Content for TS 33.503 Word version: 18.3.0
6.1.3.2 Restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery
6.1.3.2.1 General
6.1.3.2.2 Security flows
6.1.3.2.2.1 Restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model A
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6.1.3.2 Restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery p. 17
6.1.3.2.1 General p. 17
The security for both models of restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery is similar to that of open 5G ProSe Direct Discovery described in clause 6.1.3.1. Both models also use a UTC-based counter (see step 9 in clause 6.1.3.1) to provide freshness for the protection of the restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery message on the PC5 interface. The parameters CURRENT_TIME and MAX_OFFSET are also provided to the UE from the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN to ensure that the obtained UTC-based counter is sufficiently close to real time to protect against replays.
The major differences are that restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery requires confidentiality protection of the discovery messages (e.g. to ensure a UE's privacy is not disclosed to unauthorized parties or tracked due to constantly sending the same ProSe Restricted/Response Code in the clear) and that the MIC checking may be performed by the receiving UE (if allowed by the 5G DDNMF).
The security parameters needed by a sending UE to protect a discovery message (i.e. in Model A the Announcing UE and in Model B the Discoverer UE sending the ProSe Query Code and the Discoveree UE sending the ProSe Response Code) are provided in the Code-Sending Security Parameters. Similarly, the security parameters needed by a UE receiving a discovery message (i.e. in Model A the Monitoring UE and in Model B the Discoverer UE receiving a ProSe Response Code and the Discoveree receiving a ProSe Query Code) are provided in the Code-Receiving Security Parameters.
In addition to clause 6.1.3.4.1 in TS 33.303, 5G Prose introduced two new features:
- During the discovery request procedure, 5G DDNMF may optionally provide the PC5 security policies to the UEs.
- A ciphering algorithm for message-specific confidentiality is configured at the UE during the Discovery Request procedure.
6.1.3.2.2 Security flows p. 17
6.1.3.2.2.1 Restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model A p. 17
The security procedure for restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model A is described as follows.
Figure 6.1.3.2.2.1-1: Security procedure for restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model A
(⇒ copy of original 3GPP image)
(⇒ copy of original 3GPP image)
Steps 1-4 refer to an Announcing UE:
Step 1.
Steps 5-10 refer to a Monitoring UE:
Announcing UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the Restricted ProSe Application User ID (RPAUID) to the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN in order to get the ProSe Code to announce and to get the associated security material. In addition, the Announcing UE shall include its PC5 UE security capability that contains the list of supported ciphering algorithms by the UE in the Discovery Request message.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay plays the role of the Announcing UE and sends a Relay Discovery Key Request instead of a Discovery Request. The Relay Discovery Key Request message includes the Relay Service Code (RSC) and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay's PC5 security capability.
Step 2.
The 5G DDNMF may check for the announce authorization with the ProSe Application Server.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G DDNMF may check with the UDM whether the UE-to-Network relay is authorized to announce UE-to-Network relay discovery message.
Step 3.
If the Announcing UE is roaming, the 5G DDNMFs in the HPLMN and VPLMN of the Announcing UE exchange Announce Auth.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, Npkmf_Discovery_AnnounceAuthorize service operation is used to obtain the authorization from the 5G PKMF for announcing in the PLMN.
Step 4.
The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE returns the ProSe Restricted Code and the corresponding Code-Sending Security Parameters, along with the CURRENT_TIME and MAX_OFFSET parameters. The Code-Sending Security Parameters provide the necessary information for the Announcing UE to protect the transmission of the ProSe Restricted Code and are stored with the ProSe Restricted Code. The Announcing UE takes the same actions with CURRENT_TIME and MAX_OFFSET as described for the Announcing UE in step 4 of clause 6.1.3.1 of the present document. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE shall include the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm in the Discovery Response message. The 5G DDNMF determines the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm based on the ProSe Restricted Code and the received PC5 UE security capability in step 1. The UE stores the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm together with the ProSe Restricted Code.
In addition, the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE may associate the ProSe Restricted Code with the PC5 security policies and include the PC5 security policies in the Discovery Response message.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is used instead of the Discovery Response, and the RSC is used instead of the ProSe Restricted Code.
Step 5.
Steps 11 and 12 occur over PC5:
The Monitoring UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the RPAUID and its PC5 UE security capability to the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN in order to be allowed to monitor for one or more Restricted ProSe Application User IDs.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G ProSe Remote UE plays the role of the Monitoring UE and sends a Relay Discovery Key Request instead of the Discovery Request. The Relay Discovery Key Request message includes the RSC and the 5G ProSe Remote UE's PC5 security capability. The Remote UE may provide a list of PLMN IDs in which the UE is authorized to use a 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. in the Relay Discovery Key Request.
Step 6.
The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE sends an authorization request to the ProSe Application Server. If, based on the permission settings, the RPAUID is allowed to discover at least one of the Target RPAUIDs contained in the Application Level Container, the ProSe Application Server returns an authorization response.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G DDNMF of the Remote UE may check with the UDM whether the Remote UE is authorized to monitor UE-to-Network relay discovery.
Step 7.
If the Discovery Request is authorized, the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE contacts the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE by sending a Monitor Request message, as specified in clause 6.3 of TS 23.304, including the PC5 UE security capability received in step 5.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay Discovery, Relay Discovery Key Request and RSC are used instead of Discovery Request and RPAUID. The 5G DDNMF of the remote UE discovers 5G DDNMF(s) of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay(s) supporting the RSC based on HPLMN IDs of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay(s) mapping to the RSC. Npkmf_Discovery_MonitorKey service operation is used to obtain the discovery key from the 5G PKMF for monitoring in the PLMN.
Step 8.
The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE may exchange authorization messages with the ProSe Application Server.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, this step is skipped.
Step 9.
If the PC5 UE security capability in step 5 includes the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm, the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE responds to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE with a Monitor Response message including the ProSe Restricted Code, the corresponding Code-Receiving Security Parameters, an optional Discovery User Integrity Key (DUIK), and the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm (based on the information/keys stored in step 4). The Code-Receiving Security Parameters provide the information needed by the Monitoring UE to undo the protection applied by the Announcing UE. The DUIK shall be included as a separate parameter if the Code-Receiving Security Parameters indicate that the Monitoring UE use Match Reports for MIC checking. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE stores the ProSe Restricted Code and the Discovery User Integrity Key (if it received one outside of the Code-Receiving Security Parameters).
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is used instead of the Monitor Response, and the RSC and the HPLMN ID of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay (i.e. the Announcing UE) are used instead of the ProSe Restricted Code. The HPLMN ID of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay is used to identify the discovery security materials. Npkmf_Discovery_MonitorKey service operation is used to obtain the discovery key from the 5G PKMF for monitoring in the PLMN.
The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE may send the PC5 security policies associated with the ProSe Restricted Code to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, MIC checking is performed only at the Remote UE and the 5G DDNMF of the Remote UE does not need to configure integrity checking for UE-to-Network Relay discovery.
Step 10.
The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE returns the Discovery Filter and the Code-Receiving Security Parameters, along with the CURRENT_TIME and MAX_OFFSET parameters and the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm. The Monitoring UE takes the same actions with CURRENT_TIME and MAX_OFFSET as described for the Monitoring UE in step 9 of clause 6.1.3.1 of the present document. The UE stores the Discovery Filter, Code-Receiving Security Parameters, and the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm together with the ProSe Restricted Code.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is returned instead of the Discovery Response, and the RSC is included instead of the ProSe Restricted Code. The response message contains the discovery security materials and the HPLMN ID as contained in step 9. The Relay Discovery Key Response includes multiple sets of discovery security materials and the associated HPLMN IDs of the potential relays if multiple 5G DDNMFs/PKMFs of the potential relays supporting the RSC are discovered in step 7.
If the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE receives the PC5 security policies associated with the ProSe Restricted Code in step 9, the Monitoring UE's 5G DDNMF forwards the PC5 security policies to the Monitoring UE.
Step 11.
Steps 13-16 refer to a Monitoring UE that has encountered a match:
The UE starts announcing, if the UTC-based counter provided by the system associated with the discovery slot is within the MAX_OFFSET of the Announcing UE's ProSe clock and if the Validity Timer has not expired. The UE forms the discovery message and protects it. The four least significant bits of UTC-based counter are transmitted along with the protected discovery message.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, RSC is used instead of ProSe Response Code and the announcing message also includes the HPLMN ID in cleartext to identify the discovery security materials.
Step 12.
The Monitoring UE listens for a discovery message that satisfies its Discovery Filter if the UTC-based counter associated with that discovery slot is within the MAX_OFFSET of the monitoring UE's ProSe clock. In order to find such a matching message, it processes the message. If the Monitoring UE was not asked to send Match Reports for MIC checking, it stops at this step from a security perspective. Otherwise, it proceeds to step 13.
For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G ProSe remote UE decides the discovery security materials to process the discovery message based on the HPLMN ID in the discovery message.
Step 13.
If the UE has either not had the 5G DDNMF check the MIC for the discovered ProSe Restricted Code previously or the 5G DDNMF has checked a MIC for the ProSe Restricted Code and the associated Match Report refresh timer (see step 15 for details of this timer) has expired, or as required based on the procedure specified in TS 23.304, then the Monitoring UE sends a Match Report message to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE. The Match Report contains the UTC-based counter value with four least significant bits equal to four least significant bits received along with discovery message and nearest to the Monitoring UE's UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot where it heard the announcement, and other discovery message parameters including the ProSe Restricted Code and MIC. The 5G DDNMF checks the MIC.
Step 14.
The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE may exchange an Auth Req/Auth Resp with the ProSe Application Server to ensure that Monitoring UE is authorized to discover the Announcing UE.
Step 15.
The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE returns to the Monitoring UE an acknowledgement that the integrity check passed. It also provides the CURRENT_TIME parameter, by which the UE (re)sets its ProSe clock. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE included the Match Report refresh timer in the message to the Monitoring UE. The Match Report refresh timer indicates how long the UE will wait before sending a new Match Report for the ProSe Restricted Code.
Step 16.
The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE may send a Match Report Info message to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE.
