Tech-
invite
3GPP
space
IETF
space
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
4‑5x
Content for
TS 33.246
Word version: 19.0.0
0…
4…
A…
A
Trust model
B
Security threats
C
MBMS security requirements
D
UICC-ME interface
E
MIKEY features not used in MBMS
F
MRK key derivation for ME based MBMS key management
G
HTTP based key management messages
H
Signalling flows for MSK procedures
I
Example of using MSKs and MTKs in MBMS
J
Mapping the MBMS security requirements into security functions and mechanism
K
SRTP features not used in MBMS
L
Multicasting MBMS user data on Iub
M
Relation to IMS based MBMS user services
N
GCSE security aspects
O
Security aspects of xMB reference point between Content Provider and BM-SC
$
Change history
A
Trust model
p. 42
B
Security threats
p. 43
B.1
Threats associated with attacks on the radio interface
p. 43
B.1.1
Unauthorised access to MBMS User Service data
p. 43
B.1.2
Threats to integrity
p. 43
B.1.3
Denial of service attacks
p. 43
B.1.4
Unauthorised access to MBMS User Services
p. 43
B.1.5
Privacy violation
p. 44
B.2
Threats associated with attacks on other parts of the system
p. 44
B.2.1
Unauthorised access to data
p. 44
B.2.2
Threats to integrity
p. 44
B.2.3
Denial of service
p. 44
B.2.4
A malicious UE generating MTKs for malicious use later on
p. 44
B.2.5
Unauthorised insertion of MBMS user data and key management data
p. 45
C
(Normative) MBMS security requirements
p. 46
C.1
Requirements on security service access
p. 46
C.1.1
Requirements on secure service access
p. 46
C.1.2
Requirements on secure service provision
p. 46
C.2
Requirements on MBMS Transport Service signalling protection
p. 46
C.3
Requirements on Privacy
p. 46
C.4
Requirements on MBMS Key Management
p. 47
C.5
Requirements on integrity protection of MBMS User Service data
p. 47
C.6
Requirements on confidentiality protection of MBMS User Service data
p. 48
C.7
Requirements on content provider to BM-SC reference point
p. 48
D
(Normative) UICC-ME interface
p. 49
D.1
MSK Update Procedure
p. 49
D.2
Void
D.3
MTK generation and validation
p. 49
D.4
MSK deletion procedure
p. 50
D.5
MUK deletion procedure
p. 50
E
MIKEY features not used in MBMS
p. 51
F
(Normative) MRK key derivation for ME based MBMS key management
p. 52
G
(Normative) HTTP based key management messages
p. 53
G.1
Introduction
p. 53
G.2
Key management procedures
p. 53
G.2.1
MBMS User Service Registration
p. 53
G.2.2
MBMS User Service Deregistration
p. 54
G.2.3
MSK request
p. 54
G.2.4
Error situations
p. 55
H
Signalling flows for MSK procedures
p. 57
H.1
Scope of signalling flows
p. 57
H.2
Signalling flows demonstrating a successful MSK request procedure
p. 57
H.2.1
Successful MSK request procedure
p. 57
I
Example of using MSKs and MTKs in MBMS
p. 61
J
Mapping the MBMS security requirements into security functions and mechanism
p. 62
J.1
Consistency check
p. 62
J.1.1
Requirements on secure service access
p. 62
J.1.2
Requirements on MBMS transport Service signalling protection
p. 62
J.1.3
Requirements on Privacy
p. 63
J.1.4
Requirements on MBMS Key Management
p. 63
J.1.5
Requirements on integrity protection of MBMS User Service data
p. 64
J.1.6
Requirements on confidentiality protection of MBMS User Service data
p. 64
J.1.7
Requirements on content provider to BM-SC reference point
p. 65
J.2
Conclusions
p. 65
K
SRTP features not used in MBMS
p. 66
L
(Normative) Multicasting MBMS user data on Iub
p. 67
M
Relation to IMS based MBMS user services
p. 68
N
(Normative) GCSE security aspects
p. 69
N.0
GCSE architecture and requirements
p. 69
N.1
GCSE security requirements
p. 69
N.1.1
General
p. 69
N.1.2
GCSE Broadcast Delivery specific security requirements
p. 69
N.2
Security solution for MB2-C interface
p. 69
N.3
Security solution for MB2-U interface
p. 70
O
(Normative) Security aspects of xMB reference point between Content Provider and BM-SC
p. 71
O.1
General
p. 71
O.2
Protection of the xMB reference point
p. 71
$
Change history
p. 72