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IETF
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Content for
TR 33.816
Word version: 10.0.0
1…
4…
10…
4
Relay Architecture
5
Threats
6
Requirements
7
Security Architecture
8
Security Procedures
9
Device Security
4
Relay Architecture
p. 10
5
Threats
p. 12
5.1
General
p. 12
5.2
Assumptions for threat analysis
p. 12
5.3
Security threats
p. 12
6
Requirements
p. 15
6.1
General Requirements
p. 15
6.2
Security Requirements
p. 15
6.3
Requirements on enrolment and RN start-up procedure
p. 16
6.3.1
General
p. 16
6.3.2
Enrolment
p. 16
6.3.3
Start of IPsec
p. 16
6.4
Access restrictions for the RN
p. 17
6.5
RN Management
p. 17
7
Security Architecture
p. 17
7.1
Security protection type for relay node on User UE's S1 interface and X2 interface
p. 17
7.1.1
Analysis
p. 17
7.1.2
Security protection architecture
p. 18
7.2
Security protection type for relay node about OAM communication
p. 18
7.2.1
Analysis
p. 18
7.2.2
Security protection architecture
p. 18
8
Security Procedures
p. 19
8.1
Analysis of Un interface security
p. 19
8.1.1
General aspect on Un security for Relay architecture
p. 19
8.1.2
Analysis of options for Un interface security
p. 19
8.1.2.1
Option 1: NDS/IP and AS security over the Un interface
p. 20
8.1.2.1.1
General
p. 20
8.1.2.1.2
Residual Threats for Option 1
p. 20
8.1.2.1.2.1
NDS/IP for all user plane traffic on Un
p. 20
8.1.2.1.2.2
NDS/IP for part of the user plane traffic on Un
p. 21
8.1.2.1.2.3
Conclusion of option 1
p. 21
8.1.2.2
Option 2: AS security over the Un interface
p. 21
8.1.2.2.1
General
p. 21
8.1.2.2.2
Residual Threats for Option 2
p. 22
8.1.2.3
Option 3: NDS/IP over the Un interface
p. 22
8.1.2.3.1
General
p. 22
8.1.2.3.2
Residual Threats for Option 3
p. 22
8.1.3
Comparison of Options
p. 22
8.2
Security for the RN NAS traffic
p. 23
8.3
Security for the RN RRC traffic
p. 23
8.4
Mutual Authentication
p. 23
8.5
Enrolment procedures for RNs
p. 23
8.6
Location verification
p. 24
8.7
Security handling in handover
p. 24
8.7.1
UE Handover scenario
p. 24
8.7.2
Security handling for UE Handover from/to RN
p. 25
8.7.2.1
General
p. 25
8.7.2.2
Security handling on the source node
p. 25
8.7.2.3
Security handling on the target node
p. 25
8.8
Analysis of key interaction on Un interface
p. 26
8.8.1
Key relationship on Un interface
p. 26
8.8.2
Analysis of the key interaction on Un interface
p. 26
8.9
Differentiation the RN and UE by the DeNB
p. 26
8.10
NAS signalling security
p. 27
8.11
Algorithm negotiation for RBs on Un interface
p. 27
9
Device Security
p. 28
9.1
Security requirements on Relay Nodes
p. 28
9.2
Device Integrity check
p. 29
9.3
RN Platform Validation
p. 29
9.4
UICC aspects
p. 29