Tech-invite 3GPPspace IETFspace

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Content for TR 33.843 Word version: 15.1.0

1… 5…

5 Key issues p. 8

5.1 Key Issue #1: Authorization for indirect 3GPP communication p. 8

5.1.1 Key Issue details p. 8

5.1.2 Security threats p. 8

5.1.3 Potential security requirements p. 9

5.2 Key Issue #2: Authentication of eRemote-UE via eRelay-UE p. 9

5.2.1 Introduction p. 9

5.2.2 Key Issue Details p. 9

5.2.3 Security Threats p. 9

5.2.4 Potential Security Requirements p. 9

5.3 Key Issue #3: IMSI Privacy of eRemote-UE p. 10

5.3.1 Introduction p. 10

5.3.2 Key Issue Details p. 10

5.3.3 Security Threats p. 10

5.3.4 Potential Security Requirements p. 10

5.4 Key Issues #4: Discovery p. 11

5.4.1 Key Issue details p. 11

5.4.2 Security threats p. 11

5.4.3 Potential security requirements p. 11

5.5 Key Issues #5: Security of CP between eRemote-UE and network p. 12

5.5.1 Issue detail p. 12

5.5.2 Security threats p. 12

5.5.3 Potential security requirements p. 12

5.6 Key Issue #6: Security of Service Continuity p. 12

5.6.1 Issue detail p. 12

5.6.1.1 Handover between indirect and direct mode and vice versa p. 13

5.6.1.1.1 Handover from direct mode to indirect mode p. 13

5.6.1.1.2 Handover from indirect mode to direct mode p. 13

5.6.1.2 Handover between eRelay-UEs p. 14

5.6.1.3 Handover of eRelay-UEs p. 14

5.6.2 Security threats p. 14

5.6.3 Potential security requirements p. 14

5.7 Key Issues #7: Authentication of eRemote-UE during Setting Up Indirect 3GPP Communication p. 15

5.7.1 Key Issue details p. 15

5.7.2 Security threats p. 15

5.7.3 Potential security requirements p. 15

5.8 Key Issue #8: Authentication of eRelay-UE p. 15

5.8.1 Issue Detail p. 15

5.8.3 Security Threats p. 15

5.8.4 Potential Security Requirements p. 16

5.9 Key Issue #9: User Plane protection between eRemote-UE and eNB p. 16

5.9.1 Issue detail p. 16

5.9.2 Security threats p. 16

5.9.3 Potential security requirements p. 16

6 Solutions p. 16

6.1 Solution #1: Authentication of eRemote-UE via eRelay-UE p. 16

6.1.1 Introduction p. 16

6.1.2 Solution details p. 16

6.1.3 Evaluation p. 16

6.2 Solution #2: eRemote-UE Authentication with MITM detection p. 17

6.2.1 Introduction p. 17

6.2.2 Solution details p. 17

6.2.2.1 Authorization and Authentication of an eRemote-UE to Core Network and security context establishment between eRemote-UE and eRelay-UE p. 17

6.2.2.2 Man in the middle attack detection mechanism p. 18

6.2.3 Evaluation p. 19

6.3 Solution #3: Authentication of eRelay-UE p. 19

6.3.1 Introduction p. 19

6.3.2 Solution details p. 19

6.3.3 Evaluation p. 19

6.4 Solution #4: Solution of Authorization for Indirect 3GPP Communication p. 19

6.4.1 Introduction p. 19

6.4.2 Solution details p. 19

6.4.2.1 eRelay-UE Authorization p. 19

6.4.2.2 eRemote-UE Authorization p. 20

6.4.3 Evaluation p. 20

6.5 Solution #5: Protection of the UP between eRemote-UE and eRelay-UE p. 20

6.5.1 Introduction p. 20

6.5.2 Solution details p. 20

6.5.3 Evaluation p. 20

6.6 Solution #6: Solution for protection of CP between eRemote-UE and Network p. 20

6.6.1 Introduction p. 20

6.6.2 Solution details p. 20

6.6.3 Evaluation p. 21

6.7 Solution #7: Solution of IMSI privacy for attach via eRelay-UE p. 21

6.7.1 Introduction p. 21

6.7.2 Solution details p. 21

6.7.3 Evaluation p. 23

6.8 Solution #8: eRelay Discovery p. 23

6.8.1 General p. 23

6.8.2 Solution details p. 23

6.8.2.1 eRelay Open Discovery p. 23

6.8.2.2 eRelay Restricted Discovery p. 24

6.8.3 Evaluation p. 24

6.9 Solution #9: Path Switch of direct to indirect 3GPP Communication and vice versa p. 24

6.9.1 Introduction p. 24

6.9.2 Solution details p. 24

6.9.2.1 eRemote-UE path switch under the same eNB p. 24

6.9.2.1.1 Preconditions p. 24

6.9.2.1.2 Solution Variant a): Without special relay key p. 25

6.9.2.1.3 Solution Variant b): With special relay key p. 25

6.9.2.2 eRemote-UE Mobility under a different eNB p. 25

6.9.2.2.1 Preconditions p. 25

6.9.2.2.2 Solution Variant a): Without special relay key p. 26

6.9.2.2.3 Solution Variant b): With special relay key p. 26

6.9.3 Evaluation p. 26

6.10 Solution #10: Handover of eRemote-UE from one eRelay to another p. 27

6.10.1 Introduction p. 27

6.10.2 Solution details p. 27

6.10.2.1 Handover under the same eNB p. 27

6.10.2.1.1 Preconditions p. 27

6.10.2.1.2 Solution Variant a): Without special relay key p. 27

6.10.2.1.3 Solution Variant b): With special relay key p. 27

6.10.2.2 Handover under a different eNB p. 28

6.10.2.2.1 Preconditions p. 28

6.10.2.2.2 Solution Variant a): Without special relay key p. 28

6.10.2.2.3 Solution Variant b): With special relay key p. 28

6.10.3 Evaluation p. 29

6.11 Solution #11: Handover of eRelay-UE p. 29

6.11.1 Introduction p. 29

6.11.2 Solution details p. 29

6.11.2.1 Handover of the eRelay-UE p. 29

6.11.2.1.1 Preconditions p. 29

6.11.2.1.2 Solution Variant a): Without special relay key p. 29

6.11.2.1.3 Solution Variant b): With special relay key p. 29

6.11.3 Evaluation p. 30

6.12 Solution #12: Enhancement of Setting Up Connection between eRemote-UE and eRelay-UE p. 30

6.12.1 Introduction p. 30

6.12.2 Solution details p. 31

6.12.3 Evaluation p. 32

6.13 Solution #13: Security Parameters Configuration on eRemote-UE during Dynamic Trust Relationship Establishment p. 32

6.13.1 Introduction p. 32

6.13.2 Solution details p. 32

6.13.3 Evaluation p. 33

7 Conclusions p. 33

7.1 Key Issue 1 p. 33

7.2 Key Issue 2 p. 33

7.3 Key Issue 3 p. 33

7.4 Key Issue 4 p. 34

7.5 Key Issue 5 p. 34

7.6 Key Issue 6 p. 34

7.7 Key Issue 7 p. 34

7.8 Key Issue 8 p. 34

7.9 Key Issue 9 p. 34

7.10 Overall conclusions p. 34

$ Change History p. 35