Tech-
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IETF
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Content for
TR 33.889
Word version: 13.0.0
1…
4…
4
Group based Enhancements (GROUPE)
5
Monitoring Enhancements (MONTE)
6
Architecture Enhancements for Service capability Exposure (AESE)
7
Conclusions
A
Information on other SDO's work relevant for SCEF security architecture
$
Change History
4
Group based Enhancements (GROUPE)
p. 8
4.1
Group message protection
p. 8
4.1.1
Issue details
p. 8
4.1.2
Threats
p. 8
4.1.3
Security requirements
p. 8
4.1.4
Solutions
p. 9
4.1.4.1
Solution 1: Application layer based protection
p. 9
4.1.4.2
Solution 2: Network based protection for cell broadcast
p. 9
4.1.4.3
Solution 3: MBMS based method
p. 10
4.1.4.4
Solution 4: Authentication of UEs of a group
p. 10
4.1.4.5
Solution 5: Secure protection for unicast delivery of group message
p. 11
4.1.4.6
Solution 6: Secure protection of delivering group message via T4.
p. 11
4.1.5
Impacts on existing nodes or functionality
p. 11
4.1.6
Evaluation
p. 11
5
Monitoring Enhancements (MONTE)
p. 13
5.1
Location Management
p. 13
5.1.1
Issue details
p. 13
5.1.2
Threats
p. 13
5.1.3
Security requirements
p. 13
5.1.4
Solutions
p. 13
5.1.4.1
Solution 1: Location management
p. 13
5.1.5
Impacts on existing nodes or functionality
p. 14
5.2
Privacy of UE location information
p. 14
5.2.1
Issue details
p. 14
5.2.2
Threats
p. 14
5.2.3
Security requirements
p. 15
5.2.4
Solutions
p. 15
5.2.5
Impacts on existing nodes or functionality
p. 15
5.2.6
Evaluation
p. 15
6
Architecture Enhancements for Service capability Exposure (AESE)
p. 16
6.1
Exposure interface Security
p. 16
6.1.1
General
p. 16
6.1.2
Issue details
p. 16
6.1.3
Threats
p. 17
6.1.3.1
SCEF
p. 17
6.1.3.2
Interface A1
p. 18
6.1.3.3
Interface A4
p. 18
6.1.4
Security requirements
p. 18
6.1.4.1
SCEF
p. 18
6.1.4.2
Interface A1
p. 18
6.1.4.3
Interface A4
p. 19
6.1.5
Solutions
p. 20
6.1.5.1
Solution 1 for securing A1 interface
p. 20
6.1.5.1.1
General
p. 20
6.1.5.1.2
SCEF is controlled by a business partner i.e. another 3GPP operator (A1 interface)
p. 20
6.1.5.1.3
SCEF is controlled by a business partner i.e. a 3rd party (A1 interface)
p. 21
6.1.5.1.4
SCEF and 3GPP Network Entity are controlled by the same 3GPP operator (A1 interface)
p. 21
6.1.5.2
Solution 2 for securing A4 interface
p. 21
6.1.5.2.1
General
p. 21
6.1.5.2.2
Application accessing 3GPP Network Entity directly and Application is controlled by a business partner i.e. another 3GPP operator (A4 interface)
p. 21
6.1.5.2.3
Application accessing 3GPP Network Entity directly and Application is controlled by a business partner i.e. a 3rd party (A4 interface)
p. 22
6.1.5.2.4
Application accessing 3GPP Network Entity directly and Application and 3GPP Network Entity are controlled by the same 3GPP operator (A4 interface)
p. 22
7
Conclusions
p. 22
7.1
GROUPE Conclusion
p. 22
7.2
MONTE Conclusion
p. 22
7.3
AESE Conclusion
p. 22
A
Information on other SDO's work relevant for SCEF security architecture
p. 23
A.1
General
p. 23
A.2
Using OMA-ER-Autho4API for securing SCEF A2 and A3 interfaces
p. 23
A.2.1
General
p. 23
A.2.2
OMA-ER-Autho4API solution
p. 23
$
Change History
p. 25