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Content for
TR 33.833
Word version: 13.0.0
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7
Key Issues for Rel-13
8
Solutions for Rel-13
7
Key Issues for Rel-13
p. 96
7.1
Key Issues on ProSe Relays
p. 96
7.1.1
Key Issue #7.1.1: Maintain 3GPP communication security through relay
p. 96
7.1.1.1
Issue Detail
p. 96
7.1.1.2
Security Threats
p. 96
7.1.1.3
Potential security requirements
p. 96
7.1.2
Key Issue #7.1.2: ProSe UE-Network Relays Connection
p. 97
7.1.2.1
Issue Detail
p. 97
7.1.2.2
Security Threats
p. 97
7.1.2.3
Potential security requirements
p. 97
7.1.3
Key Issue #7.1.3: Key Issues for UE-to-Network Relays
p. 97
7.1.3.1
Key issue details
p. 97
7.1.4
Key Issue #7.1.4: UE-to-UE Relay
p. 98
7.1.4.1
Issue detail
p. 98
7.1.4.2
Threats
p. 98
7.1.4.3
Potential security requirements
p. 98
7.2
Key Issues on One-to-one Communications
p. 99
7.2.1
Key Issue #7.2.1: Security analysis for ProSe communication
p. 99
7.2.1.1
Issue Detail
p. 99
7.2.1.2
Security Threats
p. 99
7.2.1.3
Potential security requirements
p. 99
7.2.2
Key Issue #7.2.2: One-to-One Direct Communications using E-UTRA
p. 99
7.2.2.1
Key issue details
p. 99
7.2.2.2
Security threats
p. 99
7.2.2.3
Potential security requirements
p. 99
7.2.3
Key Issue #7.2.3: Mutual authentication of ProSe enabled devices for public safety in out of coverage scenario
p. 100
7.2.3.1
Key issue details
p. 100
7.2.3.2
Security threats
p. 100
7.2.3.3
Potential security requirements
p. 100
7.2.4
Key Issue #7.2.4: One-to-one ProSe Direct Communication
p. 100
7.2.4.1
General Description
p. 100
7.2.4.2
Security threats
p. 100
7.2.4.3
Potential security requirements
p. 101
7.3
Key Issues on Direct Discovery
p. 101
7.3.1
Key Issue #7.3.1: Restricted ProSe Direct Discovery (Model A and B)
p. 101
7.3.1.1
Key issue details
p. 101
7.3.1.2
Security threats
p. 101
7.3.1.3
Potential security requirements
p. 102
7.3.2
Key Issue #7.3.2: Security - PC2 interface in Restricted ProSe Direct Discovery
p. 102
7.3.2.1
Key issue details
p. 102
7.3.2.2
Security threats
p. 102
7.3.2.3
Potential security requirements
p. 103
7.3.3
Key Issue #7.3.3: Spatial Replay for ProSe Direct Discovery
p. 103
7.3.3.1
Key issue details
p. 103
7.3.3.2
Security threats
p. 104
7.3.3.3
Potential security requirements
p. 104
7.4
Key Issues on ProSe Direct Discovery (Public Safety use)
p. 105
7.4.1
Key Issue #7.4.1: Direct Discovery (public safety use) in out of coverage scenario - Group Discovery
p. 105
7.4.1.1
Key issue details
p. 105
7.4.1.2
Security threats
p. 105
7.4.1.3
Potential security requirements
p. 105
8
Solutions for Rel-13
p. 105
8.1
Solutions on ProSe Relays
p. 105
8.1.1
Solution #8.1.1 UE-to-Network relay discovery
p. 105
8.1.1.1
Solution description
p. 105
8.1.1.2
Token Calculation
p. 107
8.1.2
Solution #8.1.2 Security between Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay using GBA push for direct communication key
p. 107
8.1.2.1
General
p. 107
8.1.2.2
Solution description
p. 108
8.1.3
Solution #8.1.3 Security between Remote UE and UE-to-Network relay using GBA push for transport of direct communication key
p. 110
8.1.3.1
General
p. 110
8.1.3.2
Solution description
p. 111
8.1.4
Solution #8.1.4 Security between Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay using PC4a interface to generate Direct Communication key
p. 113
8.1.4.1
General
p. 113
8.1.4.2
Solution description
p. 113
8.1.5
Solution #8.1.5 Security between Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay based on the secure transfer of Direct Communication key generated using PC4a
p. 114
8.1.5.1
General
p. 114
8.1.5.2
Solution description
p. 116
8.1.6
Solution #8.1.6 Security between Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay using pre-shared key (PGK)
p. 117
8.1.6.1
General
p. 117
8.1.6.2
Solution description for the communication between Remote UE and UE-to-Network relay
p. 119
8.1.7
Solution #8.1.7: UE-Network Relay security using pre-allocated symmetric key
p. 122
8.1.7.1
Solution overview
p. 122
8.1.7.2
Security procedures
p. 122
8.1.7.2.1
General
p. 122
8.1.7.2.2
Procedure when PRUK is not recognized at PKMF
p. 124
8.1.7.2.3
Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Function
p. 126
8.1.7.2.4
Protection of traffic between UE and ProSe Key Management Function
p. 126
8.1.7.2.5
Protection of traffic between UEs
p. 126
8.1.8
Solution #8.1.8: UE-Network Relay security using normal GBA for direct communication key
p. 126
8.1.8.1
Solution overview
p. 126
8.1.8.2
Solution procedures
p. 126
8.1.9
Solution #8.1.9: UE-Network Relay security using normal GBA for transport of direct communication key
p. 127
8.1.9.1
Solution overview
p. 127
8.1.9.2
Solution procedures
p. 127
8.1.10
Solution #8.1.10: Security of Relay Service Code
p. 127
8.1.10.1
Solution description
p. 127
8.1.10.2
Security procedures
p. 127
8.1.11
Solution #8.1.11: Authentication and Key Agreement for one-to-one Communication between Remote UE and UE-Network Relay using identity-based cryptography
p. 128
8.1.11.1
General
p. 128
8.1.11.2
Secure One-2-One Communication between Remote UE and UE-Network Relay that follows ProSe UE-Network Relay Discovery with Model A
p. 128
8.1.11.3
Secure One-2-One Communication between Remote UE and UE-Network Relay that follows ProSe UE-Network Relay Discovery with Model B
p. 130
8.1.11.4
Solution Evaluation
p. 131
8.1.12
Solution #8.1.12 Security for UE-to-Network Relay using GBA and GBApush
p. 131
8.1.12.1
General
p. 131
8.1.12.2
Security procedure for UE-to-network relay security
p. 132
8.2
Solutions for one-to-one communications
p. 134
8.2.1
Solution for one-to-one communications with at least one UE in coverage
p. 134
8.2.1.1
Solution #8.2.1.1 Security for in coverage one-to-one direct communication using GBA for direct communication key
p. 134
8.2.1.1.1
General
p. 134
8.2.1.2
Solution #8.2.1.2 Security for in coverage one-to-one direct communication using GBA for transport of direct communication key
p. 136
8.2.1.2.1
General
p. 136
8.2.1.2.2
Solution description
p. 137
8.2.1.3
Solution #8.2.1.3: One to one security using GBA push for direct communication key
p. 139
8.2.1.3.1
Solution overview
p. 139
8.2.1.3.2
Solution procedures
p. 139
8.2.1.4
Solution #8.2.1.4: One to one security using GBA push for transport of direct communication key
p. 139
8.2.1.4.1
Solution overview
p. 139
8.2.1.4.2
Solution procedures
p. 139
8.2.1.5
Solution #8.2.1.5 Security for in coverage one-to-one direct communication and UE-to-Network Relay using GBA and GBApush
p. 139
8.2.1.5.1
General
p. 139
8.2.1.5.2
Security procedure for one-to-one security
p. 140
8.2.1.3.3
Bootstrapping re-negotiation request
p. 142
8.2.2
Solutions for one-to-one communications with both UEs out of coverage
p. 143
8.2.2.1
Solution #8.2.2.1 Authentication and Key Agreement for one-to-one ProSe communication using identity-based cryptography
p. 143
8.2.2.1.1
Secure One-2-One Communication that follows ProSe Group Member Discovery with Model A
p. 144
8.2.2.1.2
Secure one-to-one Communication that follows Group Member Discovery with Model B
p. 144
8.2.2.1.3
Secure one-to-one layer-2 link setup without prior Group Member discovery
p. 146
8.2.2.1.4
Solution Evaluation
p. 147
8.2.2.2
Solution #8.2.2.2: General security establishment for one-to-one communications
p. 147
8.2.2.2.1
Solution overview
p. 147
8.2.2.2.2
Solution description
p. 147
8.2.2.2.3
Security procedures
p. 148
8.2.2.2.3.2
Rekeying security
p. 150
8.2.2.2.4
Protection of the one-to-one traffic
p. 151
8.2.2.3
Solution #8.2.2.3: One-to-one communications using the group key
p. 152
8.2.2.3.1
Solution overview
p. 152
8.2.2.3.2
Security procedures
p. 152
8.2.3
Media layer solutions
p. 153
8.2.3.1
Solution #8.2.3.1: Media-plane security
p. 153
8.2.3.1.1
General
p. 153
8.2.3.1.2
Overview of solution
p. 153
8.3
Solutions for direct discovery (non-Public Safety)
p. 153
8.3.1
Solution #8.3.1: Authorisation for restricted ProSe direct discovery
p. 153
8.3.2
Solution #8.3.2: Security for restricted discovery
p. 153
8.3.2.1
General
p. 153
8.3.2.2
Tracking of UEs using restricted discovery announcements
p. 153
8.3.2.3
Protecting restricted discovery ProSe Codes
p. 153
8.3.2.4
Authorisation of a UE for restricted discovery
p. 154
8.3.2.5
Prevention of impersonation of a UE for restricted discovery
p. 155
8.3.3
Solution #8.3.3 ProSe Restricted Discovery in Model B with Match Report procedures initiated by Discoveree UE and Discoverer UE
p. 155
8.3.3.1
General
p. 155
8.3.3.2
Overview of solution
p. 155
8.3.3.3
Detailed signalling flows
p. 156
8.3.3.3.1
Discovery Request procedure of Discoverer UE and Discoveree UE
p. 156
8.3.3.3.2
Match Report procedure of Discoverer UE and Discoveree UE
p. 158
8.3.4
Solution #8.3.4: Integrity protection of the ProSe code for restricted discovery (Model A)
p. 159
8.3.4.1
General
p. 159
8.3.4.2
Solution description
p. 159
8.3.5
Solution #8.3.5 ProSe Restricted Discovery in Model B with Match Report procedure initiated by Discoverer UE only
p. 160
8.3.5.1
General
p. 160
8.3.5.2
Overview of solution
p. 160
8.3.5.3
Detailed signalling flows
p. 162
8.3.5.3.1
Discovery Request procedure of Discoverer UE and Discoveree UE
p. 162
8.3.5.3.2
Match Report procedure of Discoverer UE
p. 163
8.3.6
Solution #8.3.6 ProSe Restricted Discovery in Model B with local MIC Checking
p. 165
8.3.6.1
General
p. 165
8.3.6.2
Overview of solution
p. 165
8.3.6.3
Procedures
p. 167
8.3.6.3.1
Discovery Request procedure of Discoverer UE and Discoveree UE
p. 167
8.3.6.3.2
MIC Check procedures of Discoverer UE and Discoveree UE
p. 169
8.3.7
Solution #8.3.7: Security for Restricted ProSe Direct Discovery
p. 170
8.3.7.1
General
p. 170
8.3.7.2
Solution description
p. 170
8.3.8
Solution #8.3.8: Security for Restricted ProSe Direct Discovery (Model B)
p. 172
8.3.8.1
General
p. 172
8.3.8.2
Solution description
p. 172
8.3.8.3
Discoveree UE procedure
p. 173
8.3.8.4
Discoverer UE procedure before discovery
p. 174
8.3.8.5
Query procedure
p. 175
8.3.8.6
Match Report procedure for Discoverer UE
p. 176
8.3.8.7
Calculation of the MIC value
p. 177
8.3.9
Solution #8.3.9 Obtaining the security parameters needed for ProSe Restricted Discovery
p. 177
8.3.9.1
General
p. 177
8.3.9.2
Overview of solution
p. 178
8.3.9.3
Security procedures for model B
p. 178
8.3.9.4
Security procedures for model A
p. 179
8.3.10
Solution #8.3.10: Confidentiality of ProSe identifiers in PC5 interface
p. 181
8.3.10.1
New definitions specific to this solution
p. 181
8.3.10.2
General
p. 181
8.3.10.3
Solution details
p. 181
8.3.10.4
Distribution of Discovery Confidentiality Keys
p. 183
8.3.11
Solution #8.3.11 Protecting a Restricted Discovery Message (Model A and Model B)
p. 183
8.3.11.1
General
p. 183
8.3.11.2
Overview of solution
p. 183
8.3.11.3
Security procedures
p. 184
8.3.11.3.1
UE checked integrity
p. 184
8.3.11.3.2
Scrambling time-hashing
p. 185
8.3.11.3.3
Message specific confidentiality
p. 185
8.3.11.4
Processing of Discovery Message at the UEs
p. 186
8.3.11.5
ProSe Function control of used security
p. 187
8.3.12
Solution #8.3.12: Security for PC2 interface in Restricted Direct Discovery
p. 187
8.3.12.1
General
p. 187
8.3.12.2
Solution description
p. 187
8.3.14
Solution #8.3.14: Hint of scrambling key
p. 190
8.3.14.1
General
p. 190
8.3.14.2
Solution description
p. 190
8.3.15
Solution #8.3.15 Protecting a Restricted Discovery Message (Model A and Model B)
p. 191
8.3.15.1
General
p. 191
8.3.15.2
Overview of solution
p. 192
8.3.15.3
Security procedures
p. 193
8.3.15.3.1
UE checked integrity
p. 193
8.3.15.3.2
Scrambling time-hashing
p. 193
8.3.15.3.3
Message specific confidentiality
p. 194
8.3.15.4
Processing of Discovery Message at the UEs
p. 194
8.3.16
Solution #8.3.16: Masked UTC counter
p. 195
8.3.16.1
General
p. 195
8.3.16.2
Solution description
p. 195
8.4
Solutions for Direct Discovery (public safety use)
p. 196
8.4.1
Solution #8.4.1: Direct Discovery (public safety use)
p. 196
8.4.1.1
Security key for discovery message protection
p. 196
8.4.1.2
Discovery message protection mechanism
p. 196
8.4.2
Solution #8.4.2: Direct Discovery (public safety use)
p. 197
8.4.2.1
Authentication and Key Agreement for ProSe Direct Discovery using identity-based cryptography
p. 197
8.4.2.1.1
Provisioning Credential for ProSe Direct Discovery operation
p. 197
8.4.2.1.2
Authentication and Key Agreement for ProSe Direct Discovery operation
p. 198
8.4.3
Solution #8.4.3: Obtaining parameters for protection of Public Safety Group Member Discovery messages
p. 200
8.4.3.1
Solution overview
p. 200
8.4.3.2
Solution procedures
p. 200
8.4.3.2.1
Fetching the Keys from the PKMF
p. 200