RFC 7788
Home Networking Control Protocol
8. Naming and Service Discovery
Network-wide naming and service discovery can greatly improve the user friendliness of a network. The following mechanism provides means to setup and delegate naming and service discovery across multiple HNCP routers. Each HNCP router SHOULD provide and advertise a recursive name resolving server to clients that honor the announcements made in Delegated-Zone TLVs (Section 10.5), Domain-Name TLVs (Section 10.6), and Node-Name TLVs (Section 10.7), i.e., delegate queries to the designated name servers and hand out appropriate A, AAAA, and PTR records according to the mentioned TLVs. Each HNCP router SHOULD provide and announce an auto-generated or user-configured name for each internal Common Link (Section 6.1) for which it is the designated DHCPv4, stateful DHCPv6 server, mDNS proxy, or for which it provides forward or reverse DNS services on behalf of connected devices. This announcement is done using Delegated-Zone TLVs (Section 10.5) and MUST be unique in the whole network. In case of a conflict, the announcement of the node with the greatest node identifier takes precedence, and all other nodes MUST cease to announce the conflicting TLV. HNCP routers providing recursive name resolving services MUST use the included DNS server
address within the TLV to resolve names belonging to the zone as if there was an NS record. Each HNCP node SHOULD announce a node name for itself to be easily reachable and MAY announce names on behalf of other devices. Announcements are made using Node-Name TLVs (Section 10.7), and the announced names MUST be unique in the whole network. In case of a conflict, the announcement of the node with the greatest node identifier takes precedence, and all other nodes MUST cease to announce the conflicting TLV. HNCP routers providing recursive name resolving services as described above MUST resolve such announced names to their respective IP addresses as if there were corresponding A/AAAA records. Names and unqualified zones are used in an HNCP network to provide naming and service discovery with local significance. A network-wide zone is appended to all single labels or unqualified zones in order to qualify them. ".home" is the default; however, an administrator MAY configure the announcement of a Domain-Name TLV (Section 10.6) for the network to use a different one. In case multiple are announced, the domain of the node with the greatest node identifier takes precedence.9. Securing Third-Party Protocols
PSKs are often required to secure (for example) IGPs and other protocols that lack support for asymmetric security. The following mechanism manages PSKs using HNCP to enable bootstrapping of such third-party protocols. The scheme SHOULD NOT be used unless it's in conjunction with secured HNCP unicast transport (i.e., DTLS), as transferring the PSK in plaintext anywhere in the network is a potential risk, especially as the originator may not know about security (and use of DNCP security) on all links. The following rules define how such a PSK is managed and used: o If no Managed-PSK TLV (Section 10.8) is currently being announced, an HNCP node using this mechanism MUST create one after a random delay of 0 to 10 seconds with a 32 bytes long random key and add it to its node data. o In case multiple nodes announce such a TLV at the same time, all but the one with the greatest node identifier stop advertising it and adopt the remaining one. o The node currently advertising the Managed-PSK TLV MUST generate and advertise a new random one whenever an unreachable node is removed from the DNCP topology as described in Section 4.6 of [RFC7787].
PSKs for individual protocols SHOULD be derived from the random PSK using a suitable one-way hashing algorithm (e.g., by using the HMAC- based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) based on HMAC-SHA256 [RFC6234] with the particular protocol name in the info field) so that disclosure of any derived key does not impact other users of the managed PSK. Furthermore, derived PSKs MUST be updated whenever the managed PSK changes.10. Type-Length-Value Objects
HNCP defines the following TLVs in addition to those defined by DNCP. The same general rules and defaults for encoding as noted in Section 7 of [RFC7787] apply. Note that most HNCP variable-length TLVs also support optional nested TLVs, and they are encoded after the variable-length content, followed by the zero padding of the variable-length content to the next 32-bit boundary. TLVs defined here are only valid when appearing in their designated context, i.e., only directly within container TLVs mentioned in their definition or -- absent any mentions -- only as top-level TLVs within the node data set. TLVs appearing outside their designated context MUST be ignored. TLVs encoding IP addresses or prefixes allow encoding both IPv6 and IPv4 addresses and prefixes. IPv6 information is encoded as is, whereas for IPv4, the IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses format [RFC4291] is used, and prefix lengths are encoded as the original IPv4 prefix length increased by 96.10.1. HNCP-Version TLV
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type: HNCP-Version (32) | Length: >= 5 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Reserved | M | P | H | L | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | User-agent | This TLV is used to indicate the supported version and router capabilities of an HNCP node as described in Section 4. Reserved: Bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be set to 0 when creating this TLV, and their value MUST be ignored when processing the TLV.
M-capability: Priority value used for electing the on-link mDNS
[RFC6762] proxy. It MUST be set to 0 if the router is not capable
of proxying mDNS, otherwise it SHOULD be set to 4 but MAY be set
to any value from 1 to 7 to indicate a non-default priority. The
values 8-15 are reserved for future use.
P-capability: Priority value used for electing the on-link DHCPv6-PD
server. It MUST be set to 0 if the router is not capable of
providing prefixes through DHCPv6-PD (Section 6.3.4), otherwise it
SHOULD be set to 4 but MAY be set to any value from 1 to 7 to
indicate a non-default priority. The values 8-15 are reserved for
future use.
H-capability: Priority value used for electing the on-link DHCPv6
server offering non-temporary addresses. It MUST be set to 0 if
the router is not capable of providing such addresses, otherwise
it SHOULD be set to 4 but MAY be set to any value from 1 to 7 to
indicate a non-default priority. The values 8-15 are reserved for
future use.
L-capability: Priority value used for electing the on-link DHCPv4
server. It MUST be set to 0 if the router is not capable of
running a legacy DHCPv4 server offering IPv4 addresses to clients,
otherwise it SHOULD be set to 4 but MAY be set to any value from 1
to 7 to indicate a non-default priority. The values 8-15 are
reserved for future use.
User-Agent: The user-agent is a human-readable UTF-8 string that
describes the name and version of the current HNCP implementation.
10.2. External-Connection TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: External-Connection (33)| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| (Optional nested TLVs) |
An External-Connection TLV is a container TLV used to gather network
configuration information associated with a single external
connection (Section 6.2) to be shared across the HNCP network. A
node MAY publish an arbitrary number of instances of this TLV to
share the desired number of external connections. Upon reception,
the information transmitted in any nested TLVs is used for the
purposes of prefix assignment (Section 6.3) and host configuration
(Section 7).
10.2.1. Delegated-Prefix TLV
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type: Delegated-Prefix (34) | Length: >= 9 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Valid Lifetime Since Origination | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Preferred Lifetime Since Origination | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Prefix Length | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Prefix + ... | | 0-pad if any | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | (Optional nested TLVs) | The Delegated-Prefix TLV is used by HNCP routers to advertise prefixes that are allocated to the whole network and can be used for prefix assignment. Delegated-Prefix TLVs are only valid inside External-Connection TLVs, and their prefixes MUST NOT overlap with those of other such TLVs in the same container. Valid Lifetime Since Origination: The time in seconds the delegated prefix was valid for at the origination time of the node data containing this TLV. The value MUST be updated whenever the node republishes its Node-State TLV. Preferred Lifetime Since Origination: The time in seconds the delegated prefix was preferred for at the origination time of the node data containing this TLV. The value MUST be updated whenever the node republishes its Node-State TLV. Prefix Length: The number of significant bits in the prefix. Prefix: Significant bits of the prefix padded with zeros up to the next byte boundary.
10.2.1.1. Prefix-Policy TLV
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type: Prefix-Policy (43) | Length: >= 1 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Policy Type | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Value + | | The Prefix-Policy TLV contains information about the policy or applicability of a delegated prefix. This information can be used to determine whether prefixes for a certain use case (e.g., local reachability, Internet connectivity) do exist or are to be acquired and to make decisions about assigning prefixes to certain links or to fine-tune border firewalls. See Section 6.2 for a more in-depth discussion. This TLV is only valid inside a Delegated-Prefix TLV. Policy Type: The type of the policy identifier. 0: Internet connectivity (no value). 1-128: Explicit destination prefix with the Policy Type being the actual length of the prefix and the value containing significant bits of the destination prefix padded with zeros up to the next byte boundary. 129: DNS domain. The value contains a DNS label sequence encoded per [RFC1035]. Compression MUST NOT be used. The label sequence MUST end with an empty label. 130: Opaque UTF-8 string (e.g., for administrative purposes). 131: Restrictive assignment (no value). 132-255: Reserved for future additions. Value: A variable-length identifier of the given type.
10.2.2. DHCPv6-Data TLV
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type: DHCPv6-Data (37) | Length: > 0 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | DHCPv6 option stream | This TLV is used to encode auxiliary IPv6 configuration information (e.g., recursive DNS servers) encoded as a stream of DHCPv6 options. It is only valid in an External-Connection TLV or a Delegated-Prefix TLV encoding an IPv6 prefix and MUST NOT occur more than once in any single container. When included in an External-Connection TLV, it contains DHCPv6 options relevant to the external connection as a whole. When included in a delegated prefix, it contains options mandatory to handle said prefix. DHCPv6 option stream: DHCPv6 options encoded as specified in [RFC3315].10.2.3. DHCPv4-Data TLV
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type: DHCPv4-Data (38) | Length: > 0 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | DHCPv4 option stream | This TLV is used to encode auxiliary IPv4 configuration information (e.g., recursive DNS servers) encoded as a stream of DHCPv4 options. It is only valid in an External-Connection TLV and MUST NOT occur more than once in any single container. It contains DHCPv4 options relevant to the external connection as a whole. DHCPv4 option stream: DHCPv4 options encoded as specified in [RFC2131].
10.3. Assigned-Prefix TLV
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type: Assigned-Prefix (35) | Length: >= 6 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Endpoint Identifier | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Rsv. | Prty. | Prefix Length | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Prefix + ... | | 0-pad if any | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | (Optional nested TLVs) | This TLV is used to announce Published Assigned Prefixes for the purposes of prefix assignment (Section 6.3). Endpoint Identifier: The endpoint identifier of the local interface the prefix is assigned to, or 0 if it is assigned to a Private Link (e.g., when the prefix is assigned for downstream prefix delegation). Rsv.: Bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be set to 0 when creating this TLV, and their value MUST be ignored when processing the TLV. Prty: The Advertised Prefix Priority from 0 to 15. 0-1: Low priorities. 2: Default priority. 3-7: High priorities. 8-11: Administrative priorities. MUST NOT be used unless configured otherwise. 12-14: Reserved for future use. 15: Provider priorities. MAY only be used by the router advertising the corresponding delegated prefix and based on static or dynamic configuration (e.g., for excluding a prefix based on the DHCPv6-PD Prefix Exclude Option [RFC6603]).
Prefix Length: The number of significant bits in the Prefix field.
Prefix: The significant bits of the prefix padded with zeros up to
the next byte boundary.
10.4. Node-Address TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: Node-Address (36) | Length: 20 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Endpoint Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| IP Address |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| (Optional nested TLVs) |
This TLV is used to announce addresses assigned to an HNCP node as
described in Section 6.4.
Endpoint Identifier: The endpoint identifier of the local interface
the prefix is assigned to, or 0 if it is not assigned on an HNCP
enabled link.
IP Address: The globally scoped IPv6 address, or the IPv4 address
encoded as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address [RFC4291].
10.5. DNS-Delegated-Zone TLV
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type: DNS-Delegated-Zone (39) | Length: >= 17 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | IP Address | | | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |Reserved |L|B|S| | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Zone (DNS label sequence - variable length) | ... | | 0-pad if any | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | (Optional nested TLVs) | This TLV is used to announce a forward or reverse DNS zone delegation in the HNCP network. Its meaning is roughly equivalent to specifying an NS and A/AAAA record for said zone. Details are specified in Section 8. IP Address: The IPv6 address of the authoritative DNS server for the zone; IPv4 addresses are represented as IPv4-mapped addresses [RFC4291]. The special value of :: (all zeros) means the delegation is available in the global DNS hierarchy. Reserved: Those bits MUST be set to 0 when creating the TLV and ignored when parsing it unless defined in a later specification. L-bit: (DNS-based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [RFC6763] Legacy- Browse) indicates that this delegated zone SHOULD be included in the network's DNS-SD legacy browse list of domains at lb._dns-sd._udp.(DOMAIN-NAME). Local forward zones SHOULD have this bit set; reverse zones SHOULD NOT. B-bit: (DNS-SD [RFC6763] Browse) indicates that this delegated zone SHOULD be included in the network's DNS-SD browse list of domains at b._dns-sd._udp.(DOMAIN-NAME). Local forward zones SHOULD have this bit set; reverse zones SHOULD NOT. S-bit: (Fully qualified DNS-SD [RFC6763] domain) indicates that this delegated zone consists of a fully qualified DNS-SD domain, which should be used as the base for DNS-SD domain enumeration, i.e., _dns-sd._udp.(Zone) exists. Forward zones MAY have this bit set; reverse zones MUST NOT. This can be used to provision a DNS
search path to hosts for non-local services (such as those
provided by an ISP or other manually configured service
providers). Zones with this flag SHOULD be added to the search
domains advertised to clients.
Zone: The label sequence encoded according to [RFC1035].
Compression MUST NOT be used. The label sequence MUST end with an
empty label.
10.6. Domain-Name TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: Domain-Name (40) | Length: > 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Domain (DNS label sequence - variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This TLV is used to indicate the base domain name for the network as
specified in Section 8. This TLV MUST NOT be announced unless the
domain name was explicitly configured by an administrator.
Domain: The label sequence encoded according to [RFC1035].
Compression MUST NOT be used. The label sequence MUST end with an
empty label.
10.7. Node-Name TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: Node-Name (41) | Length: > 17 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| IP Address |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Name |
...
| (not null-terminated, variable length) | 0-pad if any |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| (Optional nested TLVs) |
This TLV is used to assign the name of a node in the network to a
certain IP address as specified in Section 8.
IP Address: The IP address associated with the name. IPv4
addresses are encoded using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses.
Length: The length of the name (0-63).
Name: The name of the node as a single DNS label.
10.8. Managed-PSK TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: Managed-PSK (42) | Length: 32 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| |
| |
| Random 256-bit PSK |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| (Optional nested TLVs) |
This TLV is used to announce a PSK for securing third-party protocols
exclusively supporting symmetric cryptography as specified in
Section 9.
11. General Requirements for HNCP Nodes
Each node implementing HNCP is subject to the following requirements:
o It MUST implement HNCP versioning (Section 4) and interface
classification (Section 5).
o It MUST implement and run the method for securing third-party
protocols (Section 9) whenever it uses the security mechanism of
HNCP.
If the node is acting as a router, then the following requirements
apply in addition:
o It MUST support Autonomous Address Configuration (Section 6) and
configuration of hosts and non-HNCP routers (Section 7).
o It SHOULD implement support for naming and service discovery
(Section 8) as defined in this document.
o It MAY be able to provide connectivity to IPv4 devices using
DHCPv4.
o It SHOULD be able to delegate prefixes to legacy IPv6 routers
using DHCPv6-PD (Section 6.3.4).
o In addition, the normative language of "Basic Requirements for
IPv6 Customer Edge Routers" [RFC7084] applies with the following
adjustments:
* The generic requirements G-4 and G-5 are relaxed such that any
known default router on any interface is sufficient for a
router to announce itself as the default router; similarly,
only the loss of all such default routers results in self-
invalidation.
* "WAN-Side Configuration" (Section 4.2) applies to interfaces
classified as external.
* If the Customer Edge (CE) sends a size hint as indicated in
WPD-2, the hint MUST NOT be determined by the number of LAN
interfaces of the CE but SHOULD instead be large enough to at
least accommodate prefix assignments announced for existing
delegated or ULA prefixes, if such prefixes exist and unless
explicitly configured otherwise.
* The dropping of packets with a destination address belonging to
a delegated prefix mandated in WPD-5 MUST NOT be applied to
destinations that are part of any prefix announced using an
Assigned-Prefix TLV by any HNCP router in the network.
* "LAN-Side Configuration" (Section 4.3) applies to interfaces
not classified as external.
* The requirement L-2 to assign a separate /64 to each LAN
interface is replaced by the participation in the prefix
assignment mechanism (Section 6.3) for each such interface.
* The requirement L-9 is modified, in that the M flag MUST be set
if and only if a router connected to the respective Common Link
is advertising a non-zero H-capability. The O flag SHOULD
always be set.
* The requirement L-12 to make DHCPv6 options available is
adapted, in that Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) SHOULD publish
the subset of options using the DHCPv6-Data TLV in an External-
Connection TLV. Similarly, it SHOULD do the same for DHCPv4
options in a DHCPv4-Data TLV. DHCPv6 options received inside
an OPTION_IAPREFIX [RFC3633] MUST be published using a
DHCPv6-Data TLV inside the respective Delegated-Prefix TLV.
HNCP routers SHOULD make relevant DHCPv6 and DHCPv4 options
available to clients, i.e., options contained in External-
Connection TLVs that also include delegated prefixes from which
a subset is assigned to the respective link.
* The requirement L-13 to deprecate prefixes is applied to all
delegated prefixes in the network from which assignments have
been made on the respective interface. Furthermore, the Prefix
Information Options indicating deprecation MUST be included in
Router Advertisements for the remainder of the prefixes'
respective valid lifetime but MAY be omitted after at least 2
hours have passed.
12. Security Considerations
HNCP enables self-configuring networks, requiring as little user
intervention as possible. However, this zero-configuration goal
usually conflicts with security goals and introduces a number of
threats.
General security issues for existing home networks are discussed in
[RFC7368]. The protocols used to set up addresses and routes in such
networks to this day rarely have security enabled within the
configuration protocol itself. However, these issues are out of
scope for the security of HNCP itself.
HNCP is a DNCP-based state synchronization mechanism carrying
information with varying threat potential. For this consideration,
the payloads defined in DNCP and this document are reviewed:
o Network topology information such as HNCP nodes and their common
links.
o Address assignment information such as delegated and assigned
prefixes for individual links.
o Naming and service discovery information such as auto-generated or
customized names for individual links and nodes.
12.1. Interface Classification
As described in Section 5.3, an HNCP node determines the internal or
external state on a per-interface basis. A firewall perimeter is set
up for the external interfaces, and for internal interfaces, HNCP
traffic is allowed, with the exception of the Leaf and Guest
subcategories.
Threats concerning automatic interface classification cannot be mitigated by encrypting or authenticating HNCP traffic itself since external routers do not participate in the protocol and often cannot be authenticated by other means. These threats include propagation of forged uplinks in the homenet in order to, e.g., redirect traffic destined to external locations and forged internal status by external routers to, e.g., circumvent the perimeter firewall. It is therefore imperative to either secure individual links on the physical or link layer or preconfigure the adjacent interfaces of HNCP routers to an appropriate fixed category in order to secure the homenet border. Depending on the security of the external link, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle, and similar attacks on external traffic can still happen between a homenet border router and the ISP; however, these cannot be mitigated from inside the homenet. For example, DHCPv4 has defined [RFC3118] to authenticate DHCPv4 messages, but this is very rarely implemented in large or small networks. Further, while PPP can provide secure authentication of both sides of a point-to-point link, it is most often deployed with one-way authentication of the subscriber to the ISP, not the ISP to the subscriber.12.2. Security of Unicast Traffic
Once the homenet border has been established, there are several ways to secure HNCP against internal threats like manipulation or eavesdropping by compromised devices on a link that is enabled for HNCP traffic. If left unsecured, attackers may perform arbitrary traffic redirection, eavesdropping, spoofing, or denial-of-service attacks on HNCP services such as address assignment or service discovery, and the protocols are secured using HNCP-derived keys such as routing protocols. Detailed interface categories like "Leaf" or "Guest" can be used to integrate not fully trusted devices to various degrees into the homenet by not exposing them to HNCP traffic or by using firewall rules to prevent them from reaching homenet-internal resources. On links where this is not practical and lower layers do not provide adequate protection from attackers, DTLS-based secure unicast transport MUST be used to secure traffic.12.3. Other Protocols in the Home
IGPs and other protocols are usually run alongside HNCP; therefore, the individual security aspects of the respective protocols must be considered. It can, however, be summarized that many protocols to be run in the home (like IGPs) provide -- to a certain extent -- similar
security mechanisms. Most of these protocols do not support encryption and only support authentication based on Pre-Shared Keys natively. This influences the effectiveness of any encryption-based security mechanism deployed by HNCP as homenet routing information is thus usually not encrypted.13. IANA Considerations
IANA has set up a registry for the (decimal values within range 32-511) "HNCP TLV Types" under "Distributed Node Consensus Protocol (DNCP)". The registration procedures is 'RFC Required' [RFC5226]. The initial contents are: 32: HNCP-Version 33: External-Connection 34: Delegated-Prefix 35: Assigned-Prefix 36: Node-Address 37: DHCPv4-Data 38: DHCPv6-Data 39: DNS-Delegated-Zone 40: Domain-Name 41: Node-Name 42: Managed-PSK 43: Prefix-Policy 44-511: Unassigned. 768-1023: Reserved for Private Use. This range is used by HNCP for per-implementation experimentation. How collisions are avoided is outside the scope of this document. IANA has registered the UDP port numbers 8231 (service name: hncp- udp-port, description: HNCP) and 8232 (service name: hncp-dtls-port, description: HNCP over DTLS), as well as an IPv6 link-local multicast address FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:11 (description: All-Homenet-Nodes).
14. References
14.1. Normative References
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>. [RFC2132] Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions", RFC 2132, DOI 10.17487/RFC2132, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2132>. [RFC3004] Stump, G., Droms, R., Gu, Y., Vyaghrapuri, R., Demirtjis, A., Beser, B., and J. Privat, "The User Class Option for DHCP", RFC 3004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3004, November 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3004>. [RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>. [RFC3633] Troan, O. and R. Droms, "IPv6 Prefix Options for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) version 6", RFC 3633, DOI 10.17487/RFC3633, December 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3633>. [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>. [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>. [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>. [RFC6092] Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092, DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092>. [RFC6206] Levis, P., Clausen, T., Hui, J., Gnawali, O., and J. Ko, "The Trickle Algorithm", RFC 6206, DOI 10.17487/RFC6206, March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6206>. [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. [RFC6603] Korhonen, J., Ed., Savolainen, T., Krishnan, S., and O. Troan, "Prefix Exclude Option for DHCPv6-based Prefix Delegation", RFC 6603, DOI 10.17487/RFC6603, May 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6603>. [RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>. [RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>. [RFC7695] Pfister, P., Paterson, B., and J. Arkko, "Distributed Prefix Assignment Algorithm", RFC 7695, DOI 10.17487/RFC7695, November 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7695>. [RFC7787] Stenberg, M. and S. Barth, "Distributed Node Consensus Protocol", RFC 7787, DOI 10.17487/RFC7787, April 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7787>.
14.2. Informative References
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>. [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>. [RFC3118] Droms, R., Ed. and W. Arbaugh, Ed., "Authentication for DHCP Messages", RFC 3118, DOI 10.17487/RFC3118, June 2001, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3118>. [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. [RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762, DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>. [RFC7084] Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., and B. Stark, "Basic Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers", RFC 7084, DOI 10.17487/RFC7084, November 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7084>. [RFC7368] Chown, T., Ed., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J. Weil, "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles", RFC 7368, DOI 10.17487/RFC7368, October 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7368>. [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Ole Troan, Mark Baugher, Mark Townsley, Juliusz Chroboczek, and Thomas Clausen for their contributions to the document. Thanks to Eric Kline for the original border discovery work.Authors' Addresses
Markus Stenberg Independent Helsinki 00930 Finland Email: markus.stenberg@iki.fi Steven Barth Independent Halle 06114 Germany Email: cyrus@openwrt.org Pierre Pfister Cisco Systems Paris France Email: pierre.pfister@darou.fr