RFC 7416
A Security Threat Analysis for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPLs)
Pages: 40
Informational
Informational
Part 1 of 2 – Pages 1 to 20
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Tsao Request for Comments: 7416 R. Alexander Category: Informational Eaton's Cooper Power Systems Business ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Dohler CTTC V. Daza A. Lozano Universitat Pompeu Fabra M. Richardson, Ed. Sandelman Software Works January 2015 A Security Threat Analysis for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPLs)Abstract
This document presents a security threat analysis for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPLs). The development builds upon previous work on routing security and adapts the assessments to the issues and constraints specific to low-power and lossy networks. A systematic approach is used in defining and evaluating the security threats. Applicable countermeasures are application specific and are addressed in relevant applicability statements. Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7416.
Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Relationship to Other Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Considerations on RPL Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Routing Assets and Points of Access . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3. Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs . . . . . . . . . 10 4.4. RPL Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Threat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Threats and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. Threats Due to Failures to Authenticate . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1.1. Node Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1.2. Dummy Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1.3. Node Resource Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.2. Threats Due to Failure to Keep Routing Information Confidential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.2.2. Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology) Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.3. Threats and Attacks on Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.3.1. Routing Information Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.3.2. Node Identity Misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.4. Threats and Attacks on Availability . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.4.1. Routing Exchange Interference or Disruption . . . . . 18 6.4.2. Network Traffic Forwarding Disruption . . . . . . . . 18 6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption . . . . . . . . . 20 6.4.4. Node Resource Exhaustion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.1. Confidentiality Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . 21 7.1.1. Countering Deliberate Exposure Attacks . . . . . . . 21 7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks . . . . . . . 22 7.1.3. Countering Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.1.4. Countering Remote Device Access Attacks . . . . . . . 23 7.2. Integrity Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7.2.1. Countering Unauthorized Modification Attacks . . . . 24 7.2.2. Countering Overclaiming and Misclaiming Attacks . . . 24 7.2.3. Countering Identity (including Sybil) Attacks . . . . 25 7.2.4. Countering Routing Information Replay Attacks . . . . 25 7.2.5. Countering Byzantine Routing Information Attacks . . 26 7.3. Availability Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . 26 7.3.1. Countering HELLO Flood Attacks and ACK Spoofing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 7.3.2. Countering Overload Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 7.3.3. Countering Selective Forwarding Attacks . . . . . . . 29 7.3.4. Countering Sinkhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.3.5. Countering Wormhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8. RPL Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8.1. Confidentiality Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.2. Integrity Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.3. Availability Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8.4. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401. Introduction
In recent times, networked electronic devices have found an increasing number of applications in various fields. Yet, for reasons ranging from operational application to economics, these wired and wireless devices are often supplied with minimum physical resources; the constraints include those on computational resources (RAM, clock speed, and storage) and communication resources (duty cycle, packet size, etc.) but also form factors that may rule out user-access interfaces (e.g., the housing of a small stick-on switch) or simply safety considerations (e.g., with gas meters). As a consequence, the resulting networks are more prone to loss of traffic and other vulnerabilities. The proliferation of these Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), however, are drawing efforts to examine and address their potential networking challenges. Securing the establishment and maintenance of network connectivity among these deployed devices becomes one of these key challenges.
This document presents a threat analysis for securing the Routing Protocol for LLNs (RPL). The process requires two steps. First, the analysis will be used to identify pertinent security issues. The second step is to identify necessary countermeasures to secure RPL. As there are multiple ways to solve the problem and the specific trade-offs are deployment specific, the specific countermeasure to be used is detailed in applicability statements. This document uses a model based on [ISO.7498-2.1989], which describes authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation security services. This document expands the model to include the concept of availability. As explained below, non-repudiation does not apply to routing protocols. Many of the issues in this document were also covered in the IAB Smart Object Workshop [RFC6574] and the IAB Smart Object Security Workshop [RFC7397]. This document concerns itself with securing the control-plane traffic. As such, it does not address authorization or authentication of application traffic. RPL uses multicast as part of its protocol; therefore, mechanisms that RPL uses to secure this traffic might also be applicable to the Multicast Protocol for Low- Power and Lossy Networks (MPL) control traffic as well: the important part is that the threats are similar.2. Relationship to Other Documents
Routing Over Low-Power and Lossy (ROLL) networks has specified a set of routing protocols for LLNs [RFC6550]. A number of applicability texts describe a subset of these protocols and the conditions that make the subset the correct choice. The text recommends and motivates the accompanying parameter value ranges. Multiple applicability domains are recognized, including Building and Home and Advanced Metering Infrastructure. The applicability domains distinguish themselves in the way they are operated, by their performance requirements, and by the most probable network structures. Each applicability statement identifies the distinguishing properties according to a common set of subjects described in as many sections. The common set of security threats herein are referred to by the applicability statements, and that series of documents describes the preferred security settings and solutions within the applicability statement conditions. This applicability statement may recommend more lightweight security solutions and specify the conditions under which these solutions are appropriate.
3. Terminology
This document adopts the terminology defined in [RFC6550], [RFC4949], and [RFC7102]. The terms "control plane" and "forwarding plane" are used in a manner consistent with Section 1 of [RFC6192]. The term "Destination-Oriented DAG (DODAG)" is from [RFC6550]. Extensible Authentication Protocol - Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) is defined in [RFC5216]. The Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) is defined in [RFC5191]. Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode is defined in [RFC3610]. The term "sleepy node", introduced in [RFC7102], refers to a node that may sometimes go into a low-power state, suspending protocol communications. The terms Service Set Identifier (SSID), Extended Service Set Identifier (ESSID), and Personal Area Network (PAN) refer to network identifiers, defined in [IEEE.802.11] and [IEEE.802.15.4]. Although this is not a protocol specification, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] in order to clarify and emphasize the guidance and directions to implementers and deployers of LLN nodes that utilize RPL.4. Considerations on RPL Security
Routing security, in essence, ensures that the routing protocol operates correctly. It entails implementing measures to ensure controlled state changes on devices and network elements, both based on external inputs (received via communications) or internal inputs (physical security of the device itself and parameters maintained by the device, including, e.g., clock). State changes would thereby involve not only authorization of the injector's actions, authentication of injectors, and potentially confidentiality of routing data, but also proper order of state changes through timeliness, since seriously delayed state changes, such as commands or updates of routing tables, may negatively impact system operation. A security assessment can, therefore, begin with a focus on the assets [RFC4949] that may be the target of the state changes and the
access points in terms of interfaces and protocol exchanges through which such changes may occur. In the case of routing security, the focus is directed towards the elements associated with the establishment and maintenance of network connectivity. This section sets the stage for the development of the analysis by applying the systematic approach proposed in [Myagmar2005] to the routing security, while also drawing references from other reviews and assessments found in the literature, particularly [RFC4593] and [Karlof2003] (i.e., selective forwarding, wormhole, and sinkhole attacks). The subsequent subsections begin with a focus on the elements of a generic routing process that is used to establish routing assets and points of access to the routing functionality. Next, the security model based on [ISO.7498-2.1989] is briefly described. Then, consideration is given to issues specific to or amplified in LLNs. This section concludes with the formulation of a set of security objectives for RPL.4.1. Routing Assets and Points of Access
An asset is an important system resource (including information, process, or physical resource); the access to and corruption or loss of an asset adversely affects the system. In the control-plane context, an asset is information about the network, processes used to manage and manipulate this data, and the physical devices on which this data is stored and manipulated. The corruption or loss of these assets may adversely impact the control plane of the network. Within the same context, a point of access is an interface or protocol that facilitates interaction between control-plane assets. Identifying these assets and points of access will provide a basis for enumerating the attack surface of the control plane. A level-0 data flow diagram [Yourdon1979] is used here to identify the assets and points of access within a generic routing process. The use of a data flow diagram allows for a clear and concise model of the way in which routing nodes interact and process information; hence, it provides a context for threats and attacks. The goal of the model is to be as detailed as possible so that corresponding assets, points of access, and processes in an individual routing protocol can be readily identified. Figure 1 shows that nodes participating in the routing process transmit messages to discover neighbors and to exchange routing information; routes are then generated and stored, which may be maintained in the form of the protocol forwarding table. The nodes use the derived routes for making forwarding decisions.
................................................... : : : : |Node_i|<------->(Routing Neighbor _________________ : : Discovery)------------>Neighbor Topology : : -------+--------- : : | : |Node_j|<------->(Route/Topology +--------+ : : Exchange) | : : | V ______ : : +---->(Route Generation)--->Routes : : ---+-- : : | : : Routing on Node_k | : ................................................... | |Forwarding | |on Node_l|<-------------------------------------------+ Notation: (Proc) A process Proc ________ topology A structure storing neighbor adjacency (parent/child) -------- ________ routes A structure storing the forwarding information base (FIB) -------- |Node_n| An external entity Node_n -------> Data flow Figure 1: Data Flow Diagram of a Generic Routing Process Figure 1 shows the following: o Assets include * routing and/or topology information; * route generation process; * communication channel resources (bandwidth);
* node resources (computing capacity, memory, and remaining
energy); and
* node identifiers (including node identity and ascribed
attributes such as relative or absolute node location).
o Points of access include
* neighbor discovery;
* route/topology exchange; and
* node physical interfaces (including access to data storage).
A focus on the above list of assets and points of access enables a
more directed assessment of routing security; for example, it is
readily understood that some routing attacks are in the form of
attempts to misrepresent routing topology. Indeed, the intention of
the security threat analysis is to be comprehensive. Hence, some of
the discussion that follows is associated with assets and points of
access that are not directly related to routing protocol design but
are nonetheless provided for reference since they do have direct
consequences on the security of routing.
4.2. The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model
At the conceptual level, security within an information system, in
general, and applied to RPL in particular is concerned with the
primary issues of authentication, access control, data
confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation. In the context
of RPL:
Authentication
Authentication involves the mutual authentication of the
routing peers prior to exchanging route information (i.e., peer
authentication) as well as ensuring that the source of the
route data is from the peer (i.e., data origin authentication).
LLNs can be drained by unauthenticated peers before
configuration per [RFC5548]. Availability of open and
untrusted side channels for new joiners is required by
[RFC5673], and strong and automated authentication is required
so that networks can automatically accept or reject new
joiners.
Access Control
Access Control provides protection against unauthorized use of
the asset and deals with the authorization of a node.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality involves the protection of routing information
as well as routing neighbor maintenance exchanges so that only
authorized and intended network entities may view or access it.
Because LLNs are most commonly found on a publicly accessible
shared medium, e.g., air or wiring in a building, and are
sometimes formed ad hoc, confidentiality also extends to the
neighbor state and database information within the routing
device since the deployment of the network creates the
potential for unauthorized access to the physical devices
themselves.
Integrity
Integrity entails the protection of routing information and
routing neighbor maintenance exchanges, as well as derived
information maintained in the database, from unauthorized
modifications, insertions, deletions, or replays to be
addressed beyond the routing protocol.
Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation is the assurance that the transmission and/or
reception of a message cannot later be denied. The service of
non-repudiation applies after the fact; thus, it relies on the
logging or other capture of ongoing message exchanges and
signatures. Routing protocols typically do not have a notion
of repudiation, so non-repudiation services are not required.
Further, with the LLN application domains as described in
[RFC5867] and [RFC5548], proactive measures are much more
critical than retrospective protections. Finally, given the
significant practical limits to ongoing routing transaction
logging and storage and individual device digital signature
verification for each exchange, non-repudiation in the context
of routing is an unsupportable burden that bears no further
consideration as an RPL security issue.
It is recognized that, besides those security issues captured in the
ISO 7498-2 model, availability is a security requirement:
Availability
Availability ensures that routing information exchanges and
forwarding services are available when they are required for
the functioning of the serving network. Availability will
apply to maintaining efficient and correct operation of routing
and neighbor discovery exchanges (including needed information)
and forwarding services so as not to impair or limit the
network's central traffic flow function.
It should be emphasized here that for RPL security, the above requirements must be complemented by the proper security policies and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that security objectives are met by a given RPL implementation.4.3. Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs
The requirements work detailed in Urban Requirements [RFC5548], Industrial Requirements [RFC5673], Home Automation [RFC5826], and Building Automation [RFC5867] have identified specific issues and constraints of routing in LLNs. The following is a list of observations from those requirements and evaluations of their impact on routing security considerations. Limited energy, memory, and processing node resources As a consequence of these constraints, the need to evaluate the kinds of security that can be provided needs careful study. For instance, security provided at one level could be very memory efficient yet might also be very energy costly for the network (as a whole) if it requires significant effort to synchronize the security state. Synchronization of security states with sleepy nodes [RFC7102] is a complex issue. A non- rechargeable battery-powered node may well be limited in energy for it's lifetime: once exhausted, it may well never function again. Large scale of rolled out network The possibly numerous nodes to be deployed make manual on-site configuration unlikely. For example, an urban deployment can see several hundreds of thousands of nodes being installed by many installers with a low level of expertise. Nodes may be installed and not activated for many years, and additional nodes may be added later on, which may be from old inventory. The lifetime of the network is measured in decades, and this complicates the operation of key management. Autonomous operations Self-forming and self-organizing are commonly prescribed requirements of LLNs. In other words, a routing protocol designed for LLNs needs to contain elements of ad hoc networking and, in most cases, cannot rely on manual configuration for initialization or local filtering rules. Network topology/ownership changes, partitioning or merging, and node replacement can all contribute to complicating the operations of key management.
Highly directional traffic
Some types of LLNs see a high percentage of their total traffic
traverse between the nodes and the LLN Border Routers (LBRs)
where the LLNs connect to non-LLNs. The special routing status
of and the greater volume of traffic near the LBRs have routing
security consequences as a higher-valued attack target. In
fact, when Point-to-MultiPoint (P2MP) and MultiPoint-to-Point
(MP2P) traffic represents a majority of the traffic, routing
attacks consisting of advertising incorrect preferred routes
can cause serious damage.
While it might seem that nodes higher up in the acyclic graph
(i.e., those with lower rank) should be secured in a stronger
fashion, it is not, in general, easy to predict which nodes
will occupy those positions until after deployment. Issues of
redundancy and inventory control suggest that any node might
wind up in such a sensitive attack position, so all nodes are
to be capable of being fully secured.
In addition, even if it were possible to predict which nodes
will occupy positions of lower rank and provision them with
stronger security mechanisms, in the absence of a strong
authorization model, any node could advertise an incorrect
preferred route.
Unattended locations and limited physical security
In many applications, the nodes are deployed in unattended or
remote locations; furthermore, the nodes themselves are often
built with minimal physical protection. These constraints
lower the barrier of accessing the data or security material
stored on the nodes through physical means.
Support for mobility
On the one hand, only a limited number of applications require
the support of mobile nodes, e.g., a home LLN that includes
nodes on wearable health care devices or an industry LLN that
includes nodes on cranes and vehicles. On the other hand, if a
routing protocol is indeed used in such applications, it will
clearly need to have corresponding security mechanisms.
Additionally, nodes may appear to move from one side of a wall
to another without any actual motion involved, which is the
result of changes to electromagnetic properties, such as the
opening and closing of a metal door.
Support for multicast and anycast
Support for multicast and anycast is called out chiefly for
large-scale networks. Since application of these routing
mechanisms in autonomous operations of many nodes is new, the
consequence on security requires careful consideration.
The above list considers how an LLN's physical constraints, size,
operations, and variety of application areas may impact security.
However, it is the combinations of these factors that particularly
stress the security concerns. For instance, securing routing for a
large number of autonomous devices that are left in unattended
locations with limited physical security presents challenges that are
not found in the common circumstance of administered networked
routers. The following subsection sets up the security objectives
for the routing protocol designed by the ROLL WG.
4.4. RPL Security Objectives
This subsection applies the ISO 7498-2 model to routing assets and
access points, taking into account the LLN issues, to develop a set
of RPL security objectives.
Since the fundamental function of a routing protocol is to build
routes for forwarding packets, it is essential to ensure that:
o routing/topology information integrity remains intact during
transfer and in storage;
o routing/topology information is used by authorized entities; and
o routing/topology information is available when needed.
In conjunction, it is necessary to be assured that:
o Authorized peers authenticate themselves during the routing
neighbor discovery process.
o The routing/topology information received is generated according
to the protocol design.
However, when trust cannot be fully vested through authentication of
the principals alone, i.e., concerns of an insider attack, assurance
of the truthfulness and timeliness of the received routing/topology
information is necessary. With regard to confidentiality, protecting
the routing/topology information from unauthorized exposure may be
desirable in certain cases but is in itself less pertinent, in
general, to the routing function.
One of the main problems of synchronizing security states of sleepy
nodes, as listed in the last subsection, lies in difficulties in
authentication; these nodes may not have received the most recent
update of security material in time. Similarly, the issues of
minimal manual configuration, prolonged rollout and delayed addition
of nodes, and network topology changes also complicate key
management. Hence, routing in LLNs needs to bootstrap the
authentication process and allow for a flexible expiration scheme of
authentication credentials.
The vulnerability brought forth by some special-function nodes, e.g.,
LBRs, requires the assurance, particularly in a security context, of
the following:
o The availability of communication channels and node resources.
o The neighbor discovery process operates without undermining
routing availability.
There are other factors that are not part of RPL but directly affect
its function. These factors include a weaker barrier of accessing
the data or security material stored on the nodes through physical
means; therefore, the internal and external interfaces of a node need
to be adequate for guarding the integrity, and possibly the
confidentiality, of stored information, as well as the integrity of
routing and route generation processes.
Each individual system's use and environment will dictate how the
above objectives are applied, including the choices of security
services as well as the strengths of the mechanisms that must be
implemented. The next two sections take a closer look at how the RPL
security objectives may be compromised and how those potential
compromises can be countered.
5. Threat Sources
[RFC4593] provides a detailed review of the threat sources: outsiders
and Byzantine. RPL has the same threat sources.
6. Threats and Attacks
This section outlines general categories of threats under the ISO
7498-2 model and highlights the specific attacks in each of these
categories for RPL. As defined in [RFC4949], a threat is "a
potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a
circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach security
and cause harm."
Per [RFC3067], an attack is "an assault on system security that derives from an intelligent threat, i.e., an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security services and violate the security policy of a system." The subsequent subsections consider the threats and the attacks that can cause security breaches under the ISO 7498-2 model to the routing assets and via the routing points of access identified in Section 4.1. The assessment reviews the security concerns of each routing asset and looks at the attacks that can exploit routing points of access. The threats and attacks identified are based on the routing model analysis and associated review of the existing literature. The source of the attacks is assumed to be from either inside or outside attackers. While some attackers inside the network will be using compromised nodes and, therefore, are only able to do what an ordinary node can ("node-equivalent"), other attacks may not be limited in memory, CPU, power consumption, or long-term storage. Moore's law favors the attacker with access to the latest capabilities, while the defenders will remain in place for years to decades.6.1. Threats Due to Failures to Authenticate
6.1.1. Node Impersonation
If an attacker can join a network using any identity, then it may be able to assume the role of a legitimate (and existing node). It may be able to report false readings (in metering applications) or provide inappropriate control messages (in control systems involving actuators) if the security of the application is implied by the security of the routing system. Even in systems where there is application-layer security, the ability to impersonate a node would permit an attacker to direct traffic to itself. This may permit various on-path attacks that would otherwise be difficult, such as replaying, delaying, or duplicating (application) control messages.6.1.2. Dummy Node
If an attacker can join a network using any identify, then it can pretend to be a legitimate node, receiving any service legitimate nodes receive. It may also be able to report false readings (in metering applications), provide inappropriate authorizations (in control systems involving actuators), or perform any other attacks that are facilitated by being able to direct traffic towards itself.
6.1.3. Node Resource Spam
If an attacker can join a network with any identity, then it can continuously do so with new (random) identities. This act may drain down the resources of the network (battery, RAM, bandwidth). This may cause legitimate nodes of the network to be unable to communicate.6.2. Threats Due to Failure to Keep Routing Information Confidential
The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that there are attacks against the confidentiality of routing information at all points of access. This threat may result in disclosure, as described in Section 3.1.2 of [RFC4593], and may involve a disclosure of routing information.6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure
Routing exchanges include both routing information as well as information associated with the establishment and maintenance of neighbor state information. As indicated in Section 4.1, the associated routing information assets may also include device- specific resource information, such as available memory, remaining power, etc., that may be metrics of the routing protocol. The routing exchanges will contain reachability information, which would identify the relative importance of different nodes in the network. Nodes higher up in the DODAG, to which more streams of information flow, would be more interesting targets for other attacks, and routing exchange exposures could identify them.6.2.2. Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology) Exposure
Routes (which may be maintained in the form of the protocol forwarding table) and neighbor topology information are the products of the routing process that are stored within the node device databases. The exposure of this information will allow attackers to gain direct access to the configuration and connectivity of the network, thereby exposing routing to targeted attacks on key nodes or links. Since routes and neighbor topology information are stored within the node device, attacks on the confidentiality of the information will apply to the physical device, including specified and unspecified internal and external interfaces.
The forms of attack that allow unauthorized access or disclosure of
the routing information will include:
o Physical device compromise.
o Remote device access attacks (including those occurring through
remote network management or software/field upgrade interfaces).
Both of these attack vectors are considered a device-specific issue
and are out of scope for RPL to defend against. In some
applications, physical device compromise may be a real threat, and it
may be necessary to provide for other devices to securely detect a
compromised device and react quickly to exclude it.
6.3. Threats and Attacks on Integrity
The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that information and identity
assets are exposed to integrity threats from all points of access.
In other words, the integrity threat space is defined by the
potential for exploitation introduced by access to assets available
through routing exchanges and the on-device storage.
6.3.1. Routing Information Manipulation
Manipulation of routing information that ranges from neighbor states
to derived routes will allow unauthorized sources to influence the
operation and convergence of the routing protocols and ultimately
impact the forwarding decisions made in the network.
Manipulation of topology and reachability information will allow
unauthorized sources to influence the nodes with which routing
information is exchanged and updated. The consequence of
manipulating routing exchanges can thus lead to suboptimality and
fragmentation or partitioning of the network by restricting the
universe of routers with which associations can be established and
maintained.
A suboptimal network may use too much power and/or may congest some
routes leading to premature failure of a node and a denial of service
(DoS) on the entire network.
In addition, being able to attract network traffic can make a black-
hole attack more damaging.
The forms of attack that allow manipulation to compromise the content
and validity of routing information include:
o falsification, including overclaiming and misclaiming (claiming
routes to devices that the device cannot in fact reach);
o routing information replay;
o Byzantine (internal) attacks that permit corruption of routing
information in the node even when the node continues to be a
validated entity within the network (see, for example, [RFC4593]
for further discussions on Byzantine attacks); and
o physical device compromise or remote device access attacks.
6.3.2. Node Identity Misappropriation
Falsification or misappropriation of node identity between routing
participants opens the door for other attacks; it can also cause
incorrect routing relationships to form and/or topologies to emerge.
Routing attacks may also be mounted through less-sophisticated node
identity misappropriation in which the valid information broadcasted
or exchanged by a node is replayed without modification. The receipt
of seemingly valid information that is, however, no longer current
can result in routing disruption and instability (including failure
to converge). Without measures to authenticate the routing
participants and to ensure the freshness and validity of the received
information, the protocol operation can be compromised. The forms of
attack that misuse node identity include:
o Identity attacks, including Sybil attacks (see [Sybil2002]) in
which a malicious node illegitimately assumes multiple identities.
o Routing information replay.
6.4. Threats and Attacks on Availability
The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that the process and resource assets are exposed to threats against availability; attacks in this category may exploit directly or indirectly information exchange or forwarding (see [RFC4732] for a general discussion).6.4.1. Routing Exchange Interference or Disruption
Interference is the threat action and disruption is the threat consequence that allows attackers to influence the operation and convergence of the routing protocols by impeding the routing information exchange. The forms of attack that allow interference or disruption of routing exchange include: o routing information replay; o ACK spoofing; and o overload attacks (Section 7.3.2). In addition, attacks may also be directly conducted at the physical layer in the form of jamming or interfering.6.4.2. Network Traffic Forwarding Disruption
The disruption of the network traffic forwarding capability will undermine the central function of network routers and the ability to handle user traffic. This affects the availability of the network because of the potential to impair the primary capability of the network.
In addition to physical-layer obstructions, the forms of attack that allow disruption of network traffic forwarding include [Karlof2003]: o selective forwarding attacks; |Node_1|--(msg1|msg2|msg3)-->|Attacker|--(msg1|msg3)-->|Node_2| Figure 2: Selective Forwarding Example o wormhole attacks; and |Node_1|-------------Unreachable---------x|Node_2| | ^ | Private Link | '-->|Attacker_1|===========>|Attacker_2|--' Figure 3: Wormhole Attacks o sinkhole attacks. |Node_1| |Node_4| | | `--------. | Falsify as \ | Good Link \ | | to Node_5 \ | | \ V V |Node_2|-->|Attacker|--Not Forwarded---x|Node_5| ^ ^ \ | | \ Falsify as | | \Good Link / | to Node_5 ,-------' | | | |Node_3| |Node_i| Figure 4: Sinkhole Attack Example These attacks are generally done to both control- and forwarding- plane traffic. A system that prevents control-plane traffic (RPL messages) from being diverted in these ways will also prevent actual data from being diverted.
6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption
Attacks mounted against the communication channel resource assets needed by the routing protocol can be used as a means of disrupting its operation. However, while various forms of DoS attacks on the underlying transport subsystem will affect routing protocol exchanges and operation (for example, physical-layer Radio Frequency (RF) jamming in a wireless network or link-layer attacks), these attacks cannot be countered by the routing protocol. As such, the threats to the underlying transport network that supports routing is considered beyond the scope of the current document. Nonetheless, attacks on the subsystem will affect routing operation and must be directly addressed within the underlying subsystem and its implemented protocol layers.6.4.4. Node Resource Exhaustion
A potential threat consequence can arise from attempts to overload the node resource asset by initiating exchanges that can lead to the exhaustion of processing, memory, or energy resources. The establishment and maintenance of routing neighbors opens the routing process to engagement and potential acceptance of multiple neighboring peers. Association information must be stored for each peer entity and for the wireless network operation provisions made to periodically update and reassess the associations. An introduced proliferation of apparent routing peers can, therefore, have a negative impact on node resources. Node resources may also be unduly consumed by attackers attempting uncontrolled topology peering or routing exchanges, routing replays, or the generating of other data-traffic floods. Beyond the disruption of communications channel resources, these consequences may be able to exhaust node resources only where the engagements are able to proceed with the peer routing entities. Routing operation and network forwarding functions can thus be adversely impacted by node resources exhaustion that stems from attacks that include: o identity (including Sybil) attacks (see [Sybil2002]); o routing information replay attacks; o HELLO-type flood attacks; and o overload attacks (Section 7.3.2).
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