Network Working Group                                           T. Ts'o
Request for Comments: 2946                             VA Linux Systems
Category: Standards Track                                September 2000


                     Telnet Data Encryption Option

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document describes a the telnet encryption option as a generic
   method of providing data confidentiality services for the telnet data
   stream.  While this document summarizes currently utilized encryption
   types and codes, it does not define a specific encryption algorithm.
   Separate documents are to be published defining implementations of
   this option for each encryption algorithm.


1.  Command Names and Codes

   ENCRYPT         38

       Encryption Commands
       IS               0
       SUPPORT          1
       REPLY            2
       START            3
       END              4
       REQUEST-START    5
       REQUEST-END      6
       ENC_KEYID        7
       DEC_KEYID        8

       Encryption Types
       NULL             0
       DES_CFB64        1
       DES_OFB64        2

       DES3_CFB64       3
       DES3_OFB64       4
       CAST5_40_CFB64   8
       CAST5_40_OFB64   9
       CAST128_CFB64   10
       CAST128_OFB64   11

       Following historical practice, future encryption type numbers
       will be assigned by the IANA under a First Come First Served
       policy as outlined by RFC 2434 [3].  Despite the fact that
       authentication type numbers are allocated out of an 8-bit number
       space (as are most values in the telnet specification) it is not
       anticipated that the number space is or will become in danger of
       being exhausted.  However, if this should become an issue, when
       over 50% of the number space becomes allocated, the IANA shall
       refer allocation requests to either the IESG or a designated
       expert for approval.

2.  Command Meanings

   IAC WILL ENCRYPT

      The sender of this command is willing to send encrypted data.

   IAC WONT ENCRYPT

      The sender of this command refuses to send encrypted data.

   IAC DO ENCRYPT

      The sender of this command is willing to receive encrypted data.

   IAC DONT ENCRYPT

      The sender of this command refuses to accept encrypted data.

   IAC SB ENCRYPT SUPPORT encryption-type-list IAC SE

      The sender of this command is stating which types of encryption it
      will support.  Only the side of the connection that is DO ENCRYPT
      may send the SUPPORT command.  The current types of encryption are
      listed in the current version of the Assigned Numbers document
      [1].

      The encryption-type-list may only include types which can actually
      be supported during the current session.  If ENCRYPT is negotiated
      in conjunction with AUTH the SUPPORT message MUST NOT be sent
      until after the session key has been determined.  Otherwise,

      it is impossible to know if the selected encryption type can be
      properly initialized based upon the type and length of the key
      that is available."

   IAC SB ENCRYPT IS encryption-type ... IAC SE

      The sender of this command is stating which type of encryption to
      use, and any initial data that is needed.  Only the side of the
      connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the IS command to
      initialize the encryption-type scheme.

   IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY encryption-type ... IAC SE

      The sender of this command is continuing the initial data exchange
      in order to initialize the encryption-type scheme.  Only the side
      of the connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the REPLY command.

   IAC SB ENCRYPT START keyid IAC SE

      The sender of this command is stating that all data following the
      command in the data stream will be be encrypted via the previously
      negotiated method of data encryption.  Only the side of the
      connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the START command.

      The keyid is a variable length field.  It is used by various
      encryption mechanisms to identify which encryption key is to be
      used, when multiple encryption keys might be known on either side
      of the connection.  The keyid field is encoded with the most
      significant byte first, and a keyid value of zero is reserved to
      indicate the default encryption key (this would typically be an
      encryption key derived during authentication, with the
      AUTHENTICATION option).  The keyid field must be at least one byte
      long.  The only valid values for "keyid" will be those that have
      been received in a DEC_KEYID command.

   IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE

      The sender of this command is stating that all data following the
      command in the data stream will not be encrypted.  Only the side
      of the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the END

   IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-START keyid IAC SE

      The sender of this command requests that the remote side begin
      encryption of the telnet data stream.  Only the side of the
      connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the REQUEST-START command.
      The keyid is only advisory, and my be omitted.

   IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-END IAC SE

      The sender of this command requests that the remote side stop
      encryption of the telnet data stream.  Only the side of the
      connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the REQUEST-END command.

   IAC SB ENCRYPT ENC_KEYID keyid IAC SE

      The sender of this requests that the remote side verify that
      "keyid" maps to a valid key; or verifies that the "keyid" received
      in a DEC_KEYID command is valid.  If keyid is omitted, it implies
      that there are no more known keyids, and that the attempt to find
      a common keyid has failed.  Only the side of the connection that
      is WILL ENCRYPT may send the ENC_KEYID command.

   IAC SB ENCRYPT DEC_KEYID keyid IAC SE

      The sender of this requests that the remote side verify that
      "keyid" maps to a valid key on the remote side; or verifies that
      the "keyid" received in a ENC_KEYID command is valid.  If keyid is
      omitted, it implies that there are no more known keyids, and that
      the attempt to find a common keyid has failed.  Only the side of
      the connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the DEC_KEYID command.

3.  Default Specification

   The default specification for this option is

      WONT ENCRYPT
      DONT ENCRYPT

   meaning there will not be any encryption of the Telnet data stream.

4.  Motivation

   The Telnet protocol has no form of protection from some intervening
   gateway looking at IP packets as they travel through the network.
   This is especially dangerous when passwords are sent as clear text
   over the network.  This option provides a method for encrypting the
   data stream.

5.  Implementation Rules

   Once the Encryption option is in effect, all data in the negotiated
   direction, including TELNET options, is encrypted.  Encryption begins
   with the octet of data immediately following the "IAC SB ENCRYPT
   START encryption-type IAC SE" command.  Encryption ends after the
   "IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE" command.

   WILL and DO are used only at the beginning of the connection to
   obtain and grant permission for future negotiations.  The ENCRYPT
   option must be negotiated in both directions.

   Once the two hosts have exchanged a WILL and a DO, the sender of the
   DO ENCRYPT must send a ENCRYPT SUPPORT command to let the remote side
   know the types of encryption it is willing to accept.  In the
   request, a list of supported encryption schemes is sent.  Only the
   sender of the DO may send a list of supported encryption types (IAC
   SB ENCRYPT SUPPORT encryption-type-list IAC SE).  Only the sender of
   the WILL may actually transmit encrypted data.  This is initiated via
   the "IAC SB ENCRYPT START IAC SE" command, and terminated via the
   "IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE" command.  If a START is received, and
   then a second START is received before receiving an END, the second
   START is ignored.

   If the sender of the DO would like the remote side to begin sending
   encrypted data, it can send the "IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-START IAC SE"
   command.  If the sender of the DO would like the remote side to stop
   sending encrypted data, it can send the "IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-STOP
   IAC SE" command.

   If the receiver of the SUPPORT command does not support any of the
   encryption types listed in the SUPPORT command, it should send an
   "IAC SB ENCRYPT IS NULL IAC SE" to indicate that there are no
   encryption types in common.  It may also send an IAC WONT ENCRYPT
   command to turn off the ENCRYPT option.

   The order of the encryption types in a SUPPORT command must be
   ordered to indicate a preference for different encryption types, the
   first type being the most preferred, and the last type the least
   preferred.

   If the ENCRYPT option has been enabled, and encrypted data is being
   received, the receipt of an "IAC WONT ENCRYPT" implies the receipt of
   an "IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE", e.g., the Telnet data stream is no
   longer encrypted.

   The following example demonstrates the use of the option:

      Host1                            Host2

      [ Host1 requests Host2 negotiate the encryption of data that
        Host2 sends to Host1.  Host2 agrees to negotiate the encryption
        of data that it sends to Host1.  ]
      DO ENCRYPT
                                           WILL ENCRYPT
      [ Host1 requests that Host2 enable encryption as soon as the
        initialization is completed, and informs Host2 that is supports
        DES_CFB64.  ]
      IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-START IAC
      SE
      IAC SB ENCRYPT SUPPORT DES_CFB64
      IAC SE
      [ Host2 sends the initial feed to Host1.  Host1 acknowledges
        receipt of the IV.  ]
                                       IAC SB ENCRYPT IS DES_CFB64
                                       CFB64_IV  144 146 63 229 237 148
                                       81 143 IAC SE
      IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY DES_CFB64
      CFB64_IV_OK  103 207 181 71 224
      55 229 98 IAC SE
      [ Host2 is now free to start sending encrypted data, and since a
        REQUEST-START was received, it enables encryption.  ]
                                       IAC SB ENCRYPT START IAC SE
      [ All data from Host2 to Host1 is now encrypted.  ]
                                       IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE
      [ All data from Host2 to Host1 is now in clear text again.  ]

   It is expected that any implementation that supports the Telnet
   ENCRYPT option will support all of this specification.

6.  Security Considerations

   The ENCRYPT option used in isolation provides protection against
   passive attacks, but not against active attacks.  In other words, it
   will  provide protection from someone who is just watching the IP
   packets as they pass through the network.  However, an attacker who
   is able to modify packets in flight could prevent the ENCRYPT option
   from being negotiated.

   This flaw can be remedied by using the Telnet Authentication option
   alongside the ENCRYPT option.  Specifically, setting
   ENCRYPT_USING_TELOPT in the authentication-type-pair can be used to
   force that Encryption be negotiated even in the face of active
   attacks.

   In addition, an active attacker can interfere with attempts to start
   or restart encryption.  If encryption is requested by the user, and
   the client is unable to negotiate enabling or re-enabling encryption,
   the client must assume that it is being attacked, and MUST
   immediately terminate the telnet connection.

7.  Future directions for Telnet Encryption

   The specification defines a method for providing data confidentiality
   to the telnet data stream.  Unfortunately all of the encryption
   mechanism provided under this option do not provide data integrity,
   because of the complexity of specifying a protocol which provided
   integrity services efficiently in a stream-oriented protocol.

   The TELNET START_TLS specification provides a scheme which provides
   confidentiality, integrity, and compression, and future work for
   telnet encryption should closely examine using this specification.
   One promising approach would use the anonymous Diffie-Hellman mode of
   TLS, followed by the telnet AUTHENTICATION option where the
   authentication mechanism would include the client and server finished
   messages computed during the TLS negotiation.

8.  Acknowledgments

   This document was originally written by Dave Borman of Cray Research,
   with the assistance of Theodore Ts'o of MIT and the IETF Telnet
   Working Group.

9.  References

   [1] Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Telnet Protocol Specification", STD
       8, RFC 854, May 1983.

   [2] Ts'o, T. and J. Altman, "Telnet Authentication Option", RFC 2941,
       September 2000.

   [3] Alvestrand, H. and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
       Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.

10.  Author's Address

   Theodore Ts'o, Editor
   VA Linux Systems
   43 Pleasant St.
   Medford, MA 02155

   Phone: (781) 391-3464
   EMail: tytso@mit.edu

11.  Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.