This document specifies a TLS 1.3 extension that allows a server to authenticate with a combination of a certificate and an external pre-shared key (PSK).

This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for examination, experimental implementation, and evaluation. This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8773.

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The TLS 1.3 [RFC 8446] handshake protocol provides two mutually exclusive forms of server authentication. First, the server can be authenticated by providing a signature certificate and creating a valid digital signature to demonstrate that it possesses the corresponding private key. Second, the server can be authenticated by demonstrating that it possesses a pre-shared key (PSK) that was established by a previous handshake. A PSK that is established in this fashion is called a resumption PSK. A PSK that is established by any other means is called an external PSK. This document specifies a TLS 1.3 extension permitting certificate-based server authentication to be combined with an external PSK as an input to the TLS 1.3 key schedule. Several implementors wanted to gain more experience with this specification before producing a Standards Track RFC. As a result, this specification is being published as an Experimental RFC to enable interoperable implementations and gain deployment and operational experience.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC 2119] [RFC 8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The development of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed today, including the digital signature algorithms that are used to authenticate the server in the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol. It is an open question whether or not it is feasible to build a large-scale quantum computer, and if so, when that might happen. However, if such a quantum computer is invented, many of the cryptographic algorithms and the security protocols that use them would become vulnerable. The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol employs key agreement algorithms and digital signature algorithms that could be broken by the development of a large-scale quantum computer [TRANSITION]. The key agreement algorithms include Diffie-Hellman (DH) [DH1976] and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [IEEE1363]; the digital signature algorithms include RSA [RFC 8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [FIPS186]. As a result, an adversary that stores a TLS 1.3 handshake protocol exchange today could decrypt the associated encrypted communications in the future when a large-scale quantum computer becomes available. In the near term, this document describes a TLS 1.3 extension to protect today's communications from the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer by providing a strong external PSK as an input to the TLS 1.3 key schedule while preserving the authentication provided by the existing certificate and digital signature mechanisms.

This section provides a brief overview of the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension. The client includes the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension in the ClientHello message. The "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension MUST be accompanied by the "key_share", "psk_key_exchange_modes", and "pre_shared_key" extensions. The client MAY also find it useful to include the "supported_groups" extension. Since the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is intended to be used only with initial handshakes, it MUST NOT be sent alongside the "early_data" extension. These extensions are all described in Section 4.2 of RFC 8446, which also requires the "pre_shared_key" extension to be the last extension in the ClientHello message. If the client includes both the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension and the "early_data" extension, then the server MUST terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert. If the server is willing to use one of the external PSKs listed in the "pre_shared_key" extension and perform certificate-based authentication, then the server includes the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension in the ServerHello message. The "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension MUST be accompanied by the "key_share" and "pre_shared_key" extensions. If none of the external PSKs in the list provided by the client is acceptable to the server, then the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is omitted from the ServerHello message. When the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is successfully negotiated, the TLS 1.3 key schedule processing includes both the selected external PSK and the (EC)DHE shared secret value. (EC)DHE refers to Diffie-Hellman over either finite fields or elliptic curves. As a result, the Early Secret, Handshake Secret, and Master Secret values all depend upon the value of the selected external PSK. Of course, the Early Secret does not depend upon the (EC)DHE shared secret. The authentication of the server and optional authentication of the client depend upon the ability to generate a signature that can be validated with the public key in their certificates. The authentication processing is not changed in any way by the selected external PSK. Each external PSK is associated with a single hash algorithm, which is required by Section 4.2.11 of RFC 8446. The hash algorithm MUST be set when the PSK is established, with a default of SHA-256.

This section specifies the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension, which MAY appear in the ClientHello message and ServerHello message. It MUST NOT appear in any other messages. The "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension MUST NOT appear in the ServerHello message unless the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension appeared in the preceding ClientHello message. If an implementation recognizes the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension and receives it in any other message, then the implementation MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. The general extension mechanisms enable clients and servers to negotiate the use of specific extensions. Clients request extended functionality from servers with the extensions field in the ClientHello message. If the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest message, then the client sends another ClientHello message as described in Section 4.1.2 of RFC 8446, including the same "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension as the original ClientHello message, or aborts the handshake. Many server extensions are carried in the EncryptedExtensions message; however, the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is carried in the ServerHello message. Successful negotiation of the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension affects the key used for encryption, so it cannot be carried in the EncryptedExtensions message. Therefore, the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is only present in the ServerHello message if the server recognizes the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension and the server possesses one of the external PSKs offered by the client in the "pre_shared_key" extension in the ClientHello message. The Extension structure is defined in [RFC 8446]; it is repeated here for convenience. The "extension_type" identifies the particular extension type, and the "extension_data" contains information specific to the particular extension type. This document specifies the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension, adding one new type to ExtensionType: The "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is relevant when the client and server possess an external PSK in common that can be used as an input to the TLS 1.3 key schedule. The "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is essentially a flag to use the external PSK in the key schedule, and it has the following syntax:

Section 4 lists the extensions that are required to accompany the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension. Most of those extensions are not impacted in any way by this specification. However, this section discusses the extensions that require additional consideration. The "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension is defined in of Section 4.2.9 of RFC 8446. The "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension restricts the use of both the PSKs offered in this ClientHello and those that the server might supply via a subsequent NewSessionTicket. As a result, when the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension is included in the ClientHello message, clients MUST include psk_dhe_ke mode. In addition, clients MAY also include psk_ke mode to support a subsequent NewSessionTicket. When the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension is included in the ServerHello message, servers MUST select the psk_dhe_ke mode for the initial handshake. Servers MUST select a key exchange mode that is listed by the client for subsequent handshakes that include the resumption PSK from the initial handshake. The "pre_shared_key" extension is defined in Section 4.2.11 of RFC 8446. The syntax is repeated below for convenience. All of the listed PSKs MUST be external PSKs. If a resumption PSK is listed along with the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension, the server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. "OfferedPsks" contains the list of PSK identities and associated binders for the external PSKs that the client is willing to use with the server. The identities are a list of external PSK identities that the client is willing to negotiate with the server. Each external PSK has an associated identity that is known to the client and the server; the associated identities may be known to other parties as well. In addition, the binder validation (see below) confirms that the client and server have the same key associated with the identity. The "obfuscated_ticket_age" is not used for external PSKs. As stated in Section 4.2.11 of RFC 8446, clients SHOULD set this value to 0, and servers MUST ignore the value. The binders are a series of HMAC [RFC 2104] values, one for each external PSK offered by the client, in the same order as the identities list. The HMAC value is computed using the binder_key, which is derived from the external PSK, and a partial transcript of the current handshake. Generation of the binder_key from the external PSK is described in Section 7.1 of RFC 8446. The partial transcript of the current handshake includes a partial ClientHello up to and including the PreSharedKeyExtension.identities field, as described in Section 4.2.11.2 of RFC 8446. The "selected_identity" contains the index of the external PSK identity that the server selected from the list offered by the client. As described in Section 4.2.11 of RFC 8446, the server MUST validate the binder value that corresponds to the selected external PSK, and if the binder does not validate, the server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

When the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is successfully negotiated, authentication of the server depends upon the ability to generate a signature that can be validated with the public key in the server's certificate. This is accomplished by the server sending the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages, as described in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 of [RFC 8446]. TLS 1.3 does not permit the server to send a CertificateRequest message when a PSK is being used. This restriction is removed when the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is negotiated, allowing certificate-based authentication for both the client and the server. If certificate-based client authentication is desired, this is accomplished by the client sending the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages as described in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 of [RFC 8446].

Section 7.1 of RFC 8446 specifies the TLS 1.3 key schedule. The successful negotiation of the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension requires the key schedule processing to include both the external PSK and the (EC)DHE shared secret value. If the client and the server have different values associated with the selected external PSK identifier, then the client and the server will compute different values for every entry in the key schedule, which will lead to the client aborting the handshake with a "decrypt_error" alert.

IANA has updated the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry [IANA] to include "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" with a value of 33 and the list of messages "CH, SH" in which the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension may appear.

The Security Considerations in [RFC 8446] remain relevant. TLS 1.3 [RFC 8446] does not permit the server to send a CertificateRequest message when a PSK is being used. This restriction is removed when the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is offered by the client and accepted by the server. However, TLS 1.3 does not permit an external PSK to be used in the same fashion as a resumption PSK, and this extension does not alter those restrictions. Thus, a certificate MUST NOT be used with a resumption PSK. Implementations must protect the external pre-shared key (PSK). Compromise of the external PSK will make the encrypted session content vulnerable to the future development of a large-scale quantum computer. However, the generation, distribution, and management of the external PSKs is out of scope for this specification. Implementers should not transmit the same content on a connection that is protected with an external PSK and a connection that is not. Doing so may allow an eavesdropper to correlate the connections, making the content vulnerable to the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer. Implementations must generate external PSKs with a secure key-management technique, such as pseudorandom generation of the key or derivation of the key from one or more other secure keys. The use of inadequate pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) to generate external PSKs can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the external PSKs and search the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute-force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. [RFC 4086] offers important guidance in this area. If the external PSK is known to any party other than the client and the server, then the external PSK MUST NOT be the sole basis for authentication. The reasoning is explained in Section 4.2 of [K2016]. When this extension is used, authentication is based on certificates, not the external PSK. In this extension, the external PSK preserves confidentiality if the (EC)DH key agreement is ever broken by cryptanalysis or the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer. As long as the attacker does not know the PSK and the key derivation algorithm remains unbroken, the attacker cannot derive the session secrets, even if they are able to compute the (EC)DH shared secret. Should the attacker be able compute the (EC)DH shared secret, the forward-secrecy advantages traditionally associated with ephemeral (EC)DH keys will no longer be relevant. Although the ephemeral private keys used during a given TLS session are destroyed at the end of a session, preventing the attacker from later accessing them, these private keys would nevertheless be recoverable due to the break in the algorithm. However, a more general notion of "secrecy after key material is destroyed" would still be achievable using external PSKs, if they are managed in a way that ensures their destruction when they are no longer needed, and with the assumption that the algorithms that use the external PSKs remain quantum-safe. TLS 1.3 key derivation makes use of the HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) algorithm, which depends upon the HMAC [RFC 2104] construction and a hash function. This extension provides the desired protection for the session secrets, as long as HMAC with the selected hash function is a pseudorandom function (PRF) [GGM1986]. This specification does not require that the external PSK is known only by the client and server. The external PSK may be known to a group. Since authentication depends on the public key in a certificate, knowledge of the external PSK by other parties does not enable impersonation. Since confidentiality depends on the shared secret from (EC)DH, knowledge of the external PSK by other parties does not enable eavesdropping. However, group members can record the traffic of other members and then decrypt it if they ever gain access to a large-scale quantum computer. Also, when many parties know the external PSK, there are many opportunities for theft of the external PSK by an attacker. Once an attacker has the external PSK, they can decrypt stored traffic if they ever gain access to a large-scale quantum computer, in the same manner as a legitimate group member. TLS 1.3 [RFC 8446] takes a conservative approach to PSKs; they are bound to a specific hash function and KDF. By contrast, TLS 1.2 [RFC 5246] allows PSKs to be used with any hash function and the TLS 1.2 PRF. Thus, the safest approach is to use a PSK exclusively with TLS 1.2 or exclusively with TLS 1.3. Given one PSK, one can derive a PSK for exclusive use with TLS 1.2 and derive another PSK for exclusive use with TLS 1.3 using the mechanism specified in [IMPORT]. TLS 1.3 [RFC 8446] has received careful security analysis, and the following informal reasoning shows that the addition of this extension does not introduce any security defects. This extension requires the use of certificates for authentication, but the processing of certificates is unchanged by this extension. This extension places an external PSK in the key schedule as part of the computation of the Early Secret. In the initial handshake without this extension, the Early Secret is computed as: With this extension, the Early Secret is computed as: Any entropy contributed by the external PSK can only make the Early Secret better; the External PSK cannot make it worse. For these two reasons, TLS 1.3 continues to meet its security goals when this extension is used.

Appendix E.6 of RFC 8446 discusses identity-exposure attacks on PSKs. The guidance in this section remains relevant. This extension makes use of external PSKs to improve resilience against attackers that gain access to a large-scale quantum computer in the future. This extension is always accompanied by the "pre_shared_key" extension to provide the PSK identities in plaintext in the ClientHello message. Passive observation of the these PSK identities will aid an attacker in tracking users of this extension.

[RFC2119]

S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC8174]

B. Leiba, "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

[RFC8446]

E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

[DH1976]

W Diffie, and M Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography", DOI 10.1109/TIT.1976.1055638, November 1976,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1055638>.

[FIPS186]

NIST, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 186-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4>.

[GGM1986]

O Goldreich, S Goldwasser, and S Micali, "How to construct random functions", DOI 10.1145/6490.6503, August 1986,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/6490.6503>.

[IANA]

IANA, "TLS ExtensionType Values",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml>.

[IEEE1363]

IEEE, "IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography", IEEE Std 1363-2000, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2000.92292, August 2000,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/891000>.

[IMPORT]

D Benjamin, and C Wood, "Importing External PSKs for TLS", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-03, February 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-03>.

[K2016]

H Krawczyk, "A Unilateral-to-Mutual Authentication Compiler for Key Exchange (with Applications to Client Authentication in TLS 1.3)", DOI 10.1145/2976749.2978325, October 2016,
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2976749.2978325>.

[RFC2104]

H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

[RFC4086]

D. Eastlake 3rd, J. Schiller, and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

[RFC5246]

T. Dierks, and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

[RFC8017]

K. Moriarty, B. Kaliski, J. Jonsson, and A. Rusch, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.

[TRANSITION]

P Hoffman, "The Transition from Classical to Post-Quantum Cryptography", Internet-Draft draft-hoffman-c2pq-06, November 2019,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-c2pq-06>.

Many thanks to Liliya Akhmetzyanova, Roman Danyliw, Christian Huitema, Ben Kaduk, Geoffrey Keating, Hugo Krawczyk, Mirja Kühlewind, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos, Nick Sullivan, Martin Thomson, and Peter Yee for their review and comments; their efforts have improved this document.

Russ Housley