999]
-
S. Sanfilippo, "more ip id", November 1999,
<https://github.com/antirez/ >.hping/ raw/ master/ docs/ MORE-FUN-WITH-IPID - [Schuba1993]
-
C. Schuba, "Addressing Weakness in the Domain Name System Protocol", August 1993,
<http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/ >.papers/ christoph-schuba/ schuba-DNS-msthesis.pdf - [Shimomura1995]
-
T. Shimomura, "Technical details of the attack described by Markoff in NYT", January 1995,
<https://www.gont.com.ar/files/ >.post-shimomura-usenet.txt - [Silbersack2005]
-
The FreeBSD Project, M. Silbersack, "Improving TCP/IP security through randomization without sacrificing interoperability",
<https://www.silby.com/eurobsdcon05/ >.eurobsdcon_silbersack.pdf - [SipHash]
-
"SipHash: a fast short-input PRF", February 2023,
<https://github.com/veorq/ >.SipHash - [TBIT]
-
TBIT, "TBIT, the TCP Behavior Inference Tool", 2001,
<https://www.icir.org/tbit/ >. - [TCPT-uptime]
-
Securiteam, B. McDanel, "TCP Timestamping - Obtaining System Uptime Remotely", March 2001,
<https://seclists.org/bugtraq/ >.2001/ Mar/ 182 - [Zalewski2001]
-
M. Zalewski, "Strange Attractors and TCP/IP Sequence Number Analysis", April 2001,
<https://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/oldtcp/ >.tcpseq.html - [Zalewski2002]
-
M. Zalewski, "Strange Attractors and TCP/IP Sequence Number Analysis - One Year Later (2002)",
<https://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/ >. - [Zalewski2012]
-
M. Zalewski, "p0f v3 (3.09b)",
<https://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/p0f.shtml >.
Appendix A. Algorithms and Techniques with Known Issues
The following subsections discuss algorithms and techniques with known negative security and privacy implications.
A.1. Predictable Linear Identifiers Algorithm
One of the most trivial ways to achieve uniqueness with a low identifier reuse frequency is to produce a linear sequence. This type of algorithm has been employed in the past to generate identifiers of Categories #1, #2, and #4 (please see Section 6 for an analysis of these categories).
For example, the following algorithm has been employed (see, e.g., [Morris1985], [Shimomura1995], [Silbersack2005], and [CPNI-TCP]) in a number of operating systems for selecting IP IDs, TCP ephemeral port numbers, etc.:
NOTE:
suitable_id() checks whether a candidate numeric identifier is suitable (e.g., whether it is unique or not).
For obvious reasons, this algorithm results in predictable sequences. Since a global counter is used to generate the transient numeric identifiers ("next_id" in the example above), an entity that learns one numeric identifier can infer past numeric identifiers and predict future values to be generated by the same algorithm. Since the value employed for the increments is known (such as "1" in this case), an attacker can sample two values and learn the number of identifiers that were generated in between the two sampled values. Furthermore, if the counter is initialized, to some known value (e.g., when the system is bootstrapped), the algorithm will leak additional information, such as the number of transmitted fragmented datagrams in the case of an IP ID generator [Sanfilippo1998a] or the system uptime in the case of TCP timestamps [TCPT-uptime].
/* Initialization code */
next_id = min_id;
id_inc= 1;
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
retry = id_range;
do {
if (next_id == max_id) {
next_id = min_id;
}
else {
next_id = next_id + id_inc;
}
if (suitable_id(next_id)) {
return next_id;
}
retry--;
} while (retry > 0);
return ERROR;
A.2. Random-Increments Algorithm
This algorithm offers a middle ground between the algorithms that generate randomized transient numeric identifiers (such as those described in Sections [7.1.1] and [7.1.2]) and those that generate identifiers with a predictable monotonically increasing function (see Appendix A.1).
NOTE:
random() is a PRNG that returns a pseudorandom unsigned integer number of appropriate size. Beware that "adapting" the length of the output of random() with a modulo operator (e.g., C language's "%") may change the distribution of the PRNG. To preserve a uniform distribution, the rejection sampling technique [Romailler2020] can be used.
suitable_id() is a function that checks whether a candidate identifier is suitable (e.g., whether it is unique or not).
This algorithm aims at producing a global monotonically increasing sequence of transient numeric identifiers while avoiding the use of fixed increments, which would lead to trivially predictable sequences. The value "id_rinc" allows for direct control of the trade-off between unpredictability and identifier reuse frequency. The smaller the value of "id_rinc", the more similar this algorithm is to a predicable, global linear identifier generation algorithm (as the one in Appendix A.1). The larger the value of "id_rinc", the more similar this algorithm is to the algorithm described in Section 7.1.1 of this document.
When the identifiers wrap, there is a risk of collisions of transient numeric identifiers (i.e., identifier reuse). Therefore, "id_rinc" should be selected according to the following criteria:
/* Initialization code */
next_id = random(); /* Initialization value */
id_rinc = 500; /* Determines the trade-off */
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
retry = id_range;
do {
/* Random increment */
id_inc = (random() % id_rinc) + 1;
if ( (max_id - next_id) >= id_inc){
next_id = next_id + id_inc;
}
else {
next_id = min_id + id_inc - (max_id - next_id);
}
if (suitable_id(next_id)) {
return next_id;
}
retry = retry - id_inc;
} while (retry > 0);
return ERROR;
- It should maximize the wrapping time of the identifier space.
- It should minimize identifier reuse frequency.
- It should maximize unpredictability.
A.3. Reusing Identifiers Across Different Contexts
Employing the same identifier across contexts in which stability is not required (i.e., overloading the semantics of transient numeric identifiers) usually has negative security and privacy implications.
For example, in order to generate transient numeric identifiers of Category #2 or #3, an implementation or specification might be tempted to employ a source for the numeric identifiers that is known to provide unique values but that may also be predictable or leak information related to the entity generating the identifier. This technique has been employed in the past for, e.g., generating IPv6 IIDs by reusing the MAC address of the underlying network interface card. However, as noted in [RFC 7721] and [RFC 7707], embedding link-layer addresses in IPv6 IIDs not only results in predictable values but also leaks information about the manufacturer of the underlying network interface card, allows for network activity correlation, and makes address-based scanning attacks feasible.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Bernard Aboba, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Steven Bellovin, Luis León Cárdenas Graide, Spencer Dawkins, Theo de Raadt, Guillermo Gont, Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Gre Norcie, Colin Perkins, Vincent Roca, Shivan Sahib, Rich Salz, Martin Thomson, and Michael Tüxen for providing valuable comments on earlier draft versions of this document.
The authors would like to thank Shivan Sahib and Christopher Wood for their guidance during the publication process of this document.
The authors would like to thank Jean-Philippe Aumasson and Mathew D. Green (John Hopkins University) for kindly answering a number of questions.
The authors would like to thank Diego Armando Maradona for his magic and inspiration.
Authors' Addresses
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
Segurola y Habana 4310 7mo piso
Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires
Argentina
Email: fgont@si6networks.com
Ivan Arce
Quarkslab
Segurola y Habana 4310 7mo piso
Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires
Argentina
Email: iarce@quarkslab.com
