This document describes the encapsulation of IOAM Data-Fields in IPv6. For general IOAM security considerations, see [
RFC 9197]. Security considerations of the specific IOAM Data-Fields for each case (i.e., Trace, POT, and E2E) are also described and defined in [
RFC 9197].
As this document describes new options for IPv6, the security considerations of [
RFC 8200] and [
RFC 8250] apply.
From a network-protection perspective, there is an assumed trust model such that any node that adds IOAM to a packet, removes IOAM from a packet, or modifies IOAM Data-Fields of a packet is assumed to be allowed to do so. By default, packets that include IPv6 extension headers with IOAM information
MUST NOT be leaked through the boundaries of the IOAM-Domain.
IOAM-Domain boundary routers
MUST filter any incoming traffic from outside the IOAM-Domain that contains IPv6 extension headers with IOAM information. IOAM-Domain boundary routers
MUST also filter any outgoing traffic leaving the IOAM-Domain that contains IPv6 extension headers with IOAM information.
In the general case, an IOAM node only adds, removes, or modifies an IPv6 extension header with IOAM information, if the directive to do so comes from a trusted source and the directive is validated.
Problems may occur if the above behaviors are not implemented or if the assumed trust model is violated (e.g., through a security breach). In addition to the security considerations discussed in [
RFC 9197], the security considerations associated with IPv6 extension headers listed in [
RFC 9098] apply.
The network devices in an IOAM-Domain are trusted to add, update, and remove IOAM options according to the constraints specified in [
RFC 8200]. IOAM-Domain does not rely on the AH as defined in [
RFC 4302] to secure IOAM options. The use of IOAM options with AH and its processing are not defined in this document. Future documents may define the use of IOAM with AH and its processing.