RFC 3010
NFS version 4 Protocol
Network Working Group S. Shepler Request for Comments: 3010 B. Callaghan Obsoletes: 1813, 1094 D. Robinson Category: Standards Track R. Thurlow Sun Microsystems Inc. C. Beame Hummingbird Ltd. M. Eisler Zambeel, Inc. D. Noveck Network Appliance, Inc. December 2000 NFS version 4 Protocol Status of this Memo This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.Abstract
NFS (Network File System) version 4 is a distributed file system protocol which owes heritage to NFS protocol versions 2 [RFC1094] and 3 [RFC1813]. Unlike earlier versions, the NFS version 4 protocol supports traditional file access while integrating support for file locking and the mount protocol. In addition, support for strong security (and its negotiation), compound operations, client caching, and internationalization have been added. Of course, attention has been applied to making NFS version 4 operate well in an Internet environment. Key Words The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Overview of NFS Version 4 Features . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1.1. RPC and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1.2. Procedure and Operation Structure . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1.3. File System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.1.3.1. Filehandle Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.1.3.2. Attribute Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.1.3.3. File System Replication and Migration . . . . . . . . 9 1.1.4. OPEN and CLOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.1.5. File locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.1.6. Client Caching and Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.2. General Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2. Protocol Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1. Basic Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2. Structured Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. RPC and Security Flavor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1. Ports and Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.2. Security Flavors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.2.1. Security mechanisms for NFS version 4 . . . . . . . . . 19 3.2.1.1. Kerberos V5 as security triple . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.2.1.2. LIPKEY as a security triple . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.2.1.3. SPKM-3 as a security triple . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.3. Security Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3.1. Security Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3.2. SECINFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.4. Callback RPC Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4. Filehandles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.1. Obtaining the First Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1.1. Root Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1.2. Public Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.2. Filehandle Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.2.1. General Properties of a Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.2.2. Persistent Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2.3. Volatile Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2.4. One Method of Constructing a Volatile Filehandle . . . . 28 4.3. Client Recovery from Filehandle Expiration . . . . . . . . 28 5. File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.1. Mandatory Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.2. Recommended Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.3. Named Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.4. Mandatory Attributes - Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.5. Recommended Attributes - Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.6. Interpreting owner and owner_group . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5.7. Character Case Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.8. Quota Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.9. Access Control Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.9.1. ACE type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.9.2. ACE flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.9.3. ACE Access Mask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5.9.4. ACE who . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6. File System Migration and Replication . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6.1. Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6.2. Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6.3. Interpretation of the fs_locations Attribute . . . . . . . 46 6.4. Filehandle Recovery for Migration or Replication . . . . . 47 7. NFS Server Name Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7.1. Server Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7.2. Browsing Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.3. Server Pseudo File System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.4. Multiple Roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.5. Filehandle Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.6. Exported Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.7. Mount Point Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.8. Security Policy and Name Space Presentation . . . . . . . 50 8. File Locking and Share Reservations . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.1. Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.1.1. Client ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.1.2. Server Release of Clientid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.1.3. nfs_lockowner and stateid Definition . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.1.4. Use of the stateid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 8.1.5. Sequencing of Lock Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.1.6. Recovery from Replayed Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.1.7. Releasing nfs_lockowner State . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 8.2. Lock Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 8.3. Blocking Locks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.4. Lease Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.5. Crash Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 8.5.1. Client Failure and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 8.5.2. Server Failure and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 8.5.3. Network Partitions and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 8.6. Recovery from a Lock Request Timeout or Abort . . . . . . 63 8.7. Server Revocation of Locks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 8.8. Share Reservations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 8.9. OPEN/CLOSE Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 8.10. Open Upgrade and Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 8.11. Short and Long Leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 8.12. Clocks and Calculating Lease Expiration . . . . . . . . . 67 8.13. Migration, Replication and State . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 8.13.1. Migration and State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 8.13.2. Replication and State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 8.13.3. Notification of Migrated Lease . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 9. Client-Side Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 9.1. Performance Challenges for Client-Side Caching . . . . . . 70 9.2. Delegation and Callbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
9.2.1. Delegation Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 9.3. Data Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 9.3.1. Data Caching and OPENs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 9.3.2. Data Caching and File Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 9.3.3. Data Caching and Mandatory File Locking . . . . . . . . 77 9.3.4. Data Caching and File Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 9.4. Open Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 9.4.1. Open Delegation and Data Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 9.4.2. Open Delegation and File Locks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 9.4.3. Recall of Open Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 9.4.4. Delegation Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 9.5. Data Caching and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 9.5.1. Revocation Recovery for Write Open Delegation . . . . . 85 9.6. Attribute Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 9.7. Name Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 9.8. Directory Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 10. Minor Versioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 11. Internationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 11.1. Universal Versus Local Character Sets . . . . . . . . . . 91 11.2. Overview of Universal Character Set Standards . . . . . . 92 11.3. Difficulties with UCS-4, UCS-2, Unicode . . . . . . . . . 93 11.4. UTF-8 and its solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 11.5. Normalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 12. Error Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 13. NFS Version 4 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 13.1. Compound Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 13.2. Evaluation of a Compound Request . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 13.3. Synchronous Modifying Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 13.4. Operation Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 14. NFS Version 4 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 14.1. Procedure 0: NULL - No Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 14.2. Procedure 1: COMPOUND - Compound Operations . . . . . . . 102 14.2.1. Operation 3: ACCESS - Check Access Rights . . . . . . . 105 14.2.2. Operation 4: CLOSE - Close File . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 14.2.3. Operation 5: COMMIT - Commit Cached Data . . . . . . . 109 14.2.4. Operation 6: CREATE - Create a Non-Regular File Object. 112 14.2.5. Operation 7: DELEGPURGE - Purge Delegations Awaiting Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 14.2.6. Operation 8: DELEGRETURN - Return Delegation . . . . . 115 14.2.7. Operation 9: GETATTR - Get Attributes . . . . . . . . . 115 14.2.8. Operation 10: GETFH - Get Current Filehandle . . . . . 117 14.2.9. Operation 11: LINK - Create Link to a File . . . . . . 118 14.2.10. Operation 12: LOCK - Create Lock . . . . . . . . . . . 119 14.2.11. Operation 13: LOCKT - Test For Lock . . . . . . . . . 121 14.2.12. Operation 14: LOCKU - Unlock File . . . . . . . . . . 122 14.2.13. Operation 15: LOOKUP - Lookup Filename . . . . . . . . 123 14.2.14. Operation 16: LOOKUPP - Lookup Parent Directory . . . 126
14.2.15. Operation 17: NVERIFY - Verify Difference in Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 14.2.16. Operation 18: OPEN - Open a Regular File . . . . . . . 128 14.2.17. Operation 19: OPENATTR - Open Named Attribute Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 14.2.18. Operation 20: OPEN_CONFIRM - Confirm Open . . . . . . 138 14.2.19. Operation 21: OPEN_DOWNGRADE - Reduce Open File Access 140 14.2.20. Operation 22: PUTFH - Set Current Filehandle . . . . . 141 14.2.21. Operation 23: PUTPUBFH - Set Public Filehandle . . . . 142 14.2.22. Operation 24: PUTROOTFH - Set Root Filehandle . . . . 143 14.2.23. Operation 25: READ - Read from File . . . . . . . . . 144 14.2.24. Operation 26: READDIR - Read Directory . . . . . . . . 146 14.2.25. Operation 27: READLINK - Read Symbolic Link . . . . . 150 14.2.26. Operation 28: REMOVE - Remove Filesystem Object . . . 151 14.2.27. Operation 29: RENAME - Rename Directory Entry . . . . 153 14.2.28. Operation 30: RENEW - Renew a Lease . . . . . . . . . 155 14.2.29. Operation 31: RESTOREFH - Restore Saved Filehandle . . 156 14.2.30. Operation 32: SAVEFH - Save Current Filehandle . . . . 157 14.2.31. Operation 33: SECINFO - Obtain Available Security . . 158 14.2.32. Operation 34: SETATTR - Set Attributes . . . . . . . . 160 14.2.33. Operation 35: SETCLIENTID - Negotiate Clientid . . . . 162 14.2.34. Operation 36: SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM - Confirm Clientid . 163 14.2.35. Operation 37: VERIFY - Verify Same Attributes . . . . 164 14.2.36. Operation 38: WRITE - Write to File . . . . . . . . . 166 15. NFS Version 4 Callback Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 15.1. Procedure 0: CB_NULL - No Operation . . . . . . . . . . . 170 15.2. Procedure 1: CB_COMPOUND - Compound Operations . . . . . 171 15.2.1. Operation 3: CB_GETATTR - Get Attributes . . . . . . . 172 15.2.2. Operation 4: CB_RECALL - Recall an Open Delegation . . 173 16. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 17. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 17.1. Named Attribute Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 18. RPC definition file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 19. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 20. Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 20.1. Editor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 20.2. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 20.3. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 21. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2121. Introduction
The NFS version 4 protocol is a further revision of the NFS protocol defined already by versions 2 [RFC1094] and 3 [RFC1813]. It retains the essential characteristics of previous versions: design for easy recovery, independent of transport protocols, operating systems and filesystems, simplicity, and good performance. The NFS version 4 revision has the following goals:
o Improved access and good performance on the Internet.
The protocol is designed to transit firewalls easily, perform well
where latency is high and bandwidth is low, and scale to very
large numbers of clients per server.
o Strong security with negotiation built into the protocol.
The protocol builds on the work of the ONCRPC working group in
supporting the RPCSEC_GSS protocol. Additionally, the NFS version
4 protocol provides a mechanism to allow clients and servers the
ability to negotiate security and require clients and servers to
support a minimal set of security schemes.
o Good cross-platform interoperability.
The protocol features a file system model that provides a useful,
common set of features that does not unduly favor one file system
or operating system over another.
o Designed for protocol extensions.
The protocol is designed to accept standard extensions that do not
compromise backward compatibility.
1.1. Overview of NFS Version 4 Features
To provide a reasonable context for the reader, the major features of
NFS version 4 protocol will be reviewed in brief. This will be done
to provide an appropriate context for both the reader who is familiar
with the previous versions of the NFS protocol and the reader that is
new to the NFS protocols. For the reader new to the NFS protocols,
there is still a fundamental knowledge that is expected. The reader
should be familiar with the XDR and RPC protocols as described in
[RFC1831] and [RFC1832]. A basic knowledge of file systems and
distributed file systems is expected as well.
1.1.1. RPC and Security
As with previous versions of NFS, the External Data Representation
(XDR) and Remote Procedure Call (RPC) mechanisms used for the NFS
version 4 protocol are those defined in [RFC1831] and [RFC1832]. To
meet end to end security requirements, the RPCSEC_GSS framework
[RFC2203] will be used to extend the basic RPC security. With the
use of RPCSEC_GSS, various mechanisms can be provided to offer
authentication, integrity, and privacy to the NFS version 4 protocol.
Kerberos V5 will be used as described in [RFC1964] to provide one
security framework. The LIPKEY GSS-API mechanism described in
[RFC2847] will be used to provide for the use of user password and server public key by the NFS version 4 protocol. With the use of RPCSEC_GSS, other mechanisms may also be specified and used for NFS version 4 security. To enable in-band security negotiation, the NFS version 4 protocol has added a new operation which provides the client a method of querying the server about its policies regarding which security mechanisms must be used for access to the server's file system resources. With this, the client can securely match the security mechanism that meets the policies specified at both the client and server.1.1.2. Procedure and Operation Structure
A significant departure from the previous versions of the NFS protocol is the introduction of the COMPOUND procedure. For the NFS version 4 protocol, there are two RPC procedures, NULL and COMPOUND. The COMPOUND procedure is defined in terms of operations and these operations correspond more closely to the traditional NFS procedures. With the use of the COMPOUND procedure, the client is able to build simple or complex requests. These COMPOUND requests allow for a reduction in the number of RPCs needed for logical file system operations. For example, without previous contact with a server a client will be able to read data from a file in one request by combining LOOKUP, OPEN, and READ operations in a single COMPOUND RPC. With previous versions of the NFS protocol, this type of single request was not possible. The model used for COMPOUND is very simple. There is no logical OR or ANDing of operations. The operations combined within a COMPOUND request are evaluated in order by the server. Once an operation returns a failing result, the evaluation ends and the results of all evaluated operations are returned to the client. The NFS version 4 protocol continues to have the client refer to a file or directory at the server by a "filehandle". The COMPOUND procedure has a method of passing a filehandle from one operation to another within the sequence of operations. There is a concept of a "current filehandle" and "saved filehandle". Most operations use the "current filehandle" as the file system object to operate upon. The "saved filehandle" is used as temporary filehandle storage within a COMPOUND procedure as well as an additional operand for certain operations.
1.1.3. File System Model
The general file system model used for the NFS version 4 protocol is the same as previous versions. The server file system is hierarchical with the regular files contained within being treated as opaque byte streams. In a slight departure, file and directory names are encoded with UTF-8 to deal with the basics of internationalization. The NFS version 4 protocol does not require a separate protocol to provide for the initial mapping between path name and filehandle. Instead of using the older MOUNT protocol for this mapping, the server provides a ROOT filehandle that represents the logical root or top of the file system tree provided by the server. The server provides multiple file systems by gluing them together with pseudo file systems. These pseudo file systems provide for potential gaps in the path names between real file systems.1.1.3.1. Filehandle Types
In previous versions of the NFS protocol, the filehandle provided by the server was guaranteed to be valid or persistent for the lifetime of the file system object to which it referred. For some server implementations, this persistence requirement has been difficult to meet. For the NFS version 4 protocol, this requirement has been relaxed by introducing another type of filehandle, volatile. With persistent and volatile filehandle types, the server implementation can match the abilities of the file system at the server along with the operating environment. The client will have knowledge of the type of filehandle being provided by the server and can be prepared to deal with the semantics of each.1.1.3.2. Attribute Types
The NFS version 4 protocol introduces three classes of file system or file attributes. Like the additional filehandle type, the classification of file attributes has been done to ease server implementations along with extending the overall functionality of the NFS protocol. This attribute model is structured to be extensible such that new attributes can be introduced in minor revisions of the protocol without requiring significant rework. The three classifications are: mandatory, recommended and named attributes. This is a significant departure from the previous attribute model used in the NFS protocol. Previously, the attributes for the file system and file objects were a fixed set of mainly Unix attributes. If the server or client did not support a particular attribute, it would have to simulate the attribute the best it could.
Mandatory attributes are the minimal set of file or file system attributes that must be provided by the server and must be properly represented by the server. Recommended attributes represent different file system types and operating environments. The recommended attributes will allow for better interoperability and the inclusion of more operating environments. The mandatory and recommended attribute sets are traditional file or file system attributes. The third type of attribute is the named attribute. A named attribute is an opaque byte stream that is associated with a directory or file and referred to by a string name. Named attributes are meant to be used by client applications as a method to associate application specific data with a regular file or directory. One significant addition to the recommended set of file attributes is the Access Control List (ACL) attribute. This attribute provides for directory and file access control beyond the model used in previous versions of the NFS protocol. The ACL definition allows for specification of user and group level access control.1.1.3.3. File System Replication and Migration
With the use of a special file attribute, the ability to migrate or replicate server file systems is enabled within the protocol. The file system locations attribute provides a method for the client to probe the server about the location of a file system. In the event of a migration of a file system, the client will receive an error when operating on the file system and it can then query as to the new file system location. Similar steps are used for replication, the client is able to query the server for the multiple available locations of a particular file system. From this information, the client can use its own policies to access the appropriate file system location.1.1.4. OPEN and CLOSE
The NFS version 4 protocol introduces OPEN and CLOSE operations. The OPEN operation provides a single point where file lookup, creation, and share semantics can be combined. The CLOSE operation also provides for the release of state accumulated by OPEN.1.1.5. File locking
With the NFS version 4 protocol, the support for byte range file locking is part of the NFS protocol. The file locking support is structured so that an RPC callback mechanism is not required. This is a departure from the previous versions of the NFS file locking protocol, Network Lock Manager (NLM). The state associated with file locks is maintained at the server under a lease-based model. The
server defines a single lease period for all state held by a NFS client. If the client does not renew its lease within the defined period, all state associated with the client's lease may be released by the server. The client may renew its lease with use of the RENEW operation or implicitly by use of other operations (primarily READ).1.1.6. Client Caching and Delegation
The file, attribute, and directory caching for the NFS version 4 protocol is similar to previous versions. Attributes and directory information are cached for a duration determined by the client. At the end of a predefined timeout, the client will query the server to see if the related file system object has been updated. For file data, the client checks its cache validity when the file is opened. A query is sent to the server to determine if the file has been changed. Based on this information, the client determines if the data cache for the file should kept or released. Also, when the file is closed, any modified data is written to the server. If an application wants to serialize access to file data, file locking of the file data ranges in question should be used. The major addition to NFS version 4 in the area of caching is the ability of the server to delegate certain responsibilities to the client. When the server grants a delegation for a file to a client, the client is guaranteed certain semantics with respect to the sharing of that file with other clients. At OPEN, the server may provide the client either a read or write delegation for the file. If the client is granted a read delegation, it is assured that no other client has the ability to write to the file for the duration of the delegation. If the client is granted a write delegation, the client is assured that no other client has read or write access to the file. Delegations can be recalled by the server. If another client requests access to the file in such a way that the access conflicts with the granted delegation, the server is able to notify the initial client and recall the delegation. This requires that a callback path exist between the server and client. If this callback path does not exist, then delegations can not be granted. The essence of a delegation is that it allows the client to locally service operations such as OPEN, CLOSE, LOCK, LOCKU, READ, WRITE without immediate interaction with the server.
1.2. General Definitions
The following definitions are provided for the purpose of providing an appropriate context for the reader. Client The "client" is the entity that accesses the NFS server's resources. The client may be an application which contains the logic to access the NFS server directly. The client may also be the traditional operating system client remote file system services for a set of applications. In the case of file locking the client is the entity that maintains a set of locks on behalf of one or more applications. This client is responsible for crash or failure recovery for those locks it manages. Note that multiple clients may share the same transport and multiple clients may exist on the same network node. Clientid A 64-bit quantity used as a unique, short-hand reference to a client supplied Verifier and ID. The server is responsible for supplying the Clientid. Lease An interval of time defined by the server for which the client is irrevocably granted a lock. At the end of a lease period the lock may be revoked if the lease has not been extended. The lock must be revoked if a conflicting lock has been granted after the lease interval. All leases granted by a server have the same fixed interval. Note that the fixed interval was chosen to alleviate the expense a server would have in maintaining state about variable length leases across server failures. Lock The term "lock" is used to refer to both record (byte- range) locks as well as file (share) locks unless specifically stated otherwise. Server The "Server" is the entity responsible for coordinating client access to a set of file systems. Stable Storage NFS version 4 servers must be able to recover without data loss from multiple power failures (including cascading power failures, that is, several power failures in quick succession), operating system failures, and hardware failure of components other than the storage medium itself (for example, disk, nonvolatile RAM).
Some examples of stable storage that are allowable for an
NFS server include:
1. Media commit of data, that is, the modified data has
been successfully written to the disk media, for
example, the disk platter.
2. An immediate reply disk drive with battery-backed on-
drive intermediate storage or uninterruptible power
system (UPS).
3. Server commit of data with battery-backed intermediate
storage and recovery software.
4. Cache commit with uninterruptible power system (UPS) and
recovery software.
Stateid A 64-bit quantity returned by a server that uniquely
defines the locking state granted by the server for a
specific lock owner for a specific file.
Stateids composed of all bits 0 or all bits 1 have special
meaning and are reserved values.
Verifier A 64-bit quantity generated by the client that the server
can use to determine if the client has restarted and lost
all previous lock state.
2. Protocol Data Types
The syntax and semantics to describe the data types of the NFS
version 4 protocol are defined in the XDR [RFC1832] and RPC [RFC1831]
documents. The next sections build upon the XDR data types to define
types and structures specific to this protocol.
2.1. Basic Data Types
Data Type Definition
_____________________________________________________________________
int32_t typedef int int32_t;
uint32_t typedef unsigned int uint32_t;
int64_t typedef hyper int64_t;
uint64_t typedef unsigned hyper uint64_t;
attrlist4 typedef opaque attrlist4<>;
Used for file/directory attributes
bitmap4 typedef uint32_t bitmap4<>;
Used in attribute array encoding.
changeid4 typedef uint64_t changeid4;
Used in definition of change_info
clientid4 typedef uint64_t clientid4;
Shorthand reference to client identification
component4 typedef utf8string component4;
Represents path name components
count4 typedef uint32_t count4;
Various count parameters (READ, WRITE, COMMIT)
length4 typedef uint64_t length4;
Describes LOCK lengths
linktext4 typedef utf8string linktext4;
Symbolic link contents
mode4 typedef uint32_t mode4;
Mode attribute data type
nfs_cookie4 typedef uint64_t nfs_cookie4;
Opaque cookie value for READDIR
nfs_fh4 typedef opaque nfs_fh4<NFS4_FHSIZE>;
Filehandle definition; NFS4_FHSIZE is defined as 128
nfs_ftype4 enum nfs_ftype4;
Various defined file types
nfsstat4 enum nfsstat4;
Return value for operations
offset4 typedef uint64_t offset4;
Various offset designations (READ, WRITE, LOCK, COMMIT)
pathname4 typedef component4 pathname4<>;
Represents path name for LOOKUP, OPEN and others
qop4 typedef uint32_t qop4;
Quality of protection designation in SECINFO
sec_oid4 typedef opaque sec_oid4<>;
Security Object Identifier
The sec_oid4 data type is not really opaque.
Instead contains an ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER as used
by GSS-API in the mech_type argument to
GSS_Init_sec_context. See [RFC2078] for details.
seqid4 typedef uint32_t seqid4;
Sequence identifier used for file locking
stateid4 typedef uint64_t stateid4;
State identifier used for file locking and delegation
utf8string typedef opaque utf8string<>;
UTF-8 encoding for strings
verifier4 typedef opaque verifier4[NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE];
Verifier used for various operations (COMMIT, CREATE,
OPEN, READDIR, SETCLIENTID, WRITE)
NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE is defined as 8
2.2. Structured Data Types
nfstime4
struct nfstime4 {
int64_t seconds;
uint32_t nseconds;
}
The nfstime4 structure gives the number of seconds and nanoseconds
since midnight or 0 hour January 1, 1970 Coordinated Universal
Time (UTC). Values greater than zero for the seconds field denote
dates after the 0 hour January 1, 1970. Values less than zero for
the seconds field denote dates before the 0 hour January 1, 1970.
In both cases, the nseconds field is to be added to the seconds
field for the final time representation. For example, if the time
to be represented is one-half second before 0 hour January 1,
1970, the seconds field would have a value of negative one (-1)
and the nseconds fields would have a value of one-half second
(500000000). Values greater than 999,999,999 for nseconds are
considered invalid.
This data type is used to pass time and date information. A
server converts to and from its local representation of time when
processing time values, preserving as much accuracy as possible.
If the precision of timestamps stored for a file system object is
less than defined, loss of precision can occur. An adjunct time
maintenance protocol is recommended to reduce client and server
time skew.
time_how4
enum time_how4 {
SET_TO_SERVER_TIME4 = 0,
SET_TO_CLIENT_TIME4 = 1
};
settime4
union settime4 switch (time_how4 set_it) {
case SET_TO_CLIENT_TIME4:
nfstime4 time;
default:
void;
};
The above definitions are used as the attribute definitions to
set time values. If set_it is SET_TO_SERVER_TIME4, then the
server uses its local representation of time for the time value.
specdata4
struct specdata4 {
uint32_t specdata1;
uint32_t specdata2;
};
This data type represents additional information for the device
file types NF4CHR and NF4BLK.
fsid4
struct fsid4 {
uint64_t major;
uint64_t minor;
};
This type is the file system identifier that is used as a
mandatory attribute.
fs_location4
struct fs_location4 {
utf8string server<>;
pathname4 rootpath;
};
fs_locations4
struct fs_locations4 {
pathname4 fs_root;
fs_location4 locations<>;
};
The fs_location4 and fs_locations4 data types are used for the
fs_locations recommended attribute which is used for migration
and replication support.
fattr4
struct fattr4 {
bitmap4 attrmask;
attrlist4 attr_vals;
};
The fattr4 structure is used to represent file and directory
attributes.
The bitmap is a counted array of 32 bit integers used to contain
bit values. The position of the integer in the array that
contains bit n can be computed from the expression (n / 32) and
its bit within that integer is (n mod 32).
0 1
+-----------+-----------+-----------+--
| count | 31 .. 0 | 63 .. 32 |
+-----------+-----------+-----------+--
change_info4
struct change_info4 {
bool atomic;
changeid4 before;
changeid4 after;
};
This structure is used with the CREATE, LINK, REMOVE, RENAME
operations to let the client the know value of the change
attribute for the directory in which the target file system
object resides.
clientaddr4
struct clientaddr4 {
/* see struct rpcb in RFC 1833 */
string r_netid<>; /* network id */
string r_addr<>; /* universal address */
};
The clientaddr4 structure is used as part of the SETCLIENT
operation to either specify the address of the client that is
using a clientid or as part of the call back registration.
cb_client4
struct cb_client4 {
unsigned int cb_program;
clientaddr4 cb_location;
};
This structure is used by the client to inform the server of its
call back address; includes the program number and client
address.
nfs_client_id4
struct nfs_client_id4 {
verifier4 verifier;
opaque id<>;
};
This structure is part of the arguments to the SETCLIENTID
operation.
nfs_lockowner4
struct nfs_lockowner4 {
clientid4 clientid;
opaque owner<>;
};
This structure is used to identify the owner of a OPEN share or
file lock.
3. RPC and Security Flavor
The NFS version 4 protocol is a Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
application that uses RPC version 2 and the corresponding eXternal
Data Representation (XDR) as defined in [RFC1831] and [RFC1832]. The
RPCSEC_GSS security flavor as defined in [RFC2203] MUST be used as
the mechanism to deliver stronger security for the NFS version 4
protocol.
3.1. Ports and Transports
Historically, NFS version 2 and version 3 servers have resided on
port 2049. The registered port 2049 [RFC1700] for the NFS protocol
should be the default configuration. Using the registered port for
NFS services means the NFS client will not need to use the RPC
binding protocols as described in [RFC1833]; this will allow NFS to
transit firewalls.
The transport used by the RPC service for the NFS version 4 protocol
MUST provide congestion control comparable to that defined for TCP in
[RFC2581]. If the operating environment implements TCP, the NFS
version 4 protocol SHOULD be supported over TCP. The NFS client and
server may use other transports if they support congestion control as
defined above and in those cases a mechanism may be provided to
override TCP usage in favor of another transport.
If TCP is used as the transport, the client and server SHOULD use
persistent connections. This will prevent the weakening of TCP's
congestion control via short lived connections and will improve
performance for the WAN environment by eliminating the need for SYN
handshakes.
Note that for various timers, the client and server should avoid
inadvertent synchronization of those timers. For further discussion
of the general issue refer to [Floyd].
3.2. Security Flavors
Traditional RPC implementations have included AUTH_NONE, AUTH_SYS,
AUTH_DH, and AUTH_KRB4 as security flavors. With [RFC2203] an
additional security flavor of RPCSEC_GSS has been introduced which
uses the functionality of GSS-API [RFC2078]. This allows for the use
of varying security mechanisms by the RPC layer without the
additional implementation overhead of adding RPC security flavors.
For NFS version 4, the RPCSEC_GSS security flavor MUST be used to
enable the mandatory security mechanism. Other flavors, such as, AUTH_NONE, AUTH_SYS, and AUTH_DH MAY be implemented as well.3.2.1. Security mechanisms for NFS version 4
The use of RPCSEC_GSS requires selection of: mechanism, quality of protection, and service (authentication, integrity, privacy). The remainder of this document will refer to these three parameters of the RPCSEC_GSS security as the security triple.3.2.1.1. Kerberos V5 as security triple
The Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism as described in [RFC1964] MUST be implemented and provide the following security triples. column descriptions: 1 == number of pseudo flavor 2 == name of pseudo flavor 3 == mechanism's OID 4 == mechanism's algorithm(s) 5 == RPCSEC_GSS service 1 2 3 4 5 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 390003 krb5 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 DES MAC MD5 rpc_gss_svc_none 390004 krb5i 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 DES MAC MD5 rpc_gss_svc_integrity 390005 krb5p 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 DES MAC MD5 rpc_gss_svc_privacy for integrity, and 56 bit DES for privacy. Note that the pseudo flavor is presented here as a mapping aid to the implementor. Because this NFS protocol includes a method to negotiate security and it understands the GSS-API mechanism, the pseudo flavor is not needed. The pseudo flavor is needed for NFS version 3 since the security negotiation is done via the MOUNT protocol. For a discussion of NFS' use of RPCSEC_GSS and Kerberos V5, please see [RFC2623].3.2.1.2. LIPKEY as a security triple
The LIPKEY GSS-API mechanism as described in [RFC2847] MUST be implemented and provide the following security triples. The definition of the columns matches the previous subsection "Kerberos V5 as security triple"
1 2 3 4 5 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 390006 lipkey 1.3.6.1.5.5.9 negotiated rpc_gss_svc_none 390007 lipkey-i 1.3.6.1.5.5.9 negotiated rpc_gss_svc_integrity 390008 lipkey-p 1.3.6.1.5.5.9 negotiated rpc_gss_svc_privacy The mechanism algorithm is listed as "negotiated". This is because LIPKEY is layered on SPKM-3 and in SPKM-3 [RFC2847] the confidentiality and integrity algorithms are negotiated. Since SPKM-3 specifies HMAC-MD5 for integrity as MANDATORY, 128 bit cast5CBC for confidentiality for privacy as MANDATORY, and further specifies that HMAC-MD5 and cast5CBC MUST be listed first before weaker algorithms, specifying "negotiated" in column 4 does not impair interoperability. In the event an SPKM-3 peer does not support the mandatory algorithms, the other peer is free to accept or reject the GSS-API context creation. Because SPKM-3 negotiates the algorithms, subsequent calls to LIPKEY's GSS_Wrap() and GSS_GetMIC() by RPCSEC_GSS will use a quality of protection value of 0 (zero). See section 5.2 of [RFC2025] for an explanation. LIPKEY uses SPKM-3 to create a secure channel in which to pass a user name and password from the client to the user. Once the user name and password have been accepted by the server, calls to the LIPKEY context are redirected to the SPKM-3 context. See [RFC2847] for more details.3.2.1.3. SPKM-3 as a security triple
The SPKM-3 GSS-API mechanism as described in [RFC2847] MUST be implemented and provide the following security triples. The definition of the columns matches the previous subsection "Kerberos V5 as security triple". 1 2 3 4 5 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 390009 spkm3 1.3.6.1.5.5.1.3 negotiated rpc_gss_svc_none 390010 spkm3i 1.3.6.1.5.5.1.3 negotiated rpc_gss_svc_integrity 390011 spkm3p 1.3.6.1.5.5.1.3 negotiated rpc_gss_svc_privacy For a discussion as to why the mechanism algorithm is listed as "negotiated", see the previous section "LIPKEY as a security triple." Because SPKM-3 negotiates the algorithms, subsequent calls to SPKM- 3's GSS_Wrap() and GSS_GetMIC() by RPCSEC_GSS will use a quality of protection value of 0 (zero). See section 5.2 of [RFC2025] for an explanation.
Even though LIPKEY is layered over SPKM-3, SPKM-3 is specified as a mandatory set of triples to handle the situations where the initiator (the client) is anonymous or where the initiator has its own certificate. If the initiator is anonymous, there will not be a user name and password to send to the target (the server). If the initiator has its own certificate, then using passwords is superfluous.3.3. Security Negotiation
With the NFS version 4 server potentially offering multiple security mechanisms, the client needs a method to determine or negotiate which mechanism is to be used for its communication with the server. The NFS server may have multiple points within its file system name space that are available for use by NFS clients. In turn the NFS server may be configured such that each of these entry points may have different or multiple security mechanisms in use. The security negotiation between client and server must be done with a secure channel to eliminate the possibility of a third party intercepting the negotiation sequence and forcing the client and server to choose a lower level of security than required or desired.3.3.1. Security Error
Based on the assumption that each NFS version 4 client and server must support a minimum set of security (i.e. LIPKEY, SPKM-3, and Kerberos-V5 all under RPCSEC_GSS), the NFS client will start its communication with the server with one of the minimal security triples. During communication with the server, the client may receive an NFS error of NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC. This error allows the server to notify the client that the security triple currently being used is not appropriate for access to the server's file system resources. The client is then responsible for determining what security triples are available at the server and choose one which is appropriate for the client.3.3.2. SECINFO
The new SECINFO operation will allow the client to determine, on a per filehandle basis, what security triple is to be used for server access. In general, the client will not have to use the SECINFO procedure except during initial communication with the server or when the client crosses policy boundaries at the server. It is possible that the server's policies change during the client's interaction therefore forcing the client to negotiate a new security triple.
3.4. Callback RPC Authentication
The callback RPC (described later) must mutually authenticate the NFS server to the principal that acquired the clientid (also described later), using the same security flavor the original SETCLIENTID operation used. Because LIPKEY is layered over SPKM-3, it is permissible for the server to use SPKM-3 and not LIPKEY for the callback even if the client used LIPKEY for SETCLIENTID. For AUTH_NONE, there are no principals, so this is a non-issue. For AUTH_SYS, the server simply uses the AUTH_SYS credential that the user used when it set up the delegation. For AUTH_DH, one commonly used convention is that the server uses the credential corresponding to this AUTH_DH principal: unix.host@domain where host and domain are variables corresponding to the name of server host and directory services domain in which it lives such as a Network Information System domain or a DNS domain. Regardless of what security mechanism under RPCSEC_GSS is being used, the NFS server, MUST identify itself in GSS-API via a GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE name type. GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE names are of the form: service@hostname For NFS, the "service" element is nfs Implementations of security mechanisms will convert nfs@hostname to various different forms. For Kerberos V5 and LIPKEY, the following form is RECOMMENDED: nfs/hostname For Kerberos V5, nfs/hostname would be a server principal in the Kerberos Key Distribution Center database. For LIPKEY, this would be the username passed to the target (the NFS version 4 client that receives the callback). It should be noted that LIPKEY may not work for callbacks, since the LIPKEY client uses a user id/password. If the NFS client receiving the callback can authenticate the NFS server's user name/password
pair, and if the user that the NFS server is authenticating to has a
public key certificate, then it works.
In situations where NFS client uses LIPKEY and uses a per-host
principal for the SETCLIENTID operation, instead of using LIPKEY for
SETCLIENTID, it is RECOMMENDED that SPKM-3 with mutual authentication
be used. This effectively means that the client will use a
certificate to authenticate and identify the initiator to the target
on the NFS server. Using SPKM-3 and not LIPKEY has the following
advantages:
o When the server does a callback, it must authenticate to the
principal used in the SETCLIENTID. Even if LIPKEY is used,
because LIPKEY is layered over SPKM-3, the NFS client will need to
have a certificate that corresponds to the principal used in the
SETCLIENTID operation. From an administrative perspective, having
a user name, password, and certificate for both the client and
server is redundant.
o LIPKEY was intended to minimize additional infrastructure
requirements beyond a certificate for the target, and the
expectation is that existing password infrastructure can be
leveraged for the initiator. In some environments, a per-host
password does not exist yet. If certificates are used for any
per-host principals, then additional password infrastructure is
not needed.
o In cases when a host is both an NFS client and server, it can
share the same per-host certificate.
(page 23 continued on part 2)
