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TR 33.882
Study on Personal IoT Networks Security aspects

3GPP‑Page  
V18.0.1 (Wzip)  2023/06  26 p.
Rapporteur:
Mr. Xie, Zhenhua
vivo Mobile Communication Co.,

full Table of Contents for  TR 33.882  Word version:  18.0.1

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1 Scope  2 References  3 Definitions of terms and abbreviations  4 Assumptions  5 Key issues  6 Proposed solutions  7 Conclusions  $ Change history 

 

1  Scope  p. 7

The present document studies how 5G security architecture and procedures can be enhanced to support Personal IoT Network. The aim of the present document is to study the security aspects of Personal IoT Networks for any potential enhancements in alignment with the outcome of SA2 study in TR 23.700-88. The study will look at the following aspects, performing gap analysis where necessary:
  1. Study potential security enhancements for authentications required to secure Personal IoT Networks.
  2. Study the security protection and access control for communications required to secure Personal IoT Networks.
  3. Study the security enhancements for privacy required to secure Personal IoT Networks.
  4. Other security aspects for any potential enhancements in alignment with the outcome of SA2 study in TR 23.700-88.
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2  References  p. 7

3  Definitions of terms and abbreviations  p. 7

3.1  Terms  p. 7

3.2  Abbreviations  p. 8

4  Assumptions  p. 8

5  Key issues  p. 8

5.1  Key Issue #1: Authentication and authorization for PINE  p. 8

5.1.1  Key issue details  p. 8

5.1.2  Security threats  p. 8

5.1.3  Potential security requirements  p. 8

5.2  Key Issue #2: Authorization of PIN capabilities  p. 9

5.2.1  Key issue details  p. 9

5.2.2  Security threats  p. 9

5.2.3  Potential security requirements  p. 9

6  Proposed solutions  p. 9

6.1  Mapping of solutions to key issues  p. 9

6.2  Solution #1: PINE authentication and authorization  p. 10

6.2.1  Introduction  p. 10

6.2.2  Solution details  p. 10

6.2.3  Evaluation  p. 11

6.3  Solution #2: PINE authentication by AAA over 5G CP  p. 11

6.3.1  Introduction  p. 11

6.3.2  Solution details  p. 11

6.3.3  Evaluation  p. 12

6.4  Solution #3: Authentication for PIN elements involving SMF  p. 12

6.4.1  Introduction  p. 12

6.4.2  Solution details  p. 13

6.4.3  Evaluation  p. 14

6.5  Solution #4: PEGC/PEMC and PINE Authentication and Authorization  p. 14

6.5.1  Introduction  p. 14

6.5.2  Solution details  p. 15

6.5.2.1  General  p. 15

6.5.2.2  PEGC/PEMC authentication and/or authorization procedure  p. 15

6.5.2.3  PINE authentication and/or authorization procedure  p. 16

6.5.3  Evaluation  p. 16

6.6  Solution #5: EAP-based PINE authentication  p. 17

6.6.1  Introduction  p. 17

6.6.2  Solution details  p. 17

6.6.3  Evaluation  p. 18

6.7  Solution #6: Authorization on AF manipulating PIN  p. 18

6.7.1  Introduction  p. 18

6.7.2  Solution details  p. 18

6.7.3  Evaluation  p. 18

6.8  Solution #7: Authentication and Authorization of PINE Elements  p. 19

6.8.1  Introduction  p. 19

6.8.2  Solution details  p. 19

6.8.3  Evaluation  p. 20

6.9  Solution #8: AF authorization in PIN scenarios  p. 20

6.9.1  Introduction  p. 20

6.9.2  Solution details  p. 20

6.9.3  Evaluation  p. 20

6.10  Solution #9: PIN AF authorization for accessing the UDR  p. 21

6.10.1  Introduction  p. 21

6.10.2  Solution details  p. 21

6.10.3  Evaluation  p. 21

6.11  Solution #10: Local Authentication and Authorization of PINE  p. 21

6.11.1  Introduction  p. 21

6.11.2  Solution details  p. 21

6.11.2.1  Architecture  p. 21

6.11.2.2  Procedures  p. 23

6.11.3  Evaluation  p. 24

6.12  Solution #11: UDM based AF authorization mechanism for PIN scenarios  p. 24

6.12.1  Introduction  p. 24

6.12.2  Solution details  p. 24

6.12.3  Evaluation  p. 24

7  Conclusions  p. 25

7.1  Conclusions for KI#1  p. 25

$  Change history  p. 26

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