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4‑5x
Content for
TS 24.008
Word version: 18.6.0
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4.2…
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9.3…
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10.5.4
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4.3
MM common procedures
4.3.1
TMSI reallocation procedure
4.3.2
Authentication procedure
4.3.2a
Authentication procedure used for a UMTS authentication challenge
4.3.2b
Authentication Procedure used for a GSM authentication challenge
4.3.3
Identification procedure
4.3.4
IMSI detach procedure
4.3.5
Abort procedure
4.3.6
MM information procedure
...
4.3
MM common procedures
p. 88
4.3.1
TMSI reallocation procedure
p. 88
4.3.1.0
General
|R14|
p. 88
4.3.1.1
TMSI reallocation initiation by the network
p. 89
4.3.1.2
TMSI reallocation completion by the mobile station
p. 89
4.3.1.3
TMSI reallocation completion in the network.
p. 89
4.3.1.4
Abnormal cases in the mobile station
p. 89
4.3.1.5
Abnormal cases on the network side
|R12|
p. 90
4.3.2
Authentication procedure
p. 90
4.3.2a
Authentication procedure used for a UMTS authentication challenge
p. 90
4.3.2b
Authentication Procedure used for a GSM authentication challenge
p. 91
4.3.2.1
Authentication request by the network
p. 91
4.3.2.2
Authentication response by the mobile station
p. 91
4.3.2.3
Authentication processing in the network
p. 92
4.3.2.3a
128-bit circuit-switched GSM ciphering key
|R9|
p. 92
4.3.2.4
Ciphering key sequence number
p. 92
4.3.2.5
Authentication not accepted by the network
p. 93
4.3.2.5.1
Authentication not accepted by the MS
p. 94
4.3.2.6
Abnormal cases
p. 95
4.3.2.6.1
MS behaviour towards a network that has failed the authentication procedure
p. 97
4.3.2.7
Handling of keys at intersystem change from Iu mode to A/Gb mode
p. 97
4.3.2.7a
Use of established security contexts
p. 98
4.3.2.8
Handling of keys at intersystem change from A/Gb mode to Iu mode
p. 99
4.3.2.9
Void
4.3.2.10
Derivation of keys at SRVCC or vSRVCC handover from S1 mode
|R8|
p. 100
4.3.2.10.0
General
|R11|
p. 100
4.3.2.10.1
PDN connection with integrity protection
|R9|
p. 100
4.3.2.10.2
PDN connection without integrity protection
|R9|
p. 100
4.3.2.11
Derivation of keys at SRVCC handover from Iu mode to Iu mode
|R8|
p. 100
4.3.2.11.1
PDN connection with integrity protection
|R9|
p. 100
4.3.2.11.2
PDN connection without integrity protection
|R9|
p. 101
4.3.2.12
Derivation of keys at SRVCC handover from Iu mode to A/Gb mode
|R8|
p. 102
4.3.2.12.1
PDN connection with integrity protection
|R9|
p. 102
4.3.2.12.2
PDN connection without integrity protection
|R9|
p. 103
4.3.2.13
Derivation of keys at CS to PS SRVCC handover from A/Gb mode to Iu mode
|R11|
p. 103
4.3.2.14
Derivation of keys at 5G-SRVCC from NG-RAN to UTRAN
|R16|
p. 105
4.3.2.14.1
PDU session with integrity protection
p. 105
4.3.2.14.2
PDU session without integrity protection
p. 105
4.3.3
Identification procedure
p. 105
4.3.3.0
General
|R14|
p. 105
4.3.3.1
Identity request by the network
p. 105
4.3.3.2
Identification response by the mobile station
p. 105
4.3.3.3
Abnormal cases in the mobile station
p. 106
4.3.3.4
Abnormal cases on the network side
|R14|
p. 106
4.3.4
IMSI detach procedure
p. 106
4.3.4.0
General
|R10|
p. 106
4.3.4.1
IMSI detach initiation by the mobile station
p. 107
4.3.4.2
IMSI detach procedure in the network
p. 107
4.3.4.3
IMSI detach completion by the mobile station
p. 107
4.3.4.4
Abnormal cases
p. 107
4.3.5
Abort procedure
p. 108
4.3.5.1
Abort procedure initiation by the network
p. 108
4.3.5.2
Abort procedure in the mobile station
p. 108
4.3.6
MM information procedure
p. 108
4.3.6.1
MM information procedure initiation by the network
p. 108
4.3.6.2
MM information procedure in the mobile station
p. 109