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TR 33.890
Study on Security support for Next Generation Real Time Communication services

3GPP‑Page  
V18.0.0 (Wzip)  2023/06  23 p.
Rapporteur:
Mr. Li, Fei
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd.

full Table of Contents for  TR 33.890  Word version:  18.0.0

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1 Scope  2 References  3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations  4 Assumptions  5 Key issues  6 Proposed solutions  7 Conclusions  $ Change history 

 

1  Scope  p. 6

The present document studies security aspects for any potential enhancements based on the ongoing study in TR 23.700-87. For each of the key issues in the scope of the SA WG2 study, the security aspects that are to be covered in this study are as follows:
  • Analysing the potential security aspects on how to verify and authorize the 3rd party specific identity information during a call both on originating and terminating sides.
  • Analysing potential security impacts from supporting service-based architecture in IMS media control interfaces.
  • Analysing potential security aspects to support Data Channel usage in IMS network.
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2  References  p. 6

3  Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations  p. 6

3.1  Terms  p. 6

3.2  Symbols  p. 7

3.3  Abbreviations  p. 7

4  Assumptions  p. 7

5  Key issues  p. 7

5.1  Key issue #1: Third party specific user identities  p. 7

5.1.1  Key issue details  p. 7

5.1.2  Threats  p. 7

5.1.3  Potential security requirements  p. 7

5.2  Key issue #2: Security aspects of Data Channel usage in IMS network  p. 8

5.2.1  Key issue details  p. 8

5.2.2  Security threats  p. 8

5.2.3  Potential security requirements  p. 8

5.3  Key issue #3: security aspects of SBA in IMS media control plane  p. 8

5.3.1  Key issue details  p. 8

5.3.2  Security threats  p. 8

5.3.3  Potential security requirements  p. 8

6  Proposed solutions  p. 9

6.0  Mapping of solutions to key issues  p. 9

6.1  Solution #1: How the Originating IMS network signs the 3rd party IDs and terminating IMS network verifies the 3rd party IDs  p. 9

6.1.1  Introduction  p. 9

6.1.2  Solution details  p. 9

6.1.2.1  Solution Description  p. 9

6.1.2.2  How Originating IMS network invokes the signing on behalf of 3rd party (SIP trunk)  p. 11

6.1.2.3  How Originating IMS network invokes the signing on behalf of 3rd party (Single SIP registration)  p. 12

6.1.3  Evaluation  p. 14

6.2  Solution #2: SHAKEN based third-party specific user identities  p. 14

6.2.1  Introduction  p. 14

6.2.2  Solution details  p. 14

6.2.2.1  General procedures  p. 14

6.2.2.2  Alternative authorisation procedure  p. 16

6.2.3  Evaluation  p. 16

6.3  Solution #3: Service based interface protection in media control plane  p. 16

6.3.1  Introduction  p. 16

6.3.2  Solution details  p. 16

6.3.2.1  Protection at the network or transport layer  p. 16

6.3.2.2  Authentication and authorization  p. 16

6.3.3  Evaluation  p. 16

6.4  Solution #4: End-to-access-edge security for IMS data channels  p. 16

6.4.1  Introduction  p. 16

6.4.2  Solution details  p. 16

6.4.3  Evaluation  p. 17

6.5  Solution #5: How to avoid e2ae limitation and achieve e2e security for IMS Data Channel  p. 17

6.5.1  Introduction  p. 17

6.5.2  Solution details  p. 18

6.5.2.1  Solution Description  p. 18

6.5.3  Evaluation  p. 19

7  Conclusions  p. 19

7.1  Conclusion on Key Issue #3  p. 19

7.2  Conclusion on Key Issue #2  p. 19

7.3  Conclusions for Key Issue #1  p. 19

$  Change history  p. 20

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