This section discusses security considerations when SIP user agents issue emergency alerts utilizing MESSAGE and CAP. Location-specific threats are not unique to this document and are discussed in [
RFC 7378] and [
RFC 6442].
The Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies (ECRIT) emergency services architecture [
RFC 6443] considers classic individual-to-authority emergency calling where the identity of the emergency caller does not play a role at the time of the call establishment itself, i.e., a response to the emergency call does not depend on the identity of the caller. In the case of emergency alerts generated by devices such as sensors, the processing may be different in order to reduce the number of falsely generated emergency alerts. Alerts could get triggered based on certain sensor input that might have been caused by factors other than the actual occurrence of an alert-relevant event. For example, a sensor may simply be malfunctioning. For this reason, not all alert messages are directly sent to a PSAP, but rather, may be pre-processed by a separate entity, potentially under supervision by a human, to filter alerts and potentially correlate received alerts with others to obtain a larger picture of the ongoing situation.
In any case, for alerts initiated by sensors, the identity could play an important role in deciding whether to accept or ignore an incoming alert message. With the scenario shown in
Figure 1, it is very likely that only authenticated sensor input will be processed. For this reason, it needs to be possible to refuse to accept alert messages from unknown origins. Two types of information elements can be used for this purpose:
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SIP itself provides security mechanisms that allow the verification of the originator's identity, such as P-Asserted-Identity [RFC 3325] or SIP Identity [RFC 8224]. The latter provides a cryptographic assurance while the former relies on a chain-of-trust model. These mechanisms can be reused.
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CAP provides additional security mechanisms and the ability to carry further information about the sender's identity. Section 3.3.4.1 of [CAP] specifies the signing algorithms of CAP documents.
The specific policy and mechanisms used in a given deployment are out of scope for this document.
There is no rate limiting mechanisms in SIP, and all kinds of emergency calls, including those defined in this document, could be used by malicious actors or misbehaving devices to effect a denial-of-service attack on the emergency services. The mechanism defined in this document does not introduce any new considerations, although it may be more likely that devices that place non-interactive emergency calls without a human initiating them may be more likely than those that require a user to initiate them.
Implementors should note that automated emergency calls may be prohibited or regulated in some jurisdictions, and there may be penalties for "false positive" calls.
This document describes potential retrieval of information by dereferencing URIs found in a Call Info header of a SIP MESSAGE. These may include a CAP alert as well as other additional data [
RFC 7852] blocks. The domain of the device sending the SIP MESSAGE; the domain of the server holding the CAP alert, if sent by reference; and the domain of other additional data blocks, if sent by reference, may all be different. No assumptions can be made that there are trust relationships between these entities. Recipients
MUST take precautions in retrieving any additional data blocks passed by reference, including the CAP alert, because the URI may point to a malicious actor or entity not expecting to be referred to for this purpose. The considerations in handling URIs in [
RFC 3986] apply.
Use of timestamps to prevent replay is subject to the availability of accurate time at all participants. Because emergency event notification via this mechanism is relatively low frequency and generally involves human interaction, implementations may wish to consider messages with times within a small number of seconds of each other to be effectively simultaneous for the purposes of detecting replay. Implementations may also wish to consider that most deployed time distribution protocols likely to be used by these systems are not presently secure.
In addition to the desire to perform identity-based access control, the classic communication security threats need to be considered, including integrity protection to prevent forgery or replay of alert messages in transit. To deal with replay of alerts, a CAP document contains the mandatory <identifier>, <sender>, and <sent> elements and an optional <expire> element. Together, these elements make the CAP document unique for a specific sender and provide time restrictions. An entity that has already received a CAP alert within the indicated timeframe is able to detect a replayed message and, if the content of that message is unchanged, then no additional security vulnerability is created. Additionally, it is
RECOMMENDED to make use of SIP security mechanisms, such as the SIP Identity PASSporT [
RFC 8225], to tie the CAP alert to the SIP message. To provide protection of the entire SIP message exchange between neighboring SIP entities, the usage of TLS is
RECOMMENDED. [
RFC 6443] discusses the issues of using TLS with emergency calls, which are equally applicable to non-interactive emergency calls.
Note that none of the security mechanisms in this document protect against a compromised sensor sending crafted alerts. Confidentiality provided for any emergency calls, including non-interactive messages, is subject to local regulations. Privacy issues are discussed in [
RFC 7852] and are applicable here.