Content for TR 33.820 Word version: 8.3.0
4 System architecture
5 Threats analysis
6 Security Requirements
7 Common Security mechanisms solutions for H(e)NB
8 Conclusions
A Security mechanisms for OAM
B TrE Types and Corresponding Interfaces
$ Change history
4 System architecture p. 9
4.1 General p. 9
4.2 System architecture of HNB p. 10
4.3 System architecture of HeNB p. 11
4.4 Overview of Security Architecture p. 11
5 Threats analysis p. 13
5.1 Common threats to H(e)NB p. 13
5.1.1 Threats List p. 13
5.1.2 Grouping of Threats p. 14
5.1.3 Threats p. 15
5.1.4 Threats Impact Overview p. 28
5.2 Specific HNB Threats p. 29
5.3 Specific HeNB Threats p. 29
6 Security Requirements p. 29
6.1 Common Requirements for H(e)NB p. 29
6.2 Specific Requirements for HeNB p. 31
6.3 Countermeasures for H(e)NB p. 31
7 Common Security mechanisms solutions for H(e)NB p. 36
7.1 H(e)NB Authentication Principle p. 36
7.2 Secure Storage and Execution p. 37
7.2.1 Hosting Party Module p. 37
7.2.2 Trusted Environment (TrE) p. 37
7.2.2.1 General p. 37
7.2.2.2 TrE Interfaces p. 38
7.2.2.2.1 General p. 38
7.2.2.2.2 TrE Interface Categories p. 38
7.2.2.3 H(e)NB Authentication p. 38
7.3 Comparison of H(e)NB Authentication Methods p. 39
7.4 Authentication Method Selection p. 39
7.5 Device Integrity Check p. 43
7.5.1 General p. 43
7.5.2 H(e)NB Validation p. 44
7.5.2.1 General p. 44
7.5.2.2 Autonomous Validation p. 44
7.5.2.3 Remote Validation p. 45
7.5.2.4 Semi-Autonomous Validation p. 45
7.5.2.5 Policy for H(e)NB Validation p. 47
7.5.2.6 Device Revalidation p. 48
7.5.2.7 Hybrid validation p. 48
7.5.3 Analysis of Device Integrity Validation p. 49
7.5.4 Study of Device Integrity Validation Methods p. 50
7.5.4.1 Terms of Reference p. 50
7.5.4.2 Scope of Study p. 51
7.5.4.3 Threat Analysis of Validation Methods p. 51
7.5.4.3.1 General p. 51
7.5.4.3.2 Security Requirements for AUv p. 51
7.5.4.3.3 Threats and Counter-Measures Applicable to AuV p. 51
7.5.4.3.4 Security Requirements Applicable to SAV p. 52
7.5.4.3.5 Threats and Counter-Measures Applicable to SAV p. 52
7.5.4.3.6 Analysis and Conclusions p. 53
7.5.4.4 Answers to Questions Concerning Autonomous Validation p. 53
7.5.4.5 Answers to Questions Concerning Semi Autonomous Validation p. 56
7.5.4.6 Answers to Questions Concerning Hybrid Validation p. 64
7.6 Authentication Implementation Options p. 66
7.6.1 Generic Authentication p. 66
7.6.1.1 General p. 66
7.6.1.2 EAP-AKA-based Client Authentication p. 66
7.6.1.2.1 General p. 66
7.6.1.2.2 Assumptions at H(e)NB p. 66
7.6.1.2.3 Assumptions for Storage of AKA Credential p. 67
7.6.1.2.4 Assumptions in Core Network p. 67
7.6.1.2.5 Authentication Flow p. 67
7.6.1.2.6 Impacts on Core Network p. 67
7.6.1.2.7 Authentication Identifier p. 67
7.6.1.3 Certificate-based Client Authentication p. 67
7.6.2 Device Authentication p. 69
7.6.3 Hosting Party Authentication p. 72
7.6.3.1 Bundled with the Device Authentication p. 72
7.6.3.2 Stand-alone Hosting Party Authentication p. 72
7.6.4 Relations to Trusted Environment p. 77
7.7 Backhaul Security Mechanisms p. 78
7.8 Location Locking mechanisms p. 79
7.8.1 Overview of Location Locking p. 79
7.8.2 Comparison Security of H(e)NB Location Identification Methods p. 79
7.8.3 Location Authentication p. 81
7.8.4 Location Authorisation p. 81
7.8.5 Solutions p. 81
7.8.5.1 Solution based on IP Address p. 82
7.8.5.2 Solution based on H(e)NB Reports of Neighbouring Macro-cells p. 84
7.8.5.3 Solution based on IP Address and H(e)NB Reports of Neighbouring Macro-cells p. 84
7.8.5.4 Solution based on UE Information p. 85
7.8.5.5 Solution based on UE information and H(e)NB Reports of Neighbouring Macro-cells p. 85
7.8.5.6 Solution based on (A-)GPS in H(e)NB p. 85
7.8.6 Re-locking of H(e)NB Location p. 85
7.8.7 H(e)NB Location Policy Options and Configuration p. 86
7.9 Access Control Mechanisms for H(e)NB p. 86
7.10 Security Mechanisms for OAM p. 88
7.11 Clock Synchronization Security Mechanisms for H(e)NB p. 88
7.11.1 General p. 88
7.11.2 Based on Secure Backhaul Link between H(e)NB and SeGW p. 88
7.11.3 Based on Security Protocols of the Clock Synchronization Protocols p. 89
7.12 H(e)NB Distress Indication p. 89
7.12.1 General Requirement p. 89
7.12.2 Distress Communication Function p. 89
7.12.3 H(e)NB Distress Indication Procedure using Distress Communication Function p. 89
7.12.4 Optional Procedure for Replacement of Normal Code Image Using Distress Communication Function p. 90
7.12.5 Requirements for Distress Communication Function and Distress Indication Message p. 90
8 Conclusions p. 91
A Security mechanisms for OAM p. 93
A.1 Mechanism to verify the software updates p. 93
A.2 Another method to verify the software updates p. 94
B TrE Types and Corresponding Interfaces p. 97
$ Change history p. 99
