Content for TS 29.501 Word version: 19.0.0

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6.1 Introduction 6.2 General 6.3 SBA-specific requirements
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6 Requirements for secure API design p. 73

6.1 Introduction p. 73

This clause contains a list of security requirements for API design provided by SA3.

The following requirements are intended as general guidance for 3GPP Stage 3 work in order to specify secure protocols and APIs. As such, these guidelines are independent of the specific technology and shall be followed at all times.

The valid format and range of values (when applicable) for each IE shall be defined unambiguously.

NOTE 1:
Explicitly defining format and range of values not only helps to improve the security of a certain implementation, but also allows for reliable interoperability between different protocol implementations. Example: Defining a "lowercase string variable of length 10 and range [a..z]" is much more explicit that just defining a "string of length 10". There are known vulnerabilities such as a denial of service (resulting in the parser converting from a string representing an integer - an attacker can pass in an arbitrarily large integer and trigger an unhandled exception) and such leading to a heap corruption and crash (proof-of-concept available), or potentially remote code execution (no proof-of-concept known). Unicode literals also require special treatment when doing string comparisons to ensure that equivalent strings return true when compared.
For each message the number of leaf IEs shall not exceed 2048K. If a leaf IE is an array of a simple data type, then the whole array shall count as one leaf. If a leaf IE is a data structure or an array of data structures, then it shall be considered a branch, i.e. it shall not be counted as a leaf. The data structure's (branch) attributes determine the number of leaves. For instance, a data structure with e.g. three attributes will count as three leaves.
The maximum size of the JSON body of any HTTP request/response shall not exceed 16 million octets before compression is applied, if any.

NOTE 2:
APIs need to be designed taking care to avoid a too large HTTP content size for performance reasons.
The maximum nesting depth of leaves shall not exceed 32. If a leaf IE is an array of a simple data type, then the whole array shall be considered as the first level of nesting. If a leaf IE is a data structure or an array of data structures, then it shall be considered a branch and the first level of nesting. The data structure's attributes (leaves) shall be considered as the second level of nesting. For instance, a data structure with e.g. one attribute-A, which is also a data structure with e.g. one attribute-B, then attribute-B will make the third level of nesting.

NOTE 3:
There are resource exhaustion attacks on JSON parsers. Defined maximum numbers of IEs, sizes and nesting depths allow implementations to know an upper bound of required resources. It also allows validation of incoming messages. Recursively processing nested objects leads to stack exhaustion and a denial of service bug.
For data structures where values are accessible using names (sometimes referred to as keys), e.g. a JSON object, the name shall be unique. The occurrence of the same name (or key) twice within such a structure shall be an error and the message shall be rejected.

NOTE 4:
Serialization schemes (e.g. JSON) can leave the handling of repeated names (keys) up to the implementer's discretion. For example, for a repeated name an error can be raised, the pair can be ignored, or the first or last value read can be used, though there is no canonical order in which a parser should treat the data it receives. Failure to adhere to consistent handling rules can lead to vulnerabilities. From a security perspective rejecting objects with repeated names, rather than accepting according to some rule, is the more robust solution, and aids in identification of potentially malicious activity. There are known attacks with specially crafted malicious messages that are designed to confuse implementations of NFs to get fraudulent messages into a PLMN.

6.3 SBA-specific requirements p. 74

The following requirements shall be considered for every network function that implements a service-based interface.

OpenAPI specifications are machine-readable JSON objects and can be used as the basis for re-configuring an NFs action when an API or message structure changes. Therefore, each OpenAPI specifications shall contain all necessary information to correctly and unambiguously parse the contents of the message body.

NOTE:
Attacks often exploit corner cases and unspecified behavior in order to exploit a system. Traffic normalization counters this by either dropping traffic that is malformed or by forcing certain information elements to a "normal" value. Typically, this relates to inconsistent fields.
3GPP TS 33.501 documents which type of information shall be confidentiality protected on the N32 interface. The fields where these types of information (e.g. SUPI) is contained may have different names. Even if the field names are different, the mechanism specified in clause 5.2.3.3 of TS 29.573 shall clearly identify the type of information carried in each IE and which information types shall be confidentiality protected.