UE and HA can use the IKEv2 CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange procedure to create a child security association to be used to provide integrity protection, confidentiality protection or both, to all data traffic exchanged within the DSMIPv6 tunnel. The procedure can be initiated by the HA or by the UE at any time after the security association between UE and HA has been set up. If both UE and HA independently decide to initiate the child security association establishment, the procedure described in
RFC 5996 applies. The profiles for tunnel mode IPsec ESP are defined in
TS 33.402.
After establishing the IPsec security association with the HA as described in
subclause 5.1.2.2, the UE may initiate the creation of child security association pair to provide integrity protection, confidentiality protection or both. If the UE determines that the trust relationship of the non-3GPP access network is "untrusted" (see
TS 24.302), the UE shall not initiate the creation of child security association. If the UE initiates the creation of child security association pair, the UE shall send to the HA a CREATE_CHILD_SA request as described in
RFC 4877 and
RFC 5996 with the following additions:
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the content of the Security Association payload is set accordingly for integrity protection, confidentiality protection or both as indicated in RFC 5996 using the IPsec profiles defined in TS 33.402; and
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the TSi shall contain all the Home Network Prefix assigned to the UE. If prefix delegation is used, the TSi shall also contain all the prefix(es) provided to the UE. If the UE received an IPv4 Home Address, the TSi shall also contain the IPv4 Home Address.
When the UE receives a CREATE_CHILD_SA request from the HA with selectors indicating the DSMIPv6 tunnel traffic, if the UE supports integrity protection, confidentiality protection or both, the UE shall reply with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response selecting the preferred transform proposed by the HA as specified in
RFC 5996.
If the child SA is created successfully, the UE shall start encapsulating all the uplink packets in the DSMIPv6 tunnel in an IPsec ESP tunnel as negotiated with the HA during the CREATE_CHILD_SA procedure.
The UE can stop using integrity protection, confidentiality protection or both, for the DSMIPv6 tunnel traffic. In order to do that, the UE shall delete the respective child security association by sending an INFORMATIONAL request message including the DELETE payload as specified in
RFC 5996.
After establishing the IPsec security association with the UE as described in
subclause 5.1.3.1, the HA may initiate the creation of child security association pair to provide integrity protection, confidentiality protection or both. If the HA receives the trust relationship indication as "untrusted" from the 3GPP AAA server during the authentication and authorization procedure or the authorization procedure (see
TS 29.273), the HA shall not initiate the creation of child security association procedure. If the trust relationship indication is not received, the initiation of the creation of the child security association is implementation dependent (e.g. based on configuration). If the HA initiates the creation of child security association pair, the HA shall send to the UE a CREATE_CHILD_SA request as described in
RFC 4877 and
RFC 5996 with the following additions:
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the content of the Security Association payload is set accordingly for integrity protection, confidentiality protection or both as indicated in RFC 5996 using the IPsec profiles defined in TS 33.402; and
-
the TSi shall contain all the Home Network Prefix assigned to the UE. If prefix delegation is used, the TSi shall also contain all the prefix(es) provided to the UE. If the UE received an IPv4 Home Address, the TSi shall also contain the IPv4 Home Address.
When the HA receives a CREATE_CHILD_SA request from the UE with selectors indicating the DSMIPv6 tunnel traffic, if the HA supports integrity protection, confidentiality protection or both, the HA shall check whether the child security association establishment can be accepted or not. If the HA receives the trust relationship indication set to "untrusted" indication from the 3GPP AAA server (see
TS 29.273), the HA shall reject the child security association establishment by using the NOTIFY payload of type "NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS" in the CREATE_CHILD_SA response. If HA does not receive the trust relationship indication, whether to accept or reject the child security association is implementation dependent. Otherwise, the HA shall reply with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response selecting the preferred transform proposed by the HA as specified in
RFC 5996.
If the child SA is created successfully, the HA shall start encapsulating, all the uplink packets in the DSMIPv6 tunnel in an IPsec ESP tunnel as negotiated with the UE during the CREATE_CHILD_SA procedure.
The HA can stop using integrity protection, confidentiality protection or both, for the DSMIPv6 tunnel traffic. In order to do that, the HA shall delete the respective child security association by sending an INFORMATIONAL request message including the DELETE payload as specified in
RFC 5996.