Content for TR 33.897 Word version: 13.1.0
6 Security analysis of IOPS p. 9
6.1 General p. 9
6.2 Key issue #1: Security credentials in IOPS networks p. 9
6.3 Key issue #2: Integrity and confidentiality for IOPS network p. 10
6.3.1 Key issue details p. 10
6.3.2 Security threat p. 10
6.3.3 Potential security requirement p. 10
6.4 Key issue #3: Isolated E-UTRAN support of Public Safety UEs belonging to different Public Safety organizations p. 11
6.5 Key issue #4: IOPS AKA based upon a secondary USIM application using a single UICC p. 11
6.5.1 Key issue details p. 11
6.5.2 Security threat p. 12
6.5.2.1 Interception of IOPS network user traffic p. 12
6.5.2.2 Theft or loss p. 12
6.5.2.3 Impersonation p. 12
6.5.3 Potential security requirement p. 12
6.6 Key issue #5: Isolated E-UTRAN internode interface security p. 13
6.6.1 Key issue details p. 13
6.6.2 Security threat p. 14
6.6.3 Potential security requirement p. 14
7 Proposed solutions p. 14
7.1 Proposed Solution #1: AKA based on a USIM application dedicated exclusively for IOPS operation p. 14
7.2 Proposed Solution #2: IOPS inter-node interface security p. 19
8 Evaluation p. 19
8.1 Proposed Solution #1: AKA based on a USIM application dedicated exclusively for IOPS operation p. 19
8.1.1 General p. 19
8.1.2 Analysis of Security Analysis Key Issues p. 19
8.1.2.0 Introduction p. 19
8.1.2.1 Key Issue #1: Security credentials in IOPS networks p. 20
8.1.2.2 Key Issue #2: Integrity and confidentiality for IOPS networks p. 20
8.1.2.3 Key Issue #3: Isolated E-UTRAN support of Public Safety UEs belonging to different Public Safety organizations p. 20
8.1.2.4 Key Issue #4: AKA based on a USIM application dedicated exclusively for IOPS operation p. 20
8.1.2.5 Key Issue #5: Internode interface security p. 20
8.1.3 Scalability p. 20
8.1.3.1 Hardware dimensioning p. 20
8.1.3.2 Provisioning of credentials p. 21
8.1.3.3 Replacement of a large number of credentials in case of compromise of a local HSS p. 21
8.1.3a 'Subscriber key separation' mechanism to mitigation of compromise of local HSSs p. 21
8.1.4 Malicious switching of USIM applications p. 23
8.1.5 Conclusion p. 23
9 Conclusions p. 23
$ Change History p. 24
