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Content for
TR 22.857
Word version: 6.0.0
1…
4…
4
Current Situation
5
Reusable technology: An alternate approach
6
Integrating the Runtime Independent Framework into the Current MExE Specification
7
Additional open issues
8
Out of scope issues
9
Conclusion
A
Generic MExE Security
$
Change history
4
Current Situation
p. 7
4.1
Delaying new technology adoption into 3GPP
p. 7
4.2
Unbounded specification growth
p. 7
4.3
Inefficient use of 3GPP technical resources
p. 7
4.4
Uncertain implementation requirements
p. 8
4.5
Potential fragmentation of the application market
p. 8
4.6
Unclear technology requirements for classmarks
p. 8
4.7
Summary of current situation
p. 9
5
Reusable technology: An alternate approach
p. 9
5.1
Security infrastructure
p. 9
5.1.1
Security model
p. 10
5.1.1.1
Application isolation
p. 10
5.1.1.2
Domain definitions
p. 10
5.1.1.3
User permission types
p. 11
5.1.1.4
Control of application connections and network activity
p. 11
5.1.2
Certificates and certificate management
p. 11
5.1.2.1
Certificate format requirements
p. 11
5.1.2.2
Domain-based certificate requirements
p. 11
5.1.2.3
Certificate chain structure and authorization
p. 11
5.1.2.4
Certification Configuration Message (CCM)
p. 12
5.1.2.5
Handling of root public key stored on an installed security device
p. 12
5.1.3
Administrator role
p. 12
5.2
Service environment
p. 12
5.2.1
Capability negotiation
p. 13
5.2.2
Provisioning
p. 13
5.2.3
Management requirements
p. 13
5.3
Core software update
p. 13
5.4
Provisioning a runtime environment
p. 13
5.5
Multiple execution environment support
p. 13
6
Integrating the Runtime Independent Framework into the Current MExE Specification
p. 14
6.1
RTIF conformance requirements
p. 14
6.1.1
Runtime generic requirements
p. 14
6.1.2
Runtime mapping requirements
p. 14
6.2
UAProf extensions
p. 15
6.3
Other MExE specification changes
p. 16
6.3.1
RTIF conformance
p. 16
6.3.2
Multiple execution environment and runtime support
p. 16
7
Additional open issues
p. 16
7.1
Binding executables to certificates and metadata
p. 16
7.2
Root key certificate packaging and metadata
p. 17
7.3
Handling of existing MExE classmarks
p. 17
8
Out of scope issues
p. 17
9
Conclusion
p. 18
A
Generic MExE Security
p. 19
A.1
Introduction
p. 19
A.2
MExE executable integrity
p. 19
A.2.1
Full signature verification
p. 20
A.2.2
Optimised pre-launch signature verification
p. 20
A.3
MExE executable permissions
p. 20
A.3.1
MExE executable permissions for operator, manufacturer and third party security domains
p. 20
A.3.2
MExE executable permissions for untrusted MExE executables
p. 23
A.4
Handling of MExE executables when their valid root public key is not available
p. 25
A.4.1
Launching of MExE executables when their valid RPK is not available
p. 25
A.4.2
Currently executing secure MExE executables when their valid RPK is no longer available
p. 25
A.5
User permission types
p. 25
A.6
Root Public keys
p. 26
A.6.1
Operator root public key
p. 26
A.6.1.1
Caching of root public keys
p. 27
A.6.1.2
MExE device actions on detection of valid (U)SIM application and/or power up
p. 27
A.6.2
Manufacturer root public key
p. 29
A.6.3
Third party root public key
p. 29
A.7
Certification and authorisation architecture
p. 30
A.7.1
Certification requirements
p. 30
A.7.1.1
MExE terminal requirements for certificate processing
p. 30
A.7.2
Certification administration requirements
p. 31
A.7.3
Example certification process
p. 31
A.7.4
Certificate Chain Verification
p. 32
A.8
Usage of Signed Content
p. 34
A.8.1
Example of sSigned packages used for installation
p. 34
A.8.2
Installation of root certificates in a signed data package
p. 35
6.8.3
Installation of other signed data
p. 36
A.9
Certificate fFormat
p. 36
A.9.1
Certificate extension for removal of network access
p. 36
A.9.1.1
X.509 version 3
p. 36
A.10
Certificate management
p. 36
A.10.1
Certificate configuration message (CCM)
p. 37
A.10.1.1
CCM numbering convention
p. 40
A.10.1.2
CCM order of transmission
p. 40
A.10.1.3
CCM field mapping convention
p. 40
A.10.1.4
Authorised CCM download mechanisms
p. 40
A.11
Separation of I/O streams
p. 41
6.12
Core software download
p. 41
A.13
Administrator Concept
p. 41
A.13.1
Administrator root public key
p. 41
A.13.2
Provisioned mechanism for designating administrative responsibilities and adding third parties in a MExE device
p. 42
A.13.3
MExE administrator determination mechanism
p. 42
A.13.3.1
Determining the administrator of the MExE device
p. 42
A.13.3.2
Determining the administrator of the MExE device, for MExE-(U)SIM supporting third party certificates
p. 43
A.13.3.2.1
Administrator of the MExE device is the user
p. 43
A.13.3.2.2
Administrator of the MExE device is not the user
p. 44
A.13.4
Administrator root certificate download mechanism
p. 45
$
Change history
p. 46