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Content for TR 33.745 Word version: 19.0.0

1… 5…

5 Key issues p. 9

5.1 Key Issue #1: Security of 5G NR Femto Ownership p. 9

5.1.1 Key issue details p. 9

5.1.2 Security threats p. 10

5.1.3 Potential security requirements p. 10

5.2 Key issue #2: Authentication aspect of 5G NR Femto connecting to the operator network. p. 10

5.2.1 Key issue details p. 10

5.2.2 Security Threats p. 10

5.2.3 Potential security requirements p. 10

5.3 Key Issue #3: Support of 5G Femto location security p. 10

5.3.1 Key issue details p. 10

5.3.2 Security threats p. 11

5.3.3 Potential security requirements p. 11

5.4 Key Issue #4: UE access control p. 11

5.4.1 Key issue details p. 11

5.4.2 Security threats p. 11

5.4.3 Potential security requirements p. 11

5.5 Key Issue #5: Protection of backhaul link between 5G NR Femto and 5GC p. 11

5.5.1 Key issue details p. 11

5.5.2 Security threats p. 11

5.5.3 Potential security requirements p. 12

5.6 Key Issue #6: Hosting Party authentication p. 12

5.6.1 Key issue details p. 12

5.6.2 Security threats p. 12

5.6.3 Potential security requirements p. 12

5.7 Key Issue #7: Direct link between 5G NR Femtos p. 12

5.7.1 Key issue details p. 12

5.7.2 Security threats p. 12

5.7.3 Potential security requirements p. 12

5.8 Key Issue #8: 5G NR Femto management system accessible on the public internet p. 13

5.8.1 Key issue details p. 13

5.8.2 Security threats p. 13

5.8.3 Potential security requirements p. 13

5.9 Key issue #9: 5GS Core network topology hiding from 5G NR Femto deployments p. 13

5.9.1 Key issue details p. 13

5.9.2 Threats p. 13

5.9.3 Potential security requirements p. 13

6 Solutions p. 14

6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues p. 14

6.1 Solution #1: Reusing existing mechanism for Ownership Security p. 14

6.1.1 Introduction p. 14

6.1.2 Solution details p. 14

6.1.3 Evaluation p. 14

6.2 Solution #2: IKEv2 EAP-AKA-based authentication p. 14

6.2.1 Introduction p. 14

6.2.2 Solution details p. 15

6.2.3 Evaluation p. 16

6.3 Solution #3: Solution to secure backhaul of 5G NR Femto p. 16

6.3.1 Introduction p. 16

6.3.2 Solution details p. 16

6.3.3 Evaluation p. 17

6.4 Solution #4: UE access control using CAG verification p. 17

6.4.1 Introduction p. 17

6.4.2 Solution details p. 17

6.4.3 Solution Evaluation p. 19

6.5 Solution #5: Security of 5G NR Femto Ownership p. 20

6.5.1 Solution details p. 20

6.5.2 Solution Evaluation p. 21

6.6 Solution #6: Multi-factor authentication based femto owner/manager authentication p. 21

6.6.1 Solution details p. 21

6.6.2 Solution Evaluation p. 23

6.7 Solution #7: Support of 5G NR Femto location security p. 23

6.7.1 Solution details p. 23

6.7.2 Solution Evaluation p. 25

6.8 Solution #8: Security solution for backhaul link between 5G NR Femto and 5GC p. 25

6.8.1 Introduction p. 25

6.8.2 Solution details p. 25

6.8.3 Evaluation p. 26

6.9 Solution #9: Hosting party authentication using EAP-AKA' p. 26

6.9.1 Introduction p. 26

6.9.2 Solution details p. 26

6.9.3 Evaluation p. 27

6.10 Solution #10: Verify and authorise direct connections between 5G NR Femtos p. 27

6.10.1 Introduction p. 27

6.10.2 Solution details p. 28

6.10.3 Evaluation p. 29

6.11 Solution #11: Security solution for backhaul link between 5G NR Femto and 5G NRFemto MS p. 29

6.11.1 Introduction p. 29

6.11.2 Solution details p. 29

6.11.3 Evaluation p. 29

6.12 Solution #12: Reusing existing location verification security features p. 29

6.12.1 Introduction p. 29

6.12.2 Solution details p. 29

6.12.3 Evaluation p. 29

6.13 Solution #13: Security solution for UE CAG verification p. 30

6.13.1 Introduction p. 30

6.13.2 Solution details p. 30

6.13.3 Evaluation p. 30

6.14 Solution #14: security between 5G NR Femtos p. 30

6.14.1 Introduction p. 30

6.14.2 Solution details p. 30

6.14.3 Evaluation p. 30

6.15 Solution #15: Verify the 5G NR Femto location with Security Gateway p. 30

6.15.1 Introduction p. 30

6.15.2 Solution details p. 30

6.15.3 Evaluation p. 31

7 Conclusions p. 32

7.1 Conclusions to Key Issue #1: Security of 5G NR Femto Ownership p. 32

7.2 Conclusions to Key Issue #2: Authentication aspect of 5G NR Femto connecting to the operator network p. 32

7.3 Conclusions to Key Issue #3: Support of 5G Femto location security p. 32

7.4 Conclusions to Key Issue #4: UE access control p. 33

7.5 Conclusions to Key Issue #5: Protection of backhaul link between 5G NR Femto and 5GC p. 33

7.6 Conclusions to Key Issue #6: Hosting Party authentication p. 33

7.7 Conclusions to Key Issue #7: Direct link between 5G NR Femtos p. 33

7.8 Conclusions to Key Issue #8: 5G NR Femto management system accessible on the public internet p. 33

7.9 Conclusions to Key Issue #9: 5GS Core network topology hiding from 5G NR Femto deployments p. 34

$ Change history p. 35